CLEAVAGES, ORGANIZED INTERESTS, AND PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND JAPAN

An analysis of the relationship between labor unions, minority organizations, cleavages, and parties

by
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For Hitomi

Abstract

This project focuses on the relationship between cleavages, political parties, and interest groups in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Despite very different political and institutional characteristics – two-party, multi-party, and dominant-party systems; the German neo-corporatist state, the Japanese "developmental state," and the U.S. pluralist limited state – all of them suffer increasingly from problems of disaffection of the electorate with political parties and elections.

I explore the question in how far political parties actually represent the demands of cleavage-based constituencies as embodied by extra-electoral organized interests, how this relationship changed over time, and in how far institutional differences in government-interest group embeddedness may account for this. In particular, I am analyzing and comparing time-series data for political parties, union federations and minority organizations, by employing content analysis software in order to process data reaching back as far as five decades.

As a theoretical framework I reapply social cleavage theory in a way that both parties and extra-electoral forms of political participation are included. One of the elements that make this project unique, is this approach that permits a comparison of political parties and extra-electoral political organizations within the same theoretical and methodological framework. This framework enables me to explore the changing relationship between the programmatic language of party manifestos and organized interests' programmatic texts.

In addition to case specific insights my project will not only provide a contribution to theory on the relationship between political cleavages, parties, and organized interests, but it will also yield a basis for recommendations on how to make political parties more responsive to the demands of cleavage-based organized interests. This project may be particularly useful for

fledgling democracies in the early stages of state building, and studies focused on the interaction between political parties and interest group organizations.

First reader: Professor Richard S. Katz

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List of Abbreviations

AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
BAGIV**:** Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände (Federal working community of immigrant organizations)
BLHRRI (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute)
BLL: Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei)
BLRI: Buraku Liberation Research Institute
CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland (Christian-democratic union Germany)
CHONGRYON: Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)
Churitsu Roren: Federation of Independent Labor Unions
CGD: Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands (Christian union federation)
CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian-social union in Bavaria)
CTW: Change to Win
DBB: Deutscher Beamtenbund und Tarifunion (German public service and tariff union)
DC: Washington District of Columbia
DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Labor Union Federation)
DITIB: Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği (Turkish Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs)
Dōmei: Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Japan Confederation of Labour)
Dōwa: Assimilation Projects/Policies (dōwa taisaku jigyō)
DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutō)
EU: European Union
FDGB: Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German union federation)
FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FPTP: First past the post
FRG: Federal Republic of Germany (BRD Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
GDR: German Democratic Republic (DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik)
JAW: Confederation of Japanese Automobile Workers' Unions
JCP: Japanese Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsan-tō)
JSP: see SDP
JMIAC: Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
KOMKAR: Union of Kurdish organizations (Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistanê li Ewrûpa - Verband der Vereine aus Kurdistan)
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyūminshutō)
LGBTQ: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
LULAC: League of United Latin American Citizens
MALDEF: Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
MINDAN: Zai-Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan)
MINTOHREN: Minzoku Sabetsu to Tatakau Renraku Kyogikai (National Council for Combating Discrimination Against Ethnic Peoples in Japan)
MRG/CMP/MARPOR: Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project/Manifesto Research on Political Representation
NAACP: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NCLR: National Council of La Raza
NK: New Komei (Kōmeitō; Justice and Fairness Party)
NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National democratic party of Germany)
NPN: New Party Nippon (Shintō Nippon)
NRA: National Rifle Association
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PDS/Die Linke: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of democratic Socialism/The Left)
RAF: Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Fraction)
PNP: People's New Party (Kokumin Shintō)
PR: Proportional Representation
PSC-CVP: Parti Social Chrétien – Christelijke Volkspartij (Belgian Christian-democratic party)
RENGO: Rengō –Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai (Japanese Trade Union Confederation)
RTS: Rat der Türkeistämmigen Bürger (Council of Turkish-rooted citizens)
SDP(J): successor JSP; Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu-tō)
SNTV: Single Non Transferable Vote
Sōhyō: Nihon Rōdōkumiai Souhyogika (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan)
SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Socialdemocratic Party Germany)
StAG: Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality/Citizenship Law)
TGD: Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish Community in Germany)
UA ZENSEN: Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical Food, Commercial Service and General Worker's Unions
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.: United States of America; USA
Ver.di: Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (United Service provider union)
WASG: Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (Work and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative)
YP: Your Party (Minna no Tō)
Zenkairen: National Coalition of Buraku Liberation
ZENROKYO: Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai Renraku Kyōgi-kai (National Trade Union Council)
ZENROREN: Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai sōrengō (National Confederation of Trade Unions)

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Chapter One: Identity-Interest organizations and unresponsive parties.

Introduction

This project focuses on the relationship between cleavages, political parties, and interest groups in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Despite very different political and institutional characteristics – two-party, multi-party, and dominant-party systems; the German neo-corporatist state, the Japanese "developmental state," and the U.S. pluralist limited state – all of them suffer increasingly from problems of disaffection of the electorate with political parties and elections.

I explore the question in how far political parties actually represent the demands of cleavage-based constituencies as embodied by extra-electoral organized interests, how this relationship changed over time, and in how far institutional differences in government-interest group embeddedness may account for this. In particular, I am analyzing and comparing time-series data for political parties, union federations and minority organizations, by employing content analysis software in order to process data reaching back as far as five decades.

Within established democracies across the globe, several divisions within society based on distinct group identities such as race, ethnicity, or class, dictate the shape in which politics become defined. In some countries such as Belgium or Canada, a linguistic divide can seem to be the most politically salient sociological division. In other societies, the division of the means of production becomes the most salient division, creating long-lasting, class-based group identities. The fierce competition between poor masses and wealthier upper classes in Latin-American politics is but one example of such a divide. And in yet other countries, politics may revolve around the involvement of religion in the state. Furthermore, combinations of these divides are

possible as well, leading to divisions within divisions. These types of divisions are often referred to as social cleavages.

In many cases, these cleavages also tend to find their reflection in party politics. Some countries' party systems will originate in part from the divisions between the poor masses and the wealthier elites that emerged in the industrial era. In other cases, linguistic or ethnic divides may become factors influencing the origins of parties. However, in some cases, the electoral system, or the moment in which parties were created – for example, the time prior to the industrial revolution – may result in the absence of such cleavages, which then actually may come into existence within society after the formation of a party system. Some electoral systems may appear to be more conducive to more accurately reflecting social cleavages, while other mechanisms may result in an imperfect reflection. A good example of an imperfect reflection of cleavages in a party system is the absence of something resembling an African-American or Latino party in U.S. politics despite the fact that race is historically one of the most divisive issues in U.S. politics, if not *the* most divisive issue. Obviously, while the U.S. is a relatively straightforward example of how important divisions within a society aren't as visible in a party landscape; many other countries' party and electoral systems will also have an effect of obfuscating these highly politicized divisions known as social cleavages. One consequence of the increasing invisibility of social cleavages in party politics may be that voters increasingly stay home during elections. The U.S. voter turnout during the 2014 midterm election, for example, was the lowest since World War II. (McDonald/U.S. Election Project 2014) Even those countries with comparatively high election turnouts are faced with unprecedented drops, such as Japan's 2014 election for the Lower House of the Diet. The same is true for most other established democracies.

The absence of such cleavages in party politics thus doesn't necessarily mean the absence of such cleavages in society. Instead, it is highly likely that such cleavages become visible through other forms of political organization. The most extreme cases would be attacks committed by terrorist organizations, as in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, where the institutions of democratic governance, particularly the majoritarian party system, were ill-equipped to deal with the division. In most cases, however, social cleavages ignored by party politics or those that gradually become ignored by party politics will be visible through extra-electoral forms of political organizations, such as labor unions and minority advocacy groups.

This project was inspired by the literature addressing the increasing inability of political parties in recent decades to adequately express the aforementioned divides, or social cleavages; not echoing the demands of the people causes increased levels of disaffection of the electorate. As previously mentioned, most modern democracies evolved from societies in which these social cleavages dictated the respective political divisions within a country, often before the general population was involved in the political process. With the advent of modern nation-states, the masses gradually became politically involved through the advent of social mass movements. In many countries, political parties eventually became the main expression of social cleavages in politics. I assert that while political parties at some point and in some place *may* have been the most adequate organizational translation of the public's demands as incarnated through social cleavages, as institutions, they may not have an enduring capacity to do so.

In particular, I address the failure of the literature, which applies the concept of political cleavages in a truncated way by identifying cleavages entirely with parties, to the exclusion of extra-electoral forms of political organization, particularly interest organizations. Parties, as opposed to other forms of political mass organizations, have a tendency to become deeply

institutionalized into the state framework, thereby eroding their ability to adequately fulfill one of their most important functions: representation.

Furthermore, I contend that particular interest groups – which I will define below as identity-interest groups – remain a much better repository of cleavage translation than parties, especially when parties are unresponsive to cleavages. Understanding how parties become or remain unresponsive is of utmost importance if democracies are to remain viable and in line with ideals of representation. To keep democracy functional, party programs should be more in line with the needs of the people. Even if I were to subscribe to the elitist view that parties should moderate more radical demands from the population attributed to ignorance or a mob mentality, parties still would be intended to serve the needs or interests of the people. A first step to accomplish that is to analyze parties' unresponsiveness and what relationships look like between parties and extra-electoral political organizations.[1] To address the question of what is causing this dysfunctionality of representation; this project examines common trends between two categories of the most tractable social movement organization types: political parties and identity-interest groups. To do this, I will compare the programmatic content of party manifestos spanning several decades with programmatic documents of major interest groups representing

[1] Long term time-series data in the form of surveys addressed to individual members of sociological groups was an alternative method which was explored for this project. The advantage would be that such data could help control for the potential influence of elites, in both parties and identity-interest groups. The problem is that such data do not exist in a consistent uniform way, and no such data would be specific enough with regard to the topic explored by this project. While the possibility of creating new surveys was considered for this project and finalized to the phase of IRB approval and completion of survey questionnaires, because of highly incomplete access to potential recipients, and the fact that these data would only be representative for the most recent period, this approach had to be abandoned.

large segments of the population; in other words, groups with cleavage-based identities. In particular, the largest national union federations and minority organizations in the United States, Germany, and Japan will be analyzed.

In this chapter, the central question and related topics will be elaborated upon. A first section will briefly review some of the concepts used. The next section will discuss the unresponsiveness of parties and the relevance of this project, followed by a section formulating the proposed hypotheses. The final section will elaborate on case selection. Chapter Two will provide an elaborated background of the cases under analysis, and Chapter Three will elaborate more on case-specific data selection and methodology issues. Chapters Four and Five, respectively, will present and discuss the data analysis results found for the first two and third hypotheses. Chapter Six will provide a discussion of the main findings and a conclusion based on the research results, and will provide recommendations with regard to future research agenda items.

1. *Social cleavages*

Before delving deeper into the problem identified in the above, it is necessary to present a definition of what social cleavages are and to illuminate how they relate to parties and organized interests. The idea of something like cleavages as a politics-structuring set of sociological divisions within the polity has existed since the beginning of political science, particularly in the field of political sociology. Indeed, the origins of the cleavage concept can be traced back to authors as Tocqueville, Marx, Michels, Ostrogorski, Weber, Coser and others. (Coser 1956; Lipset 1959b; Allardt and Littunen 1964; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) It is then all the more ironic that a subfield building on a basis of authors whose works focused on the sociology of politics largely lost sight of some of the sociological aspect in their writings, in particular the

implications for organized interest groups. However, it was not until Lipset and Rokkan published their seminal piece that the cleavage concept began to attract significant attention within the field of psephology. (Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001; Franklin 2010) Earlier works in political sociology paved the way, as well as some of Lipset and Rokkan's work, yet many of these works either did not receive as much attention as the 1967 article or lacked broader theoretical discussion of the cleavage concept. In other publications, the cleavage concept was taken as a given without much elaboration on defining it.[2] Exceptions that unfortunately did not get as much attention were follow-up pieces by Rokkan that addressed some crucial criticisms on the 1967 piece and deepened the theoretical debate of the concept. (1970; 1975) Unfortunately, despite their very ambitious attempt, Lipset and Rokkan still did not do a thorough job of specifying exactly what they meant with the concept "cleavage." Throughout the years, a range of related, yet slightly different, descriptions are used, which makes it difficult for the reader to grasp what they meant by the term, and nowhere did they devote a summarizing section to this, either. (1967; also cf. Flora et al 1999; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001; Bornschier 2009)

Bartolini and Mair criticize the literature employing the cleavage concept for only providing truncated versions of the cleavage concept. (1990; Mair 2006, 373--4) Instead, Bartolini and Mair emphasize the holistic structural foundations lying at the root of the cleavage concept in the 1967 piece. The aspect that was often focused on in the body of literature that followed was the dependent variable it appeared to discuss: the stability of party systems. Future authors applying the cleavage concept, sometimes for a single case, tended to attempt to explain the opposite: the party system stability, instability, or structure would be examined either to find or to deny the existence of cleavages. (Franklin 2010) The often diligent efforts put into such

[2] For some examples see: Lipset 1959a; Lipset 1959b; Allardt and Littunen 1964.

research, unfortunately, did not save it from the inherent logical fallacy. Given the fact that Lipset and Rokkan, and by extension many of the fathers of political sociology, at least mentioned other forms of organizational translation of cleavages, such as labor unions in the case of the class cleavage, reversing the relationship of dependent and independent variables could only make sense if such forms of organizational translation would also be included. Lipset and Rokkan explicitly recognized the importance of non-party political expressions of cleavages, yet were mostly interested in explaining contemporary party system structures. In particular, they write about "movements" or "social movements," referring to groups prior to obtaining representation through parties. (1967: 17, 22, 23, 30, etc.) The conclusions drawn from such a reversed relationship by other authors are at best incomplete, and at worst incorrect. Consequently, follow-up research pronouncing the death of cleavage politics, or critics of the cleavage concept doubting the relevance of cleavage politics, are in no position to make such claims. [3]

[3] For what is probably the most comprehensive work announcing the decline of cleavages, see Evans and De Graaf 2013 and earlier editions.

Although in Lipset's 1959 piece the ideological basis of cleavage seemed to dominate, what is important to him in the 1993 – similar to Lijphart (1999) – is the structural division of society into sociological strata. For Dahl: "… any difference within a society that is likely to polarize people into several antagonistic camps is a cleavage of exceptional importance (1971: 106)." Rokkan was initially unclear about how many "fundamental" cleavages actually existed: four, five, or seven, which Flora et al. attributes to an unfinished conception of nation building and critical junctures. (1999: 36)

In his earlier work, Martin Lipset also uses cleavages in a rather broadly defined way, referring to them as the basis for "Weltanschaung." (1959a: 94) Another curious element is that Lipset at a certain point distinguishes between *basic* cleavages and a cleavage in general, without really elaborating on what is meant (99). At the end of his 1993

Numerous follow-up pieces have been written that take the cleavage concept of Lipset and Rokkan more or less for granted, thereby avoiding a discussion of exactly what it is. Currently, the most widely accepted definition, and the one I'll be using, is the one proposed by Peter Mair. (Bornschier 2009; Mair in Katz and Crotty 2006; also see Bartolini 2005 and Bartolini and Mair 1990) Mair defines cleavage by pointing to "three distinct characteristics" of the concept; in fact he mentions four characteristics, but the fourth comes later in the text. (373):

> In the **first** place, a cleavage involves a **social division that distinguishes between groups of people on the basis of key social-structural characteristics** such as status, religion, or ethnicity. A cleavage is therefore grounded in distinct social reality. **Second**, there must be **a clear sense of collective identity** involved, in the sense that the groups on which the cleavage is grounded must be aware of their shared identity and interest as farmers, workers, Catholics, or whatever. … **Third,** a cleavage **must find organizational expression**, whether through a political body, a trade union, a church, or some other body. … one additional property of cleavages: they are deep structural divides that persist through time and through generations. (Mair in Katz and Crotty 2006; my emphasis).

As I mentioned above, Mair's definition of cleavage seems to implicitly include a fourth element, which he later mentions on the same page. Mair argues that cleavages persist because they continue to be framed in party politics (373). In line with what I argued above, I think Mair's point here is substantially incomplete, if not wrong. To be fair, this description by Mair of cleavage was based on earlier works he and Stefano Bartolini had done, and was written as part of a brief article in a party encyclopedia. Thus, I would not go so far to claim that this was indeed Mair's complete stance on the subject, but instead an ill-worded sentence unintentionally revealing a lot about the empirical literature about the subject. The sentence contradicts the third element of the definition; stating that not just parties can be deemed cleavage expressions, but

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article *The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited*, Lipset makes mention of cleavage. Unsurprisingly, he refers to the piece he wrote with Rokkan and skillfully avoids any kind of elaboration on the concept of cleavage (14--18).

also seems to assume that the type of organizational expression determines the fate of a cleavage. This assumed importance of organizational expression seems to contradict the first part of his definition. If a cleavage is indeed grounded in distinct social reality, how could the choice of the organizational expression type be capable of changing this distinct social reality, let alone threaten the persistence of a cleavage as a whole? The inclusion of *party* in the organizational element of the definition appears to be observational rather than analytic. It adequately describes the turn the literature has taken: a strong emphasis on political parties but a lack of inclusion of other forms of political organization, and a lack of a thorough exploration of the relationship between parties, organized interests, and cleavages. Indeed, the concept has almost exclusively been used in party political research so much that it is sometimes unjustifiably mistaken as a necessary element of the definition of cleavage. Also, although the analysis of cleavages and party systems may appear to be more easily quantifiable for comparative empirical studies, they are certainly not free from methodological issues with measurement. (cf. Stoll 2008; Harrop and Miller 1987) Bornschier writes: "Going beyond the three constituting elements of a cleavage, then, the term cleavage is usually reserved for durable patterns of political behavior linking social groups and political organizations." (Bornschier 2009) Political parties are thus indeed part of the organizational expressions cleavages *may* entail, but they are certainly not the only kind of political organizations that have this quality.[4]

[4] For examples of conflating cleavage with issue divide, see among others: Moreno 1999, Deegan-Krause 2006. Although Bornschier acknowledges the problems inherent to the cleavage concept as posited by Mair's interpretation of Lipset and Rokkan – among which: the problem of empirical applicability, and the conflation of cleavage with "division," or "conflict" – he seems to mostly agree with them on their definition. As will be discussed below, the literature on post-materialism is the only body of literature that deviates from this focus on just

What can be surmised from the above discussion is that the concept of cleavage, itself, has been shrouded in ambiguity since it has become popular in the field; the seminal piece *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* lacked clarity, and most theorizing of other scholars did not succeed in clarifying that much more either (1967).[5] A consequence is that future researchers defined the concept in a party-centric way, ignoring the wider theoretical implications of the Lipset and Rokkan piece. For the purpose of this project, I will continue to use the most widely accepted definition within the field, that being the Bartolini and Mair definition, which emphasizes that the organized forms cleavages are expressed by political organizations, yet are not limited to political parties. The reasons for doing so are that this definition is widely accepted

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parties, in the sense that other forms of political participation are deemed to be more relevant when discussing cleavages.

[5] In their *The Analysis of Political Cleavages*, Rae and Taylor attempted to systematize cleavage research methodology by coining a new different set of definitions. (1970) Despite the rigor of the analytical model to quantify cleavage research that was proposed, the basis on which it is founded is much shakier than the Lipset and Rokkan model. They distinguish three types of cleavages each determining aspects of a community:

> "Ascriptive or 'trait' cleavages such as race or caste" that determine level of "heterogeneity or homogeneity of a community."
> "Attitudinal or 'opinion' cleavages such as ideology […] or preference" that determine the level of "dissensus or consensus in a community."
> "Behavioral or 'act' cleavages" that determine "fractionalization or cohesion of a community." (1970: 1--2)

In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan, they explicitly look at cleavages as continua. Ascriptive traits in a given community may, however, be inescapable and not really conducive to thinking of these differences in terms of a continuum. On the other hand, the attitudinal or preference cleavage doesn't appear to have anything cleavage-like at all, as it seems to be about issue dimensions instead. (cf. Bartolini and Mair 1990) The authors, themselves, are also conflicted about how to categorize religion among these three types of cleavages. (2) What the Rae and Taylor definition and model also lacks - that it is, in essence, about deeply-rooted social and political identities - is a crucial element of cleavage.

in the field, that it is intelligible to students not familiar with this body of literature, and that it is analytically useful for this project.

2. Dysfunctional democracies

During the past few decades, party research on established democracies has focused in part on the increase in public disaffection with parties, as evidenced by voter volatility, a general trend of decline in electoral participation, and decline in party membership. (Watanuki et al. 1975; CreI1984; et al. 1985; Dunleavy 1987; Putnam 1993; Pharr and Putnam 2000, Pharr et al. 2001, Dalton et al. 2001; Diamond and Gunther 2001; etc.) The overall conclusion of many empirical observations from established democracies of what can be termed the "trilateral world" – Europe, North America, and non-Western liberal democracies – can be summarized as that there is indeed a growing trend of disaffection of the public with party politics and elections, or in other words, that representative democracy is unresponsive to voters, and disconnected with those whose interests it claims to represent.

I propose the term "identity-interest group" to distinguish from more general concepts like interest groups or Civil Society. A widely accepted definition of interest group by Schlozman and Tierney does list all the aspects that I would include for the types of groups I include in this study, yet misses an important aspect for the purposes of this project. (1986) They define interest groups as groups seeking to achieve their politically relevant goals through collective action, yet this concept can be interpreted very broadly in the sense that interest can mean a lot of different things. What is missing from this definition is a connection to group identity from which interests may sprout. The National Rifle Association (NRA) also would fit this definition, yet the members and supporters are united by a common interest, rather than

having a common identity which creates interests. While it may be true that being a gun owner is a type of identity, it is more likely that people – in this case Americans – will primarily identify as African-American, Latino, etc., instead of identity categories such as gun owners, stamp collectors, or lumberjacks. For the purpose of this project, I term those groups identity-interest groups, which do pursue politically relevant goals through collective action, but do so to advocate on behalf of groups with distinct primary social identities – in other words, social identity dictates the groups' interests. The social identities are primary, in the sense that I can reasonably argue that these types of identity can be considered to be the most politically relevant within the political context of a country. The types of identity-interest groups this study focuses on all originated in distinct social groups, with shared group identities, and a multitude of interests borne out of these shared identities; in other words, interest groups that fit with the definition of "social cleavage" as defined by Mair. (2006) An important difference for an organization that expresses one specific interest, such as gun owners, is that it lacks an identity base that could generate future interests.

If established democracies are indeed experiencing an erosion of party-centric politics, one could argue that democracy is in danger, prompting the question of what should be paid attention to in order to bring democracy back in tune with the demands of the people. This question touches upon the suggested indispensability of political parties in order for democracy to survive. (cf. Lipset 2000) Lipset underlines the importance of parties and their ability to represent distinct cleavage-based groups as a prerequisite to make liberal democracy functional. A need for a supportive, strong Civil Society and even civic culture are also mentioned as prerequisites for democracy. (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; 2000) While there are some who would argue that parties are not necessary per se for the consolidation or preservation

of democracy, one can't ignore the fact that politics in existing democracies are organized through political parties and competitive elections between parties, from which can be surmised that if not necessary, parties are at least fulfilling the function of aggregating the electorate's demands with the goal of government formation. (Schmitter 2001)

Whether or not parties are a necessary element for democracies to function, or whether they are merely a function of aggregating group interests until something more efficient becomes the norm, I should be concerned with their ability to effectively translate cleavages because for now, parties are the main venue through which the public finds its representation in politics. To this end, I should explore the relationship between identity-interest groups and parties. Or to put the question differently, to get a better understanding of why democracy appears dysfunctional in established democracies, what should political parties pay attention to if they want to continue to translate the interests of the various sociological groups in society they aim to represent? In addition, I might ask what party systems perform better and what dynamics exist among parties and the sociological groups they aim to represent. Furthermore, to what extent does it matter whether a social group forming the basis of an identity-interest group continues to grow or stagnate? The main question is how parties' professed interests are in line with the demands of the cleavage-based constituencies they aim to represent. If I want to test this, I need to include in my analysis organizations independent of parties that can be deemed much better at translating cleavages.

As mentioned earlier, most of the research has only focused on parties and neglected to include other forms of political organization. An exception to this was the body of literature

dealing with so-called post-material values.[6] (cf. Inglehart 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979) An important aspect about much of this literature is that it takes political participation other than

[6] Ever since Inglehart (1977), Barnes and Kaase (1979) and others suggested the possibility of politicization of post-material values in society, a lot of speculative literature has emerged on the link between new social movements and the possibility of a new cleavage. (Although more focused on transnational activism, also see the writings of Sidney Tarrow.) Barnes and Kaase use the term "interest cleavage," and write (like Inglehart) about "post-material values" and "material values," but also conclude that a cleavage is emerging that dominates the older cleavages (523-533). Kitschelt and Dalton et al. operationalized and quantified the idea of *new values* into a left libertarian vs. right authoritarian cleavage and new left/old vs. old left/right, respectively (1994; 1985). Dalton et al. in *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* try to explain electoral change by pointing to the possibility of a new cleavage, or "New Politics" (1985). To them, cleavages are: "relatively stable patterns of polarization, in which groups support given policies or parties, while other groups support opposing policies or parties. (Inglehart in Dalton et al.: 25)"

This definition seems far away from the revolutionary origins through which the initial four cleavages were forged. In addition, Lipset and Rokkan, who depicted parties as the endpoint of a history rooted in cleavages, political parties and the democratic opposition vs. governing parties have become only one part of political participation in the definition. In the concluding chapter, the editors write: "New Social Movements may realign or rejuvenate party systems without breaking down primary cleavage structure." (455) They argue that social movements must develop an institutional basis in order for a new cleavage to become integrated into the party system(457-459). The emergence of this kind of literature points to a problem central to their concept of cleavage. Lipset and Rokkan started with strong revolutionary, often violent conflict, leading to cleavages. Polarization, opposition, and conflict are terms that continuously reappear in the literature to describe cleavages. Here it is suggested that different value preferences are supposed to lead to cleavage. It seems doubtful that differences in alleged *new* values can be packed together with deep societal conflict under the category of cleavage. The softening up of the Lipset-Rokkan model, itself, by this body of literature (as seen in the example from Inglehart above) provides scholars with the possibility to employ not only the concept of cleavage, but the entire model in a far broader, and even more vague, sense than it was intended.

elections and political parties, in particular social movements, much more seriously than traditional research has. It adequately demonstrated that other forms of political participation deserve at least as much attention. Although Lipset and Rokkan were most interested in saying something about parties and party systems, the inclusion of social movements and their institutionalization (e.g. corporatism, clientelism, etc.) was in line with the original idea about cleavage not only being reflected in party systems. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Flora et al. 1999) Only by providing an analysis that also includes alternate forms of political representation like identity-interest groups, which complement party based research, will I have a better picture of how much established democracies, or democratic governance, are indeed affected by a drop in support for all types of political organization, instead of merely a drop in support for parties. The project proposed here will yield some insights on how effective or ineffective representative institutions are with regard to incorporating public demands of mobilized cleavage-based groups.

While it may be accurate that extra-electoral forms of political organization may also be subjected to membership erosion that parties face, there are some important differences that warrant not conflating the reasons for membership decrease for both as the same causes and consequences. Parties, particularly those originally conceptualized as mass organizations such as Social-democratic parties, tended to rely heavily on membership to fund the party organizations. The same was true for organizations like unions and some early minority organizations. I contend here that a decline in identity-interest group membership does not necessarily equate to a decline in support. What would constitute the most reliable indicator, if not the only reliable indicator, for a decline in support is the decline of the sociological basis identity-interest organizations represent. People may be in favor of workers' rights without being unionized,

themselves.[7] Large-scale structural changes from a secondary economy to a tertiary economy contributed to a decline of unionization without taking away the basis of the social movement underlying unionization. A chronic decline in electoral participation and eroding party membership are of a different order than a decline in identity-interest organization membership. A decrease in electoral participation either signifies a disinterest in politics – apathy, perhaps – or it signifies a disconnection between parties on one hand and voters on the other. If it is apathy that is increasing, then this apathy most likely also will affect other facets of political involvement of the electorate. However, it is the contention of this project that this political apathy is a symptom of a dysfunctional representative democracy caused by the inability of political parties to articulate the interests of those they aspire to represent. This project is concerned with probing the level to which political parties succeed in translating the interests of the electorate. Downs' contention that "Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies," is central to this. (1957, 28) The aspect of competing in an electoral arena, populated by political professionals, alienates said professionals from their traditional base. I also should expect that variations in party systems may provide different levels of insulation of parties from being dependent on voter support in order to stay in power. Multiparty systems, in which the regular turning over of power is common, could make parties more sensitive to demands of cleavage-based groups, while a lack of turnover, or the reduction of parties resulting in a binary choice, could be expected to make parties less prone to translate the interests of any specific group.

[7] For an example see Hara and Sato 2006. While it may be true that non-workers can be in favor of worker-rights and not all workers may necessarily agree with what organized labor favors, it is unlikely that either of the former two agents is a better or more legitimate representative of workers' demands.

Additionally, the distortion of parties and party systems will be even larger, depending on the number of cross-cutting cleavages. As a consequence, if I want to find out the extent to which existing parties articulate the interests of distinct groups in society, such as classes or ethnic groups, I need to find comparable organizations – national organizations articulating the interests of such groups – the largest of their kind and with the most national political influence unlike political parties, such groups will not be subject to the temptations innate to the electoral stage, and by virtue of that, a social movement organization will be a much more reliable vehicle for contentious politics.[8] While the arena of interest organizations is infinite compared to the finite electoral arena, selecting the largest and most influential identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of the largest segments of a distinct sociological group at one pole of a cleavage, I argue that such selection will at least be sufficiently indicative of the interests of that specific segment, and perhaps indicative of the mechanisms at work with regard to the entire population on that pole.

If Michels' iron law of oligarchy – the contention that social movement mass-organization elites like union or party leaders will allow for little internal organizational democracy – affects parties, it will also affect interest groups. [1911] There is, however, an important difference in that an identity-interest group, despite the effects of what Michels described, will still need to continuously appeal to its membership base in order to stay relevant. Political parties, despite the potential alienation that in part could be explained by Michels' assertion, is that they operate within the electoral arena where the representative institutions serve as sort of a delaying buffer or – among other factors depending on the type of electoral and party system – a life insurance policy for the party's survival, regardless of its unpopularity or a

[8] Contentious politics in the sense of Tarrow. (1998)

decline in voter turnout.[9] In other words, I agree that all organizations over time may evolve into oligarchies, but argue that political parties, depending on the electoral system, may be more or less insulated against the effect of having their supporters alienated by this.[10]

Aside from being representative of what could be considered the most salient cleavage and the most dynamic cleavages in politics, workers-vs.-owners and subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage, respectively, looking at union federations and minority organizations in the three selected cases also provides an additional advantage. Although these identity-interest organizations are not as intertwined with the state as political parties are, the cases should capture the range of variance in logic of embeddedness of identity-interest organizations into state structures and the interaction patterns between them and parties such as pluralism, clientelism, and neo-corporatism.[11] To an extent, one should assume that these different regulatory legal frameworks also will shape the way identity-interest groups organize. (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983) Depending on the regulatory framework of the country, in some cases, identity-interest organizations may find themselves deeply embedded into the state. One example is the neo-corporatist bargaining structures set up between the state, employers, and

[9] In *Reshaping the Political Arena,* Collier and Collier pointed to the fact that the continuation of a party system may be just a function of institutional survival, while the ideological and/or sociological basis for party support may have significantly changed, or as Collier and Collier put it: "In some cases, one may be dealing with apparent continuities that conceal significant changes" (1991: 34--35). Kitschelt made a similar argument with regard to the continued institutional embeddedness of traditional political party system but the sociological and ideological reorientation of the parties within that party system (Kitschelt 1994: Ch. 7).

[10] In no way am I arguing that all organizations are affected to the same degree by Michels' law of oligarchy, in fact there are exceptions that test the rule. (cf. Lipset 1956; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996)

[11] For a comprehensive comparative multi-country study, see Thomas 2001.

trade unions in Germany. In other cases, the state will adhere to a stricter pluralist doctrine, leaving identity-interest groups much more independent, yet also more vulnerable to being restricted in their operations by legislation, such as in the U.S. unions. In yet other cases, social movements' organizations may receive substantial support at different tiers such as the municipality, or within a certain sector, yet be confronted with an effective bureaucratic blockage when trying to play a role of importance at the national level, thereby eroding the bargaining power and thwarting the future potential such movements could have at this level. One example is Japan, where many citizens' movements are able to capture significant support and success at the grassroots level, or labor unions that are able to attain successes at the company level, yet national-level umbrella organizations of these groups fail to obtain similar levels of success in large part because of a clientelist political tradition and importance of bureaucracy.[12] (Curtis 1999; Hrebenar 2001; Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007; Benson 2008; Haddad 2012)

An additional reason to focus on these two types of identity-interest organization relates to the type of cleavage on which they position themselves. Labor union federations are organizations rooted in the cleavage generally considered to be most widely politicized: workers-vs.-owners. Given the historical importance of the labor movement even in countries such as the U.S., which lacks traditional socialist or workers' parties, it would make sense that these parties attempted to attract voters from this group by adopting issues relevant to them. On the other hand, minority groups, even those that grew significantly, are by definition not as interesting in

[12] This is not just the case for what Haddad termed "National Citizen Groups," but also for labor unions; unlike European unions, for example, about 90 % are organized at the enterprise level, contributing significantly to the weakness of national union federations. (2012; JILPT 2013/2014, Ch. 4)

terms of electoral support for parties because they number fewer potential voters than the dominant population group. The reason for inclusion in this case would be to examine under what conditions and/or to what extent any parties actually would show attention to in the demands of minority interests regardless of their relatively small size.

This project will focus on the relationship between the programmatic content of national labor federations, minority organizations, and parties. The goal will be to determine whether long-term trends can be observed in terms of similarity of content, and if possible, what policy recommendations can be inferred from this in order to make party-based representative politics more attuned to the demands from specific identity-interest groups, and by extension the latter's demographic basis.

3. *Hypotheses and core assumptions:*

The main assumption this analysis is based on is that identity-interest organizations that sprout from social movements with distinct sociological bases are significantly purer cleavage expressions compared with political parties. To address the problems addressed in the previous sections, I opted to propose and test two sets of hypotheses. A first set deals specifically with the variety in party systems and the relationship with identity-interest groups. A second set addresses the relationship between parties and changes of the size of the demographic basis of identity-interest organizations.[13]

Identity-interest organizations do not need to compete in an electoral arena. Political parties, on the other hand, need to gain as much support as is needed to win elections. Parties in

[13] Cf. Rokkan's "corporate" and "electoral channels" wherein social movement organizations operate. (Rokkan 1977, 566)

two-party systems, in particular, attempt to cater to an as large crowd as possible, which happens at the expense of their sociological and/or ideological profiles. (cf. Downs) I assume that because political parties will be influenced by crosscutting cleavages, and are compelled to compete for the biggest electoral market share, interest groups are assumed to be purer expressions and thus are much less affected by this. Furthermore, identity-interest organizations are also assumed to be more stable with regard to content because the sociological group identities they represent will remain much more constant than for parties. Over time, parties may be subject to much more content change, having a myriad of potential effects, such as the erosion of program stability, or the enabling of a radical wing to take over and pull a program in a specific direction.[14] By comparing the positions of identity-interest organizations and parties, and thereby using these identity-interest organizations to gain insight into how well parties are representing distinct social identities of cleavage based groups within society, I am presenting novel research methods in going to the source of identity-interest organizations directly. It allows us to gain insight into the nature of how parties and different kinds of party systems translate cleavages.

In this project, I use the social cleavage concept because it is much better suited for the analysis of various types of social movement organizations – political parties and identity-interest organizations – within the context of liberal democracies globally, instead of a traditional and oversimplified theoretical framework of binary left-right politics. The scope of this project is limited to the analysis of two cleavages that the literature identifies to be the most salient. The

[14] New issues do not constitute new social group identities, let alone cleavages. Although it may be true that interest groups can also be subject to internal radicalization or takeover, the lack of a rigid, institutionalized, electoral-like framework found in party politics will make it difficult for such groups to remain relevant in the long term in case they become too much of a radical fringe group. Third, interest groups will continue to reproduce the same social group identity over time, although new issues may be politicized within that logic

first is the worker-vs.-owner cleavage that is built around the question of who controls the means of production. This cleavage is often understood to be the most salient one because it is conflated with the archetypical left-right division in politics. (Bartolini and Mair 1990) The second is the subject-vs.-dominant group cleavage revolving around the conflict between majority and minority populations with respect to race, ethnicity, or linguistic divides. This does not mean that the other cleavages – rural-vs.-urban society or agrarian-vs.-industrial, and religious-vs.-secular – are not translated or present in the aforementioned cases.[15] Instead, based upon prior studies, I assume that there is a high likelihood they will be less salient. One of the cleavages analyzed for this project is often conflated with left-vs.-right cleavage, although the Lipset and Rokkan version "workers vs. owners" was significantly more specific, as the terms "left" and "right" may have varied meanings, depending on the context. (Daalder 1984; Proksch 2010) For example, many quantitative studies on the Japanese party system fail to confirm qualitative studies confirming a left-right division, in large part because an issue that is considered left in one national context doesn't necessarily have as much weight on a left-right scale in an aggregate multi-case study. (Proksch et al. 2010) On the other hand, in two-party systems, the conflation of left and right with cleavages is amplified by the deliberate binary logic of the system.[16] For

[15] Cf. Rose and Urwin 1969.

[16] The effects of Duverger's tendency, as exemplified by the U.S. two-party system, may create a party system that is tailored to a catch-all logic, loosening its ties to specific sociologically distinct groups and/or ideology, for the purpose of winning a majority in the electoral arena.[16] (Duverger 1972; Duverger 2003)

This tendency is often erroneously referred to as "Duverger's law;" it is erroneous because the latter merely described a tendency that he, himself, wrote: "In 1951, I did say in *Political Parties* that the former [said tendency] was 'the closest to a sociological law among all the generalizations suggested in this book,' but this remark did not have the significance that was later attributed to it.." (2003: 69) It also was not found to be 100% applicable based

example, the largest party manifesto research program, the Manifesto Project Database, "specifically examines the quality of programmatic representation by comparing policy preferences of parties to the left-right self-placements of voters over time and across regime types through to the present."[17] (MRG/CMP/MARPOR: cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2013) It therefore should not be surprising that many issues are classified incorrectly as left or right, whereas these probably don't even belong on a left-vs.-right dimension.

Most, if not all, industrialized societies increasingly have become immigration countries. In some cases, immigration has always been part of the raison d'état, albeit always engineered and not in an unrestricted form. By *engineered*, I point to the fact that even countries with supposedly open/inclusive immigration regimes were and are contingent upon what is deemed to be desirable immigrant populations. (cf. Zolberg 2006) Other states, such as many countries in Western Europe, have become de facto immigrant countries since the 1960s, yet some struggled for a long time to accept this new reality. In the age of globalization, immigration has become even more important as a continuous feature of change in industrialized democracies, significantly altering the social fabric of states and thereby potentially also reviving a subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage.[18] The influx of new immigrant groups constituting new segments

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on empirical evidence, and therefore not having the quality of a law. On the transformation to Catch-all or Cartel Parties; cf. Katz 1995; Blondel and Cotta 1996. Bowler et al. mention additional legal and other barriers and the importance of elite agency from the two major parties strengthening this tendency in the U.S. case. (2009: Ch. 9)

[17] https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/information last date accessed May 2014.

[18] In Lipset and Rokkan, this cleavage was termed "Centre vs. Periphery." (1967) Although the authors do clarify that this does not necessarily entail a geographic centre but rather a cultural/ethno-linguistic/racial centre and periphery, I opted to use subject vs. dominant population to avoid any misconceptions and because the former

of the citizenry, in particular, if they are phenotypically or religiously distinct from the majority population, may rekindle the dynamic of a dominant-vs.-subject population cleavage. Yet other demographic changes within the dominant population, such as an aging society, may contribute to an increased intensity of this cleavage. Assuming that this cleavage, albeit not the most significant, will be the most dynamic in terms of cleavage change due to the significant demographic shifts caused by newcomers in past decades, I opted to include it as the second cleavage for this project. Ideally, in terms of cases, I would look for a case that has always been relatively open to immigration, one that has only recently become more open, and one that is still struggling with the need for immigration.

What both cleavages have in common is that the sociological base has shifted significantly in the past few decades. For the worker-vs.-employer cleavage, the labor market underwent changes including, but not limited to, the increased participation of female employees, an increase of temporary and part-time jobs, a shift from an industrially based economy to a more service-based economy, and increased immigration. For the subject-minority-vs.-dominant-group cleavage, modern industrialized societies underwent such changes as an increase of immigration, an increase of or desire for naturalization, or and an increased shift of monocultural, largely homogeneous societies toward multicultural, heterogeneous societies. Because of these sociological shifts, I propose two different sets of hypotheses. One set explores the relationship between identity-interest organizations and parties, whereas the other set addresses the relationship between the sociological base of identity-interest groups and parties. Hypotheses One and Two below address the former set, Hypothesis Three the latter set.

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authors only looked at this cleavage within a limited context. Here, the opposition is created through what Zolberg and Long identified as the majority population and their perception of immigrants as "the dangerous other." (1999)

The first hypothesis (H1) relates to the responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time.

> H1: In a two-party system, parties will be or become less responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a multi-party system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less responsive to cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over time.

The expectation is that the fewer parties present in a party system, the less congruent their programs should be with those of interest groups. Instead, based on the median voter theorem, the expectation is that parties will compete for the "median voter," not only because parties will aim to attract as many voters as possible, but also because a loosened link with distinct sociological groups will make their programmatic content less contingent upon cleavages. (Downs 1957) In addition, dominant parties may gradually become unresponsive to cleavage translation as the mechanisms of normal electoral competition become muffled. Obviously, Hypothesis One (H1) implies that the cases included should exhibit significant party systems in which at least one should be a two-party system, one a multi-party system, and one a dominant-party system. Hypothesis Two (H2) explores the level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time.

> H2: In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage slightly stronger than the other party. In a multi-party system, several parties will compete to attract the votes of a cleavage-based group; therefore, I should expect cleavage translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, cleavage translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage translation by the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level.

The above hypothesis does not conflict with H1, as one party translating a cleavage better than the other does not necessarily mean that it is being translated well. While the median voter theorem dictates that parties become more alike in content, minor differences will remain because it is unlikely that parties will have completely the same content. Hypothesis Three (H3)

compares the responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest organizations.

> H3: Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political parties will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is experiencing stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth.

The expectation here is that in order to win elections, parties will attempt to attract votes from sociological groups that are continuously growing within a society. An expansion of the labor workforce or the inclusions of immigrant groups are but two examples.[19] Growth here refers to the growth of the sociological basis, the reservoir from which the selected identity-interest organizations can draw potential new individual membership. Indeed, in some cases the individual membership model may be less effective for the success of an identity-interest organization to weigh on policy-making than alternate forms of growth, such as the transition of individual membership toward community chapters or affiliates of identity-interest organizations. A more reliable way of measuring relevance of identity-interest organizations is to measure the size of the potential constituencies they represent. For example, without an identity-interest organization or any other type of organization to represent them, it is less likely that immigrant demands will become an issue voiced by political parties because there is nobody to speak for them. Once an identity-interest organization is established, however, the potential of that identity-interest organization to have influence in the communities they represent, including those who are officially members and those who are not, will mostly depend on the size of that constituency and less on the modes of official identity-interest organization membership.

[19] Rokkan who theorized a lot about the interaction between cleavages and their translation through political organizations recognized that migration and immigration could significantly shift cleavage constellations. (1977, 569-570)

All of the above hypotheses can be tested and are falsifiable, either by conducting research on other country cases and/or including more identity-interest organizations.[20] To ensure that the cases I selected for results that can be argued to be generalizable to a wide array of other cases, while at the same time taking into account the breadth of research that would have to be conducted per case, I needed to make a very careful case selection upon which I will elaborate in the next section. Listed below is a summary of what the expectations are. The analysis of the above hypotheses yielded mixed results which will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five and in the Conclusion.

Table 1: expectations H1 and H2

	H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
2-party system	Parties are or become less responsive	One party will be slightly more responsive than other
Multi-party system	Parties become more responsive over time	Party responsiveness will fluctuate over time across parties
Dominant party system	Dominant party is or becomes less responsive, other parties will be more responsive	Party responsiveness will fluctuate higher among other parties while it remains stagnant at low level for the dominant party

Table 2: expectations H3

	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
2-party system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases.
Multi-party system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases
Dominant party system	Dominant party will be less responsive – other parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases

4. Case selection

Political closure – the concept that there are no more available reservoirs to recruit new voters – is sometimes assumed to explain the stability of party systems. However, the idea that if there are

[20] The datasets used for this project will be made publicly available for other researchers to use in related projects.

no sizable groups to be mobilized, one should not expect any future cleavage system change, is wrong. Some groups in society may not have an influence on party politics, but will be able to weigh on the legislative process through other venues, such as identity-interest organizations. However, political closure is by no means a kind of teleological endpoint in history. Once a party system has become consolidated, the reservoir of voters may appear to be saturated. I posit that it is only the appearance of saturation, because the electoral reservoir does not behave according to a teleological path. The creation of the "carceral state" in the U.S., for example, led to a re-disenfranchisement of predominantly African-American males. (Gottshalk 2008)

Long-term societal evolutions such as mass immigration or the growth of the "carceral state" in some cases may inspire states to include or exclude people from voting. Other mechanisms such as voter identification and registration requirements also have been applied widely to make it more difficult for certain groups in society. The lack of permanent residence (such as populations with nomadic lifestyles), voter age restrictions, the synchronicity between working hours and voting hours, and voting-by-proxy limitations for citizens abroad, are but a few of many elements that make the electoral reservoir much less stable, let alone saturated. Over time, established parties may become so institutionalized, and the electoral market so engineered to keep undesirable voter contingents at bay and/or to give advantage to the ruling parties, that change within the party system may no longer be reliable to make any inferences with regard to cleavage alignments within a society. The question is, how do I successfully establish the extent to which parties are actually responsive to cleavages, and how do demographic transitions affect cleavage translation? The answer is to widen the analysis to extra-electoral forms of political representation as is undertaken here by also looking at identity-interest organizations. In no way am I arguing that party-based research should be abandoned or

be secondary to the analysis of other forms of political organization. On the contrary, party-based research remains just as important, yet to salvage the credibility of findings; it has to be complemented with research on alternate social movement organizations, identity-interest organizations in particular for this project.

Nearly all of the established democracies that weren't already immigration countries, such as the U.S. or Brazil, have experienced mass immigration. In some cases, like many West-European countries, it took a very long time before this reality – the political acceptance of actually *being* an immigration country – came fairly late. In yet other cases, despite the pressures of an increasingly aging society and de facto foreign worker migration, such as in the case of Japan, policy makers are still struggling with this reality. (Kondo 2004; Chung 2010) The ways in which political parties have dealt with the reality of immigration – immigration framed as part of the raison d'état of that state, immigration as a necessary post-WWII need, and immigration as still far from being accepted as a reality – matters tremendously. The level to which the demands of minority organizations originating from the immigrant population are translated by political parties may yield insights about how well national political parties cope with immigration. The assumption of electoral closure is contradicted by the realities of immigration. On one hand, depending on how open a host country is, the number of citizens with immigrant backgrounds organized in pro-immigrant interest groups will rise. On the other hand, noncitizens that arrived as legal and illegal immigrants, or as refugees, will also be supportive of these groups. As a consequence, identity-interest organizations will be able to tap more into these new reservoirs of support than political parties will because the latter, for the most part, only will be interested in citizen voters. As mentioned earlier, the demographic size of a minority could matter significantly in the sense that I also want to see if an increase in size will make them politically

more relevant for political parties. For this reason, I should include three cases with significantly different sizes of minority populations.

Given the breadth of this project, cases must be selected that are representative for a wide range of alternative cases, and must display enough variation to control for differences that could be attributed to cultural factors. To this end, both practical and theoretical criteria need to be taken into account. These criteria also should make generalization possible to a wider universe of comparative cases.

From a practical point a view, the cases selected should meet four criteria: First, they should be established liberal democracies; second, they should possess traditions of stable and longstanding political parties and social movements, and third, albeit less important, – they should be cases revisited often in comparative-politics literature dealing with the topics of this project. Lastly, there should be available and accessible data. Established liberal democracies obviously will not be the only type of industrialized societies that may have longstanding divisions rooted in social cleavages. A people's democracy, for example, may show signs of divisions suggesting the existence of cleavage, which might be inferred from the existence of ethno-cultural peripheral resistance or terrorist groups, or an oppressed Civil Society. However, the practical problem in analyzing these features would lie in the difficulty of measurement. Liberal democracies will adhere to a large level of pluralistic freedom both with regard to political parties *and* other forms of political organization, such as identity-interest organizations, making data on these organizations much more accessible and quantifiable. In addition, the visibility of political movements other than government-sanctioned ones in non-pluralistic societies may be too suppressed. Obviously, liberal democracies may display very different legal frameworks within which these organizations have to operate; this is true both for parties and

interest groups.[21] This also means that I should select cases with significantly different political institutional frameworks. Because the central problem of political disaffection with parties is something all cases suffer from, allowing for cases with different institutional regimes in which these organizations operate will help us identify what features may be most conducive to lesser rates of disaffection.

In addition to being liberal democracies, the ideal cases should also be "established" or "consolidated" democracies.[22] For the purpose of this project, the stability and longevity of the political institutions matter in order to make sound observations. As a working definition, I will term as "consolidated" those cases that have been around for at least fifty years and did not become subject to constitutional breaches or regime changes.[23] Note that although this definition of established democracy may exclude a number of cases from the analysis, it does not mean that inferences based on the results of this project can't be made for cases that have not yet consolidated sufficiently. On the contrary, the findings presented will also have a predictive value for such cases.

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[21] Obviously, some types of groups may also be banned in established liberal democracies, yet these would probably not be organizations representing large segments of the population, let alone having large membership potential. On the complexity and effects of different regulatory frameworks for private organizations such as nonprofit groups, but also interest groups, cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Salamon 1987; Thomas 2001.

[22] For both concepts, there is neither theoretically nor empirically an agreement in the literature on exactly what that is supposed to entail. (Schedler 2001) Without a clear definition, and on just the assumption that the audience will understand these concepts in the same fashion, any project avoiding a clear definition opens the door for arbitrariness and uncurtailed subjective interpretations.

[23] To clarify: A change in election regulations in itself is not sufficient to reject it as a potential case. In fact, doing so would undermine the premise of the project, as the behavior of parties is an important variable when determining the extent to which they adequately translate political cleavages.

In terms of theoretical constraints, there are four criteria tied to parties and interest groups within a case that should differ in order to make a "most different case" design successful for this project. (cf. Mill) The underlying dependent variable I explore is the long-term decreasing support of, and disaffection with, political parties. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze this phenomenon within a variety of contexts that on one hand remain similar enough for the reasons discussed above, yet on the other hand are different enough to be able to infer conclusions from our findings that can be assumed to apply to all cases within that range of variation.

A first criterion and independent variable is the level of regulatory involvement of the state and the way in which the identity-interest organizations are embedded into the state. State involvement might be very high or the social movement is highly embedded into the processes of the state. A sub-criterion here is that state-embeddedness may also occur at different – not necessarily geographical – tiers, in the sense that nationwide social movements may be regulated and incorporated at the local or regional level instead of national, thereby potentially impacting the way demands are translated to national politicians. The most extreme form of this would be the institutional regime often associated with a highly *verzuilde,* or pillarized society, or consociational democracy as a sociological basis. (cf. Huyse 1970; Rokkan 1977; Lijphart 1984; 1990 [1968]; 1999; Deschouwer 2001) However, given the strong interdependence between political parties and other organizations within a pillar on one hand, and the very limited number of possible cases of pillarized democracies on the other hand, it is best to avoid selecting a pillarized society for our analysis. A better alternative is to include the type of democracy that Lijphart would classify as an average "consensus democracy" with a corporatist logic of embedding interest groups into the state, meaning we'd be looking for a case that is not as extreme as a consociational democracy, but rather somewhere in the middle of the spectrum

while closer to the consensus democracy pole. (1984) The opposite is such that the state adheres to a relatively strict pluralistic doctrine by not embedding social movements, or relatively strict separation of the state and interest-group organizations, such as in Anglo-Saxon democracies like the U.K. or the U.S.

A second criterion is the nature of the party system. Within the literature, there is a variety of potential classifications of party systems available. (Duverger 1954; Dahl 1966; Blondel 1968; Rokkan 1968; Sartori 1976; etc.) The main thread running through all of these classification systems – and also in line with Lijphart's earlier works cited above – is that I can distinguish between two-party and multiparty systems.[24] In other words, I opted for Duverger's classification based on the number of represented parties. In addition to two-party and multiparty systems, I need to include one case to make our analysis representative for cases in which the distinction between two-party or multiparty systems is muffled by the long-term dominance of a single party. Potential examples for this could be pre-1969 Germany dominated by CDU-CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern [German Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – Christian-social union in Bavaria]), pre-1968 Belgium under Christian-democratic PSC-CVP dominance, or present-day Japan under a LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) dominance that only started to weaken in the past two decades.

A third criterion is culture. Because some theories of democracy – in particular neo-Tocquevilleans such as Putnam, Huntington, Almond and Verba – are deeply rooted in culturalist beliefs, it is important to select cases from significantly distinct cultural backgrounds

[24] Empirically speaking, this twofold typology for the most part also runs parallel with the distinction between PR and Majoritarian voting systems.

to be able to reject these type of empirically questionable *culture-all-the-way-down* explanations. (1993; 1963; 1996) Much of the literature on political cleavages, democracy and elections, and political parties has focused on the European experience. Given the fact that cultural similarity may be a variable that could explain certain aspects of European democracies, it is therefore important to look beyond Europe, yet still within the limitations set by the criteria mentioned above.[25] While the criteria of having established democracies limits the potential of culturally diverse cases somewhat – South Africa, for example, can't be used here – it is still possible to find culturally significantly different cases beyond Europe.

A fourth criterion I briefly touched upon earlier is included because of its increasing global importance – the level of openness to immigration and naturalization, and a nation's tolerance of non-majority populations on its soil. To be clear, I am not arguing that immigrant populations can be equated with all groups that could be considered segments of the subject population. For example, while the African-American minority certainly will share many interests with the U.S. Latino population with regard to discrimination from the dominant non-Latino, Caucasian population, there are obvious differences in historical background, and disagreements between both groups are partly related to that. Ideally, I want to include at least one case with a relatively open and long-established legacy of immigration. Examples would be states with "ius soli"-based types of citizenship, such as Brazil, the U.S., and potentially France. (cf. Brubaker 1992) The opposite would be closed societies with restrictive, "ius sanguinis"-based immigration and naturalization legislation. Examples for this could be Germany prior to

[25] Although some African and Latin American countries qualify for this criterion, they do not qualify for the working definition of established democracy applied to this project.

2000 [2004/5], or present-day Japan.[26] However, given the global traffic of asylum-seekers and refugees, a criterion based on the level of openness of a society should also take into account hospitability to refugee and asylum-seeking populations.[27] Including refugee and asylum-seeking populations allows for a more differentiated and realistic approach to assessing the openness of a society. Ideally for our analysis, I would include one case that is open to immigrants on one hand as well asylum-seekers and refugees on the other, one case that is more open either to immigrants or to asylum-seekers and refugees, and one case that isn't very open to either group.

The last criterion of difference included relates to the pressures and changes of the labor market in postindustrial democracies as part of an increasingly globalized economy. There is some overlap between the last criteria in part because immigration connects to this. Other evolutions that most democracies underwent, regardless of their geographic location or cultural background, include the shift from secondary to tertiary economy, increase of part-time and temporary employment, increased influx of female employees, and pressure on welfare systems. Ideally, I am looking for cases with distinct differences in the way the relationship is organized between the state and labor organizations.

I opted to select three cases that fit all criteria listed above spanning the wide range of variety among the universe of possible cases – the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Within each case, I opted to analyze two specific types of cleavage-based identity-interest organizations: union

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[26] 2000 is the year the *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz* (Nationality/Citizenship law) was changed leading to easier naturalization of second and third generation immigrants. The new *Zuwanderungsgesetz* (Immigration law) of 2004 – active since 2005 – in conjunction with the former law made it also easier for first generation immigrants to naturalize. (BGBl. – Bundesgesetzblatt)

[27] For the UNHCR definition for the difference between asylum seekers vs refugees: UNHCR http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html

federations and immigrant minority groups. The AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations), DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [German Labor Union Federation]), and RENGO (Rengō –Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai [Japanese Trade Union Confederation]) are the largest and most influential union federations in these three countries. LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), TGD (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland [Turkish Community in Germany]), and BLL (BLL – Buraku Kaihō Dōmei [Buraku Liberation League]), are the largest and most influential minority group organizations in the U.S., Germany and Japan, respectively. LULAC and TGD not only look after the interests of citizens with respective Hispanic or Turkish backgrounds, but also cater to the largest segment of immigrant populations from both countries.

Table 3: Case selection criteria

	US	**Germany**	**Japan**
Criteria of similarity			
Established democracy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Stable Party system	Yes	Yes	Yes
Has been featured in prior related studies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Criteria of difference			
Regulatory regime/tradition	Pluralist	Corporatist – strong at national, weaker at local level	Clientelist – connection to parties and other organizations via powerful bureaucracy
Party system	Two party	Multiparty	Dominant party
Cultural tradition	American	European	Asian
Openness to immigration	High	Intermediate	Low
Labor market	Inclusive – limited welfare benefits	Inclusive – extensive welfare benefits	Exclusive (company-oriented and not migrant- and women-friendly) – extensive welfare benefits for those included

Because unlike the finite space of the electoral arena, the arena in which identity-interest organizations exist is infinite – in the sense that there could be an endless amount of identity-interest organizations, I limited this project to the analysis of the largest and most influential ones representing specific poles of cleavages. Consequently, I indeed should assume that the selection

of these organizations is representative of at least that segment of the total population related to those cleavages under analysis, with the caveat that an even more complete analysis would include other organizations with smaller population bases. Because this project is the first in its kind, it seemed reasonable to start with the largest and most influential groups representing the largest segments of the cleavage population base. In short, "immigrant," "minority" and "subject population" are not synonymous, yet the largest minority group of a subject population will be most likely to help us establish mechanisms that may also be indicative of the political position of other segments of the subject population versus the dominant population.

For the U.S. case, I included LULAC as an organization in part to get an idea about how far the programs of the two national parties overlap with the demands of part of the population that is not the ethnic or racial majority of Americans. In the preliminary stages of this project, I was also considering including the NAACP. Although the latter organization definitely captures the schism between a subject and a dominant population in an even more extreme form, I opted instead to focus my attention on an organization that not only focuses on the articulation of demands of a domestic subject minority group, but one that to an extent also articulates the demands of an increasing segment of the immigrant population. In addition to immigration politics, LULAC reflects important trends in Latino self-perception with regard to the ambiguous racial classification of the Latino community, the conflict between opting for an assimilationist, anglicized "political whiteness" identity or an ethno-racial, nonwhite identity emphasizing Latino heritage and language. (cf. Basler 2008) To be clear, the NAACP is definitely a case worthwhile to study within the theoretical boundaries of this project and in particular is a good case for analyzing the racial politics of dominant-vs.-subject group cleavage dynamics. However, because one of the aims here was also to say something about the dynamics of historic migrant

populations across a variety of cases, LULAC, and by extension the U.S. Latino community, is the best-fitting organization for this project. Within the Latino community, several larger nationwide organizations operate. While the analysis of LULAC is only indicative of the relationship of the Latino segment of the total subject population in the U.S., it may yield insights to mechanisms that apply to other segments of the subject population as well.

The Japanese BLL, strictly speaking, is not an organization representing an ethnic group, but instead a separate caste. As stated earlier, I needed to include one country case that was still closed to the prospect of immigration. An examination of the Buraku population, Japan's largest minority group, can serve as a proxy for smaller groups experiencing similar levels of exclusion and discrimination, such as Zainichi Koreans, Okinawans, or Ainu, but also the comparatively small immigrant community. Despite increased assimilation and acceptance, this group is still faced with discrimination similar to that of immigrant groups and ethnic minorities discussed in the other cases. Similar to LULAC, BLL is only indicative of the relationship of the Buraku segment of the total subject population in the Japan, yet it may help us reveal mechanisms that apply to other segments of the subject population as well.

Chapter Two: U.S., German, and Japanese Union Federations and Minority Organizations

Overview

In this chapter, the individual identity-interest groups analyzed for this project will be the main focus. On one hand, the goal is to make the reader familiar with the different organizations, with an emphasis of their importance for this project. On the other hand, this chapter also serves to deepen the case-selection justification by providing more detailed data.[28] This chapter is organized as follows: A first section groups the three selected union federations: AFL-CIO, DGB, and RENGO. A second section discusses the three selected immigrant/minority organizations: LULAC, TGD, and BLL. As an in-depth discussion of each selected organization might require its own volume, the information provided here is limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this project. As already pointed out in Chapter One, none of these organizations is assumed to represent the entire population that finds itself on the worker and subject population poles of the worker-vs.-employer and subject-vs.-dominant population cleavages, respectively. I argue, however, that because they not only are the largest and most influential organizations representing the largest segments of said populations, they will be sufficient to detect the major differences with regard to how well the sociological bases of these specific segments are represented by parties compared with identity-interest organizations. Furthermore, I contend that

[28] While a discussion of the individual political parties used in the analysis might seem appropriate, I opted not to discuss them in depth here for two reasons. First, where needed in the empirical and other chapters, the parties will be discussed succinctly. Second, all political parties that acquired seats in the respective legislatures of the U.S., Germany, and Japan – with a few minor exceptions – were included in the analysis. For the identity-interest organizations, however, I selected specific groups while excluding others, a step that warrants a discussion of their relevance that is addressed in the current chapter.

the mechanisms revealed may yield insights on how the relationship may function between parties and the entire sociological base of the two selected cleavages for the three cases.

1. Union Federations

1.1 USA: AFL-CIO – American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations

The American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations, is the oldest and largest existing union federation in the U.S. The AFL-CIO emerged from the 1955 merger of the 1886-founded AFL and 1935-founded CIO, and currently comprises more than 50 unions. Of the approximately 16 million unionized employees in the U.S., about 13 million were unionized through AFL-CIO member unions.[29] (U.S. Dept. of Labor OLMS) The focus of the national leadership is lobbying employees' interests at the national level in Washington, while the organization is also active on the state and local levels. Strictly speaking, the individual member unions are able to maintain an independent course. However, and particularly with regard to the AFL-CIO leadership, the federation has a lot of indirect power over its member unions because the national organization is the level that historically had access to the White House and legislators in Washington on behalf of the members. (Storch 2013) [30]

[29] After 2005, the membership of the AFL-CIO and CTW (Change To Win) still accounts for approximately the same number, with the AFL-CIO having 9 million members and CTW about 4 million members. (U.S. Dept. of Labor OLS)

[30] At the member-union level, however, the so called iron law of oligarchy doesn't hold up, although the AFL-CIO, itself, has battled with a democratic deficit. It was not until the mid-1990s under the Sweeney leadership that the national organization invested in its grassroots connections again. (Francia 2006; Storch 2013)
The AFL-CIO national leadership is often portrayed as the crucial pivot with regard to the direction in which the organization is moving. In other words, despite being built on the logic of mass membership, and the independence

Table 4:AFL-CIO membership in thousands

Period	Membership	Period	Membership
1955	12,622	**1982-83**	13,758
1956-57	13,020	**1984-85**	13,109
1958-59	12,779	**1986-87**	12,702
1960-61	12,553	**1988-89**	13,556
1962-63	12,496	**1990-91**	13,933
1964-65	12,919	**1992-93**	13,299
1966-67	13,781	**1994-95**	13,007
1968-69	13,005	**1996-97**	12,905
1970-71	13,177	**1998-99**	12,952
1972-73	13,407	**2000-01**	13,164
1974-75	14,070	**2004-05**	12,976
1976-77	13,542	**2008-09**	8,374 (13,148)*
1978-79	13,621	**2012-13**	8,429 (12,652)*
1980-81	13,602		

* The number in brackets is the totals for both the AFL-CIO and CTW
(Source: AFL-CIO, *Executive Council Report 2013*, 66)



Figure 1: Evolution AFL-CIO membership 1955-2013 and CTW 2007-2013, in thousands

Table 4 and Figure 1 display the national membership of the AFL-CIO since its founding in 1955. These numbers appear to remain stagnant within a range of 12 million to 13 million

of federation member unions, the national leadership is credited with much power, and internal democracy is lacking, which is much in line with Michels' iron law of oligarchy. (Storch 2013; Francia 2006; Tillman 1999; Yates 1998)

members despite a steady increase of the active population. The only exception to this is the most recent decade; the split-off and creation of Change to Win (CTW) as a competing union federation in 2005. [31]

Comparing the totals of AFL-CIO members with the total U.S. labor force and the unemployed population, as outlined in Figure 2 below, it is obvious that the proportion of employees with an AFL-CIO membership is consistently decreasing over time. Union density figures confirm this trend, as union density for all wage and salary workers was still 25 percent in the 1970s, but shrank to 11 percent by 2013. (Hirsch and Macpherson 2014; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) When looking at the private sector, this image becomes even bleaker: While the unionization degree was still about 21 percent in the 1970s, it had declined to less than 7 percent by 2013. The public sector is the exception: While the unionization density was about 25 percent in the early 1970s, it actually increased to about 35 percent in the Reagan era and has remained stable to the present. In an international comparison, unionization rates declined, yet while the average density for industrialized democracies ranges between 17 percent and 22 percent, it is significantly lower for the U.S. at 11 percent. (OECD)

Despite a decrease in membership numbers, it would be incorrect to attribute this loss of membership support solely – let alone primarily – to workers' apathy or an inability of union federations to voice workers' concerns. Instead, in addition to mentioned above, more likely

[31] The only exception to this is the most recent decade, which can be attributed to the creation of the Change to Win (CTW) union federation in 2005, which groups a significant amount of unions previously affiliated with AFL-CIO. However, when combining the membership totals of both the AFL-CIO and CTW, the total remains within the 12 million-to-13 million range. In absolute numbers, union federation membership then appears to have been stagnant since 1955.

explanations for the prematurely announced *death of the unions* are leadership failures; the turnover from a secondary, industry-based economy to a tertiary, service-based economy; Republican political pressure and anti-union legislation; and too strong a reliance by the AFL-CIO on the Democratic party for support, which gradually eroded the impact of unions on the national political agenda, starting with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. (Storch 2013; Warner 2012; Tillman 1999)



Figure 2: The evolution union federation membership compared to total labor force, in thousands. Data for *Civilian Labor Force* and *Employed* retrieved from U.S. Dept. of Labor OLS

Deficiencies of the national leadership are often pinpointed by some authors as one factor to explain both the stagnation of unionism in the U.S., and its more recent, but still frail, revival. (Storch 2013; Tillman 1999) In particular, the leadership of the first two presidents, George Meany and Lane Kirkland, who governed from 1955 until 1995, is attributed with being responsible for much of the stagnation and loss of influence of the AFL-CIO. (Francia 2006; Storch 2013)

An additional problem that endures today but was much more emphasized during the Meany-Kirkland era was the failure of the organization to steer a more independent course in politics. During the era of Meany and Kirkland, the leadership was much more in support of Republican foreign policy and avoided any suspicion of affinity for socialism. (Storch 2013) As a consequence, while on one hand the AFL-CIO was pursuing the interests of workers, including those of new groups increasingly entering the workforce, on the other hand, the AFL-CIO didn't present itself as outspokenly travailliste, let alone acquire a socialist or social democratic profile. With regard to this awkward attempt to avoid ideology, Yates notes:

> What does the AFL-CIO leadership see as a good society? It is difficult to know. A close inspection of *America needs a Raise* or *Common Sense Economics* reveals little in terms of what the labor movement stands for in principle. There are a lot of words devoted to what it is against: low wages, growing inequality in income and wealth, unregulated free trade, the destruction of our social safety net, the privatization of public services, high interest rates, exorbitant CEO pay, excessive overtime, bad labor laws, a flat tax, cuts in the capital gains tax, and corporate tax breaks. But the AFL-CIO shies away from saying forthrightly what it stands *for*. (1998, 148-149)

The main problem addressed here is not so much that the AFL-CIO didn't present itself as *left* enough; the major issue is that it could have presented itself as more independent of politics. Mort, Francia, Storch and others do credit the new leadership that started in 1995 with some improvements, such as reconnecting with grassroots efforts and the focus on membership.[32] (1998; 2006; 2013)

[32] Some criticism remains, however, for example, Tillman mentions the Kaiser Permanente partnership. It increased the AFL-CIO's reservoir of members, but it meant that the AFL-CIO agreed not to engage in any activities that would damage the company's public image. (Tillman 1999) For now, the literature is divided on the success of the new leadership, leaning somewhat to the positive, yet for the organization to regain its former glory, a lot of work lies ahead. (Tillman 1999; Francia 2006) A few of the more positive developments include the addition of LGBTQ-, Latin-American-, and Asian-Pacific-American-focused AFL-CIO constituency groups, and a more welcoming

Examining the AFL-CIO documents selected for this analysis, from the earliest ones to the present, all are shaped by a progressive view on society, paying attention to Civil Rights, women's rights, and immigration. Over time this agenda becomes more progressive, as demonstrated by the inclusion of sections on LGBTQ rights. While the official stance of the AFL-CIO on these issues has always been progressive, the organization has been incapable of absorbing the member potential among African-American and female workers both during and immediately following the Civil Rights movement era, which significantly contributed to the stagnation of membership. (Francia 2006; Storch 2013)

Although the official stance of the AFL-CIO was against racial and other forms of discrimination, it remained too tolerant of member unions and leading union officials who opposed the promotion of the Civil Rights agenda, which also made it difficult for the AFL-CIO to absorb new members from those constituencies, while at the same time it drove away a segment of the white male workers by supporting Civil Rights efforts on the national level. (Francia 2006; Honey 2007; Storch 2013) The combination of racist and sexist attitudes among segments of the white male workers, the suspicious attitude of African-Americans and other minorities towards the unions' commitment to Civil Rights efforts, the inability of the AFL-CIO leadership to unite all these groups, and the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs abroad, paved the way for a climate of anti-union legislation and right-wing triumph during the Reagan era. This eventually also caused the AFL-CIO leadership to become defensive instead of going on the offensive, and also made the organization rely more on the Democratic Party. (2013) Because of

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attitude to immigrant workers. (Francia 2006) Constituency groups are suborganizations supported by the AFL-CIO representing underepresented groups. Until 2007, the four that already existed were the Alliance for Retired Americans, the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and the Coalition of Labor Union Women.

this, increased reliance on the Democrats for support of the AFL-CIO agenda, the organization sometimes would even act contrary to its members' interests in order to avoid damaging the Democratic Party.[33] (Yates 1998)

The change from an industry-based economy to a service-based economy, combined with the inability to attract members from new constituencies, also muffled another change that was happening. (Storch 2013) While the general trend of unionization was stagnation, this aggregation of all unions combined blurs some significant differences. Many traditional, industry-based unions stagnated or lost members while new unions are consistently increasing their membership pools. (Southworth and Steppan-Norris 2009) In other words, although an overall stagnation appears accurate, it may be the result of a combination of factors that only temporarily impedes the growth of U.S. unionization. Although the traditional sociological base of the AFL-CIO is industry workers, it is important to highlight that it is not only this type of employees that are represented by AFL-CIO, albeit that they still have the highest unionization rates among private-sector employees.[34]

The last and probably most important reason for membership stagnation is one that contradicts the position that a shift from secondary to tertiary economy was the major contributing factor in membership erosion, as is often proclaimed by union opposition; in fact, it debunks this assumption and identifies another factor as the major contributor. More so than in other countries that were confronted with similar shifts in the economic activities, employer opposition is identified as leading cause explaining decreasing unionization density. (Walker 2012) Despite legislation in place to prevent employers from illegal actions, there is little

[33] Yates mention the example of when the AFL-CIO, in order to avoid embarassing the Clinton administration, suppressed an internal report critical about the effects of the NAFTA agreement on U.S. workers. (1998, 150)

[34] Chapter Five will be dealing with this specifically.

disincentive to do so. According to Walker, illegal employer opposition to unionization since the 1980s has increased not only in frequency but also in intensity, explaining why the U.S. unionization density, particularly in the private sector, is substantially lower than in other industrialized democracies.[35]

1.2 Germany: DGB – Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund

Similar to the AFL-CIO in its importance, with more than 6 million members, the DGB is the largest union federation in Germany. The next two major union federations, DBB (DBB Beamtenbund und Tarifunion – *DBB German public service and tariff union*), and CGD (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands – *Christian union federation*) total about 1.27 million and 280,000 members, respectively. The DGB can be traced back to the founding of the federal republic in 1949 and was originally intended as a non-party-affiliated union federation encompassing all unions, if possible. Despite the intention of not being affiliated with any parties – party affiliation was common in the prefascist era – with the support of conservative wings of the CDU-CSU (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* [German Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – Christian-social union in Bavaria]), the aforementioned CGD was founded. Historically, the DGB demographic was closer to the social-democratic SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* [Social-democratic party Germany]), whereas employers tend to be closer to the Christian democrats and conservatives of CDU and CSU.[36]

[35] The author compares U.S. practices with other OECD countries and a more in-depth comparison between the U.S. and Canada.

[36] The CDU is the Christian-democratic party of Germany with the exception of Bavaria, where the CSU has that position.

Technically, the DGB only comprises eight member unions; however, this number is misleading, as the eight often originated out of fusions of a higher number of predecessor unions due to efficiency concerns.[37] The eight large unions that constitute the DGB comprise employees from related-yet-separate sectors while the AFL-CIO member unions are much more specific. For example: *Ver.di* (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft [United Service provider union]) comprises people of more than a 1,000 different occupations, while many equivalent occupations would be organized in smaller, more specific unions under the AFL-CIO umbrella.

For most of its history, DGB membership ranges between 6 million and 8 million members. An exception to this is the decade right after the reunification. The reunification of Germany in 1990 created a population shift, adding 15 million more citizens to the nation's total. The numbers of DGB membership increase spectacularly with 4 million members, or almost one-third of the former GDR population. The reason for this is that the only union federation of the GDR, the FDGB (*Freer Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* [Free German union federation]) was subsumed into the DGB. Although FDGB membership was technically voluntary, just as with most communist regimes, it was a de facto requirement if one wanted to build a career. The added total of 4 million thus was in itself not exactly representative of the number of people who would join a union in a pluralist society. As a consequence, a gradual drop in unionization within the same decade, going back to pre-1990 levels can be observed.

[37] CGB for example has 16 member unions despite only having about 280,000 members.



Figure 3: Membership totals of DGB, DBB, and CGB 1960-2013.[38]

The totals for DBB and CGB are significantly lower. In 1990, DBB manages to pick up 200,000 more members and gradually increases its numbers above the 1.2 million mark. What explains the increased numbers of DBB is that this union federation comprises civil service employees and private-sector service workers, while the DGB to an extent is still dealing with the conversion from its traditional membership base, the industrial workers, toward a mixed base of industrial and service workers. However, DGB is currently still dominated by members stemming from the traditional union base of industrial workers. The DBB trend is reminiscent of a similar, rising trend among the U.S. service workers' unions' membership. When counting the DBB and DGB totals together, the total number of unionized employees appears even more stable, although union density did decrease as the German population rose.

[38] The number for CGB is the 280,000 members mentioned in CGB materials. Unfortunately requests for membership totals over time remained unanswered. However, based on the literature, this number appears to be representative of CGB's relative weight for the period of 1960-present.

When taking into account the growth of the population with 15 million and the effects of those among this new group leaving the union in the next decade, the general trend is similar to what was observed for the AFL-CIO: While membership totals stagnate within the 6 million-to-8 million range, the total active population rises. In other words, here, too, union density has declined over time. However, despite being faced with similar issues like the shift of the economy from secondary to tertiary, and an increase in part-time and alternative employment arrangements, the German union density remains significantly higher than that of the U.S.

While U.S. union density rates plummeted to less than 20 percent after 1980, and less than 12 percent by 2006, German union density rates gradually decreased to 18 percent by 2011. (OECD) There are three factors that explain why the German union density remains relatively high compared with that of the U.S. First, while the U.S. population displayed steady growth, from immigration and births, to more than 312 million, the German population growth stagnated at about 80 million despite increased efforts to attract more immigrant workers in the past two decades. (U.S. Census Bureau; Statistisches Bundesamt) Estimates of the Federal German Office for Statistics project a drop of the population to 65 million by 2060. (2009) Part of the explanation is that the population decreases while the union membership number is maintained. Second, due to the way bargaining is institutionalized at the vocational level between unions, employer organizations and the government, unions can exert much more influence during collective bargaining negotiations, and illegal and legal means for employer opposition to unionization are significantly more reduced compared with the pluralist collective bargaining arena in the U.S. Lastly, the proportion of the traditional sociological basis of unions, industrial labor, is comparatively higher in Germany than in the U.S.; respectively one-in-five compared with one-in-six employees.



Figure 4: DGB membership compared to total active population. Sources: DGB and D-Statis/Statistisches Bundesamt. Data for active population before 1970 was not available.

The trend of decreased union membership in Germany appears to have made a turn towards very modest growth recently. Part of the explanation is the increase in membership for the more service-oriented DBB and the maintenance of DGB membership levels while population and active population numbers start to decline. In any event, the DGB remains by far the largest organization voicing the demands of organized labor in Germany.

1.3 Japan: RENGO - Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai

Three important changes to the labor union movement that occurred in the early 1990s changed the dynamics of Japanese labor-politics interactions, or at least planted the seeds for future change. First, there was the creation of RENGO as an intended unifying force among labor unions and the demise of its three larger predecessors: the left-leaning and then-largest federation Sōhyō (n*ihon rōdōkumiai souhyogika* [General Council of Trade Unions of Japan]) loosely affiliated with the JSP (Japanese Socialist Party) comprising mostly public employees and the

smaller Churitsu Roren federation (the Federation of Independent Labour Unions), and Dōmei (*zen nihon rodo sodomei* [Japan Confederation of Labour]), which comprised mostly private employees and had a more centrist political profile. (Hyde 2009) Second, there were the effects of the bursting of the bubble and the stagnation of Japanese economy after four decades of continuous expansion. Third, there were changes within the Japanese electoral and party system.

RENGO (Rengō – abbreviation for *Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai,* or Japanese Trade Union Confederation) is the by far largest labor union confederation in Japan. Until its foundation in 1989, Japan's labor union landscape was dominated by four confederations. *Sōhyō* and *Domei* were the two largest confederations, comprising public-sector employees on one hand, and private-sector employees on the other. (Hyde 2009) Upon the dissolution of *Domei* and smaller confederations, RENGO was founded in 1989, incorporating both. *Sōhyō* was incorporated one year later.[39]

The novelty of RENGO was not only that it unified public-sector and private-sector unions, but also that it positioned itself to be much more independent from political parties, unlike some of its predecessor confederations. Of the 9.831 million unionized Japanese employees, RENGO represents 6.658 million, while the other two large federations together represent 727,000 employees. Another 2.582 million employees are represented by unions not affiliated with any of the three large federations. (JMIAC) ZENROREN (Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai sōrengō [National Confederation of Trade Unions]) is a smaller union federation also founded in 1989 as a counter-movement to what was interpreted by some as a too-conservative position by RENGO. Although technically independent, ZENROREN is closely tied with the JCP (Japanese

[39] The only serious crisis RENGO was confronted so far was the risk of splits in the wake of the implosion of the JSP. (Reed 2003)

Communist Party). ZENROKYO (Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai Renraku Kyōgi-kai [National Trade Union Council]) is the third large union confederation, although technically the element of confederation is much weaker compared with the other two. While unionization also has been in decline in Japan, it has been more in line with the general trend in OECD countries and not as dramatic as in the U.S. A shift from secondary to tertiary economy explains part of the decline, and efforts to include the increasing cohorts of part-time and female-identified employees in the workforce have come fairly late. Looking at the numbers in Figure 5, it can be observed that the unionization numbers for RENGO and the other two larger federations have been fairly stable during the past few years, but union density in general has stabilized at about 18 percent. (OECD 2014)



Figure 5: Members belonging to industrial unions in all three federations in thousands. Source: JMIAC (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau)

An important way in which RENGO differs from both the AFL-CIO and DGB is the number and organizational structure of member unions. While the AFL-CIO and DGB group 59

and 8 large sector-based unions, respectively, the RENGO structure can be compared as the Matryoshka doll equivalent of a union federation. For example, RENGO groups a large number of subordinate union federations, among which is JAW (The confederation of Japanese Automobile Workers' Unions). Under JAW, there are various enterprises (Toyota, Honda, Nissan, etc.). Within those enterprises, there are three groups: parts manufacturing, car manufacturing, and sales unions. UA ZENSEN (The Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical Food, Commercial Service and General Worker's Unions) is another example and comprises, according to their website, 2,450 member unions, of which the bulk of 1,355 unions have less than a hundred members while 98 have more than 3,000 members each. RENGO is thus a federation of trade union federations, of which many of the latter may again comprise several federations.

While JAW and UA ZENSEN are a good illustration of how Japanese enterprise-based unions are organized, they also illustrate the distance between the RENGO leadership at the top and small, individual unions on the bottom, which in part explains why RENGO can be deemed less powerful at the national level than DGB.

Table 5: Upper rows display the number of workers in industrial unions, lower rows in italics display the total of industrial and service-sector unions.

	2000 (12)	2001 (13)	2002 (14)	2003 (15)	2004 (16)	2005 (17)	2006 (18)
RENGO	7,173,000	7,001,000	6,829,000	6,694,000	6,595,000	6,543,000	6,522,000
	7,314,000	*7,120,000*	*6,945,000*	*6,807,000*	*6,726,000*	*6,672,000*	*6,649,000*
ZENROREN	802,000	780,000	787,000	764,000	745,000	723,000	701,000
	1,036,000	*1,012,000*	*1,018,000*	*993,000*	*978,000*	*954,000*	*932,000*
ZENROKYO	258,000	247,000	169,000	160,000	154,000	150,000	139,000
	261,000	*250,000*	*172,000*	*166,000*	*160,000*	*156,000*	*152,000*
	2007 (19)	2008 (20)	2009 (21)	2010 (22)	2011 (23)	2012 (24)	2013 (25)
RENGO	6,622,000	6,623,000	6,687,000	6,732,000	6,699,000	6,693,000	6,706,000
	6,750,000	*6,761,000*	*6,832,000*	*6,876,000*	*6,839,000*	*6,839,000*	*6,844,000*
ZENROREN	684,000	663,000	647,000	635,000	620,000	607,000	592,000
	911,000	*894,000*	*883,000*	*869,000*	*860,000*	*837,000*	*827,000*

ZENROKYO	132,000	128,000	124,000	118,000	113,000	110,000	109,000
	150,000	*144,000*	*140,000*	*133,000*	*128,000*	*125,000*	*124,000*

Source: JMIAC (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau)

While bargaining in the U.S. case is based on a pluralist logic, in which the state at least formally doesn't get involved, and while bargaining in Germany happens under an institutionalized framework under the auspices of the state, the bargaining dynamics for Japanese union federations are of an entirely different order. On one hand, unions are very active and often successful at the local, or company level. On the other hand, a clientelist political tradition prevented national umbrella organizations like union federations to gain much influence in national politics, with the possible exception of the annual *Shuntō* initiatives described below.[40] (Curtis 1999; Benson 2008; Kabashima 2010) While bargaining in Germany also could be argued to be more centered on enterprises, or at least vocational sectors, an important difference with the type of union that became prevalent in Japan is that they did not seek a wider role in society. (Benson 2008) The state is much less present in bargaining than in the German case, but bargaining itself resembles the German case much better than the U.S. case. On one hand, this feature empowered unions at the local level and with regard to labor market-related demands. On the other hand, it weakened the influence of unions at the national level, in particular with regard to broader social policy issues.

The annual national *Shuntō* spring initiative, which had become a tradition since the 1940s, entered decline since the stagnation in the economy in the 1990s. *Shuntō* was the only major and regular form of union-bargaining action at the national level. In essence, *Shuntō* initiatives were wage-increase demands that would be voiced every spring by a coalition of

[40] Tsujinaka and Pekkanen suggest that labor organizations in Japan are much weaker than in Germany or South Korea. (2007)

nationally coordinated union federations. (Benson 2008) If demands were not met, short but repeated follow-up actions were the next step. While *Shuntō* action mostly was taken by larger unions and federations, they set standards that were then adopted by smaller unions. The *Shuntō* system worked well until the burst of the bubble in the 1990s. As of that point, increased work hours and increased productivity were coupled with increased pay, and these bargaining arrangements would become more dependent on individual company-union negotiations than *Shuntō*. In other words, the demise of *Shuntō* weakened collective bargaining at the national level even more, making a unified organization like RENGO even more necessary as a nationwide voice.

Table 6: Summary Labor Federations

	USA	**Germany**	**Japan**
Political tradition underlying government – social movement interaction dynamics	Strong pluralism	Neo-Corporatism	Clientelism
Predominant unionization type	Sectorial, independent from company and politics	Sectorial, integrated in negotiation frameworks between: the state, employers, and unions	Enterprise-based unionization
Action area	Market related issues and broader social issues	Market related issues and broader social issues	Union enterprises mostly focused on market-related issues
Party affiliation	Left-leaning but no formal affiliation	Eroding and loose, yet still existent affiliation primarily with SPD	Mostly left-leaning but indirect connection. Unions work just like other organizations as brokers to mobilize votes
Influence Union federations compared to each other	Weak at local and national levels	Strong at local and national level	Strong at company level, but weaker at national level
Member unions	Very specific Sectorial circumscription: Approx. 59 member unions	Larger, loosely Sectorial circumscription unions: 8 large member unions	Company specific, Matryoshka build-up of a very large number of local and company specific unions

2. Minority Organizations

2.1 USA: LULAC – League of United Latin American Citizens

Currently, the two most prominent and influential national Latino advocacy groups are the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR).[41] (Martinez 2009) Other organizations advocating on behalf of the Latino population tend to be much more specific in scope, such as being focused on students, business leaders, etc. or are local or regional. For this project, I decided to focus on LULAC instead of NCLR for a variety of reasons. While both interest groups are highly committed to the advocacy of the U.S. Latino population, contrary to NCLR, LULAC is an organization with close grassroots ties and a large membership. (Martinez 2009) Because each interest group I am interested in needs to be both an interest group in the traditional sense, – as discussed in Chapter One, as well as being an organization that fits the Mair definition of a political cleavage group, the NCLR is less suited for this analysis. (1990; 2006)

[41] For the purpose of this study I will use the term "Latino," although the literature tends to use the terms "Hispanic," and "Latino" interchangeably. Aside from a lack of theoretical agreement, the fact that the U.S. Census Bureau and research institutes like Pew also use both terms interchangeably prompted me not to go into a deeper discussion on terminology. For more on this topic, please see (among others): Oquendo 1995; Martinez 2009. With regard to Mexican-Americans, the terms Chicano/a, or Xicano/a also are used. Given the dominance of Mexican-Americans in LULAC but also in NCLR and other Latino organizations, the term is sometimes conflated with Latino or Hispanic.

In some cases, organizations may only cater to a specific demographic within the Latino community, be it with regard to the national origin, gender, or occupation of that substratum, or some organizations will operate in very specific domains such as MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) in the legal sphere. Therefore, I only considered nationwide Latino mass organizations with comprehensive agendas affecting the entire Latino community.

Founded in 1929, LULAC is also significantly older than the NCLR. LULAC presents itself as "The largest Latino civil rights and advocacy groups in the United States." (LULAC main site 2014) In the mission statement, however, it uses the term "Hispanic" instead. (LULAC "about us/Mission" 2014) NCLR, on the other hand, defines itself as "The largest Hispanic civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States." (NCLR "about us/Mission" 2014) The term "La Raza" in the NCLR name literally means "The race." The use of this term refers implicitly to the origin of NCLR's modeling itself in part after the NAACP; in other words, NCLR self-defined the Hispanic population more in terms of race, whereas LULAC has always shied away from such categorization, in part because they felt it would undercut the efforts of the NAACP.[42] (Kaplowitz 2005; NCLR "about us/history" 2014) LULAC's original stance on the discrimination of Latino Americans was originally framed as a lack of means to achieve successful integration into a majoritarian-dominated society. In other words, LULAC did not perceive their community as in need of the same types of policies intended to remedy the discrimination of African-Americans. (Kaplowitz 2005) It is not until the rise of the Chicano-movement – (cf. note 40), that LULAC gradually changes their position on this. LULAC as an organization then captures the ways in which the Mexican community, and by extension the population with a Latino background, dealt with identity struggles and discrimination issues that have plagued them.[43] (1993; 2009)

[42] MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense Fund) was created as a pendant to the NAACP's legal operations with support from LULAC. (Martinez 2009; Waters Yarsinske 2004)

[43] Two authors in particular appear much divided with regard to where LULAC stands. Marquez sees LULAC for the most part of its history as a primarily assimilationist organization with modest influence on the Civil Rights movement and a fairly naïve attitude toward anti-Latino racism; Orozco, however, credits LULAC with a significant Civil Rights movement involvement predating the larger Civil Movements struggle of the 1960s. Kaplowitz and

The qualifier "largest," as in largest organization, is confusing, but the literature points to LULAC as being larger, at least in terms of individual members and volunteers. (Martinez 2009, Kaplowitz 2005) Perhaps most importantly, during the course of its history, LULAC as an organization has changed its stance on very important issues for the Latino community such as immigration, and has taken a more independent political course from both major U.S. parties, unlike NCLR, which is credited with much more leftist attitudes and closer ties to Democratic politicians. (Marquez 2003; Kaplowitz 2009; Martinez 2009) My point here is that while an organization that is more independent from political parties, such as LULAC, may still have a programmatic content similar to that of parties, an organization already closely leaning toward one of two parties is much more likely to have similar content. In other words, selecting a case that is leaning toward one party is likely to be more similar in content, whereas in the other case, I need to see the results before I can even expect our hypothesis to be correct. In terms of party closeness – allegiance would be too a strong term here, LULAC was always much more ambivalent, in part because its middle-class cadres that tended to prefer economically conservative policies, but also because at times, LULAC leadership appeared to differ with regard to political preferences with the rank-and-file members. (Marquez 1993; Kaplowitz 2005; Martinez 2009) This ambivalence suggests that LULAC aggregates the various interests within the Latino community better into one common Latino position.[44]

Martinez can both be situated closer to Orozco, whereas Marquez became less negative in his judgment of LULAC in later writings. Much of Marquez's conclusions can be attributed to putting too much emphasis on the incentive theory framework he applies; at times it appears as if he is trying too hard to make the LULAC case fit.

[44] In addition, NCLR has always been reliant upon outside sponsorship instead of membership contributions. In an analysis of the effects of financial sponsorship on Mexican-American/Hispanic organizations, Marquez doesn't even mention LULAC as a case. Although just like other organizations, LULAC evolved to rely more on outside

Although the organization's name and the organizational mission aim at representing the wider Latino community, the bulk of the membership since its founding has been Mexican-Americans, which is not surprising because most Latino Americans do have Mexican backgrounds. (U.S. Census Bureau 2013; PewHispanic 2013) Despite this early foundation, LULAC only really started as an organization with a national agenda as of the 1960s. (Kaplowitz 2005) Before that, it was mostly active in the Southwestern areas of the U.S., particularly in Texas, New Mexico, California, and Arizona, as well as Florida.[45] These regional strongholds are still the major hubs of support of the organization, although LULAC local councils have spread all over across the U.S. and its territories. (LULAC 2014) Kaplowitz frames LULAC's increased national activity as of the 1960s as the organization's involvement as a driving force behind the wider Civil Rights movement, a claim that is disputed by another LULAC expert, Benjamin Marquez.[46] (Kaplowitz 2005; Marquez 2006) According to Marquez, LULAC was experiencing a significant decline in power and doubts Kaplowitz's emphasis of LULAC's importance to the Civil Rights movement. (1993; 2006) Regardless of whether or not LULAC

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sponsorship, at least initially, membership fees were the most important financial resource. In fact, the exclusion of LULAC as a case by Marquez appears odd, to say the least. Marquez concludes that major Mexican-American political organizations rely mostly on financial sponsors instead of grassroots. Technically, LULAC is not a Chicano organization, yet neither is NCLR, which he does include as a case. Including LULAC into this analysis indeed would have been a much better test of his hypothesis instead of focusing on organizations like NCLR that historically never had any grassroots connections comparable to LULAC.

[45] In 1948, all 49 LULAC Councils were Texan; by 1952, there were only six in 5 other states. (Marquez 1993) Of the current 900-plus councils, most are still located in the Southwest and Florida, although the organization does have at least some councils in nearly every state and territory.

[46] Also cf. Orozco 2009

was in decline during the 1960s and the 1970s, what appears to be evident is that LULAC was in a state of transition in terms of both membership and politics.

The membership data for LULAC are somewhat obscured, to put it lightly. In 2013, LULAC stated that it had 115,000 community volunteers; one year later, this number was changed to 135,000.[47] (Waters Yarsinske 2004; LULAC 2013; 2014) In numbers, LULAC underlines its market leadership with regard to the representation of the Latino population as follows: "provides counseling to more than 18,000 students per year," "Annually, LULAC engages its network of 135,000 community volunteers, 900 councils, 56 community technology centers and 14 LULAC National Educational Service Centers …" (LULAC "about" 2014) Two observations can be made here: LULAC refers to *community volunteers* instead of *members*, and nowhere does it actually mention anything about the paying membership total. On the FAQ site the following question and answer are provided:

> 4. What does it mean to be a membership based organization?
> LULAC is the largest and most active membership organization serving the Latino community. LULAC volunteer members are the driving force behind significant advancements and improvements to the quality of life for Hispanics across the country. Since LULAC's founding, our members have not wavered in their determination to end discrimination and injustice for Hispanics living in the United States. (LULAC "about/faq" 2014)

This implies that the organization's conception of *membership* mostly means nonpaying volunteer members instead the typical paying member. Although the LULAC national leadership in Washington provided me with significant help in the form of primary data, and a brief interview with their National Executive Director, repeated requests with

[47] Waters Yarsinske mentioned 115,000 as the number of volunteers. (2004) Martinez cites "Yarsinske" when pointing to a paying membership of 10,000 in 2005. (2009, 57) Unfortunately, the citation is missing from the bibliography, and the Waters Yarsinske LULAC 75th anniversary book doesn't mention this figure.

regard to paid membership, however, were ignored. I was not surprised that other authors had run into the same problem in the past. (cf. Marquez 1993; Martinez 2009)

A LULAC fiscal report for the year 2003-2004 lists $125,932 as the revenue from regular membership dues that year, as well as $3,500 from lifetime membership dues.[48] (LULAC 2004) Currently, regular membership costs about $50 annually and lifetime membership costs $1,000. (LULAC "membership" 2014) Regular LULAC membership dues for a LULAC charter group are $15 annually, with a one-time fee of $6 for new members.[49] (LULAC "members/start council" 2014) The membership dues figure is probably the accumulation of fees from charter groups – a LULAC Council – and national membership fees. The most conservative estimate I could make from this, the above number divided by the highest regular membership dues amount ($50) adds up to about 2,500 members. The most liberal estimate, dividing by charter dues, adds up to about 8,400 members. This means that the number of dues-paying members is probably somewhere in between. In other words, if I define membership strictly by including only *paying members*, the numbers estimated by Marquez's in 1993 appear in line with that. Marquez' study of LULAC paid much attention to the inability of the organization to maintain the membership numbers from earlier decades. (1993) However, aside from a likely renewed interest in membership, it appears that the logic of LULAC membership shifted in the past few decades. LULAC formal membership as computed by Marquez is simply no longer a relevant measure.

[48] After extensive research, the 2004 and 2005 LULAC financial reports were the only two I could obtain. In his study on LULAC, Marquez used a variety of sources to estimate the membership numbers for LULAC. (1993)

[49] These are just the amounts that are for the national organization, meaning that charter membership can be higher, depending on the Council in question.

In 1948, LULAC had a mere 49 LULAC Councils, all located in Texas, while 60 years later, it has more than 900 spread across the U.S. A change in funding resources also may have prompted a change in how membership is interpreted by the organization. In 1974, LULAC received nonprofit status, making it possible to receive corporate sponsorship. (Kaplowitz 2005) In that sense, the mid-1970s marked the time when LULAC changed from an exclusively member-funded organization to one more comparable to the other large Hispanic organizations. As mentioned earlier, LULAC in its own words defines membership in a much more holistic way by focusing on volunteer numbers and the councils and the local communities they operate in.[50] In conclusion, although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of LULAC *members*, in terms of popular support, the organization has always been large enough to be considered as a mass-based organization capable of weighing in on policy-making at the local and national levels.

2.2 Germany: TGD - Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland

While there is a myriad of Turkish and immigrant organizations in Germany, TGD (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland [Turkish Community in Germany]) founded in 1995 is the largest and most influential organization among the population in Germany with an immigration background. The best possible alternatives to TGD that were considered for this project are the 1993-founded

[50] According to Martinez, NCLR membership consists of affiliate organizations and individual members. (2009) To compare, NCLR doesn't list any membership data on its website but instead lists affiliated "300 community based organizations." *The Latino Intersections* page of Dartmouth University/Dartmouth College Library provides a list of Latino Organizations and Associations; listing LULAC as largest, and NCLR as having a membership of 7,000 members for the year 2002.

RTS (Rat der Türkeistämmigen Bürger [Council of Turkish-rooted citizens]) and the 1985-founded BAGIV **(**Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände [Federal working community of immigrant organizations]). (BAGIV 2011) BAGIV comprises eight nationality-based immigrant groups. However, it does not include ethnic Turks, although Kurds with Turkish citizenship are included through KOMKAR (*Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistanê li Ewrûpa – Verband der Vereine aus Kurdistan* [Union of Kurdish organizations]), and thereby is representative neither of the historically largest immigrant population group nor of the Turkish population that constitutes more than 60 percent of the population with an immigrant background in Germany.[51]

Both TGD and RTS were founded relatively late, and both aim at serving the interests of the population in Germany with a Turkish background, while the TGD is somewhat more encompassing by also fostering good relations between Turkey and Germany. Considering the fact that the Turkish population had been the largest immigration-background community in Germany for decades, the late formation of a national advocacy organization may seem surprising. Kücükhüseyin explains this time lag by pointing to internal political differences in the Turkish community –ideological issues related to politics in Germany, as well as political rivalries in Turkish politics.[52] (2002) Also, TGD proved not only to be the larger but also the politically more influential organization, while RTS limits itself to interacting with political leaders to achieve their goals, and is somewhat more elitist than TGD, which also puts a lot of

[51] An additional analysis of BAGIV, however, may be part of a future research agenda. BAGIV member federations represent part of the following immigrant communities: Spanish, Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, Serbian, Assyrian, Portuguese, and Vietnamese.

[52] There are indeed many smaller Turkish organizations with explicit ideological profiles encompassing the entire political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right.

energy into increasing its grassroots and public relations, enabling TGD to influence not only politicians directly but also public opinion at large.[53] (Kücükhüseyin 2002) In terms of issues that are reflected by TGD, but also by RTS and regional and local organizations, the equality of the Islamic faith, eradication of discrimination on the labor market, integration, and advocacy for more open immigration policies, women's rights, and friendship with Turkey are among some of the key issues. While TGD is somewhat closer to Turkey with regard to fostering a good relationship with Germany, it is independent from Turkish politics, unlike some other Turkish organizations in Germany such as DITIB (Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği [Turkish Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs]).[54] While some of the issues articulated by TGD are obviously more related to Turkey and the population with a Turkish background, there are a number of central issues that are also relevant for other, smaller communities of the subject population in Germany, such as the equality of non-Christian religions, immigration, naturalization and citizenship, integration assistance, and anti-discrimination efforts.

Aside from internal division, I should also consider that Germany did not see itself as an immigration country and assumed immigrant contingents to be temporary, as did many of the first-wave immigrants from Turkey. On one hand, like many national federated organizations, TGD is to an extent limited to voicing the overall consensus among its highly diverse member organizations. On the other hand, the subdivision organizations of TGD are devoid of extremist

[53] A few additional indices pointing to the relative weakness of RTS as a national interest group are that there is a dearth of material, there is no web page, and the fact that its national headquarters is located in the Hessian Gießen instead of Berlin.

[54] While there are smaller Turkish political organizations with explicit links to major German political parties, TGD presents itself as politically independent, in part in order to achieve higher levels of legitimacy from the many geographical, vocational, and community organizations it groups.

groups or organizations with direct links to party politics. TGD presents itself as politically independent interest group on behalf of the population with a Turkish background in Germany.[55]

Until the 1970s, the majority of foreigners in Germany consisted mostly of Italians, Greeks, Spaniards, and Austrians. As of the 1970s, Turkish citizens became the largest group of foreign residents in Germany, currently with about 1.54 million who are not citizens and about three-quarters of a million naturalized Turks since 1998. (BPB 2014; BAMF; DESTASIS 2014)

Table 7: Total population including foreigners compared to foreign, EU (and prior to that European Community), and Turkish population, in thousands.

	Total population	**Foreign total**	**EU/EC**	**Turkish**		**Total population**	**Foreign total**	**EU**	**Turkish**
1967	59948	1806	596	172	**1991**	80275	6067	1698	1779
1968	60463	1924	641	205	**1992**	80975	6670	1719	1854
1969	61195	2381	709	322	**1993**	81338	6977	1750	1918
1970	61001	2738	784	469	**1994**	81539	7118	1779	1965
1971	61503	3188	1215	652	**1995**	81817	7343	1811	2014
1972	61809	3554	1187	712	**1996**	82012	7492	1839	2049
1973	62101	3991	1278	910	**1997**	82057	7419	1850	2107
1974	61991	4051	1288	1028	**1998**	82037	7308	1854	2110
1975	61645	3900	1250	1077	**1999**	82163	7336	2299	2053
1976	61442	3852	1180	1079	**2000**	82260	7268	2329	1998
1977	61353	3892	1163	1118	**2001**	82440	7318	2343	1947
1978	61322	4006	1145	1165	**2002**	82537	7348	2299	1912
1979	61439	4251	1169	1268	**2003**	82532	7342	2346	1877
1980	61658	4566	1211	1462	**2004**	82501	7288	2108	1764
1981	61713	4721	1234	1546	**2005**	82439	7289	2144	1764
1982	61546	4672	1216	1580	**2006**	82315	7256	2523	1738
1983	61307	4574	1167	1552	**2007**	82218	7255	2562	1713
1984	61049	4405	1142	1425	**2008**	82002	7186	2584	1688
1985	61020	4482	1549*	1402	**2009**	81802	7131	2589	1658

[55] Originally DITIB (Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği [Turkish Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs]) was considered for this project. However, for a number of reasons, I opted not to include it. First, despite being the oldest national organization, founded in 1984, it only focusses on issues specifically related to religious and cultural affairs. While the name refers to Turks, its aim is rather the representation of Islam in Germany while other areas of immigrant interests are of secondary importance. Second, DITIB is far from being politically independent; the organization's imams, their superiors, and religion-attachés are all Turkish civil servants, while DITIB, itself, is an affiliate of the Turkish *Dinayet* [Presidency of Religious Affairs], an official organ of the Turkish Republic. (Yaşar 2012)

1986	61140	4662	1560	1434	**2010**	81752	7199	2663	1629
1987	61238	4286	1408	1453	**2011**	80328	7339	2822	1607
1988	61715	4624	1449	1523	**2012**	80524	6640	3050	1575
1989	62679	5007	1516	1612	**2013**	80767	7012	3366	1549
1990	79753**	5582	1644	1694					

*First year including the 15 EU member state nationals.
** Reunification year. Source: DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German Ministry of the Interior.[56]

Since a major revision of the German citizenship and nationality law (StAG) in 2000, more than half a million Turkish citizens have become naturalized German citizens. (BAMF 2012) While some Turks opted to migrate back to Turkey in the past two decades, the decreased number of Turkish citizens from its highest point in 1998 is in large part also explained by an increased number of naturalizations. According to the German Ministry of the Exterior, there are currently about 3 million *Türkischstämmige* [literally: Turkish-rooted], or citizens and noncitizens with Turkish backgrounds. (2014) Almost half of the current foreign population is from within the EU realm, which means that the Turkish population remains by far the largest immigrant group, representing almost half of non-EU immigration.

Table 8: Naturalizations of Turkish citizens since the revision of German citizenship and nationality legislation 2000.

1998	56,994	**2006**	33,388
1999	100,324	**2007**	28,861
2000	82,861	**2008**	24,449
2001	76,573	**2009**	24,647
2002	64,631	**2010**	26,192
2003	56,244	**2011**	28,103
2004	44,465	**2012**	33,246
2005	32,661		

Source: BAMF (Bundesamt fur Migration und Flüchtlinge) and DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German Ministry of the Interior.

[56] More specific data prior to 1990 is not available. *Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler*, ethnic Germans with citizenship rights in Germany primarily from the former Soviet Union, Romania and Poland, are not included because they were automatically counted within the category of German citizens. About 2.5 million Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler arrived in Germany between 1990 and 2010, although since 2005, the annual immigration rate dropped below 10,000. (BPB 2011) Data for 1970-1989 had to be calculated from annual immigration data.

Because an overwhelming majority of the *Türkischstämmige* population of 3 million has an Islamic religious background, the Turks also represent a majority of more than 60 percent of the approximately 3.8 million to 4.3 million Muslims in Germany. (BAMF 2009) As a consequence, Islamic is often conflated with Turkish in anti-immigration political rhetoric. Because Turks in Germany not only constitute the overwhelming majority among the population with immigrant backgrounds, but also the majority of Germany's population with ties to Islam, they constitute an excellent case to analyze the relationship between the majority population and what is often perceived by the latter as the "dangerous other" population in the sense of Zolberg and Woon when compared to the Hispanic population in the U.S. (1999)

The structure of TGD is dual and on one hand mirrors the regional distribution of the population with a Turkish background. Of the 11 federal state TGD federations, 10 are located in what used to be West Germany, with two separate TGD federations in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia. (TGD 2014) The only TGD federation in the former GDR area contains the state of Berlin and Brandenburg; the national headquarters is also located in Berlin. On the other hand, TGD also forms the umbrella organization of several federations and vocational groups without geographic circumscription, such as Turkish-German academics, students, physicians, and entrepreneurs.

2.3 Japan: BLL – Buraku Kaihō Dōmei [Buraku Liberation League]

The Burakumin, or *village people,* are a group that is linguistically, ethnically, racially and culturally indistinguishable from the majority population in Japan.[57] The difference between the

[57] While Burakumin is acceptable as English equivalent for addressing the minority, in Japanese it is less accepted as it is often still used in a pejorative form; instead Hisabetsu Burakumin [discriminated village people] is more

majority population and the Burakumin is that they are historically considered to be a lower caste, comparable to low castes in India, hence the term "hidden race" that is sometimes used to describe them. (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966) The origins of the group as a distinct social caste reach back to the Tokugawa or Edo period of 1603-1868, when Buddhist beliefs together with local Japanese religious traditions promoted including the idea of *unclean* occupations, such as leather workers, butchers, executioners, undertakers, and urban sanitation workers. (Alldritt 2000) In fact, the fear of pollution in Japanese culture reaches back to the founding myths of Japan thousands of years ago, long before the introduction of foreign religious or philosophical systems such as Buddhism, Confucianism or even Christianity. Buruma goes even so far to highlight the significance of purity and fear of pollution by stating that it could be understood as the Japanese equivalent to original sin in Western culture. (1984) People belonging in or related to the Buraku group were categorized as *eta,* or *dirty/filthy mass*. The rigidly hierarchical, semi-feudal structure of Tokugawa Japan furthered the gradual growth of an entirely new caste that in most cases was also constrained to living within their own communities and villages, from which the term Burakumin was derived. While in European and Islamic countries similar policies were enacted, stigmatizing parts of the population, the difference was that Burakumin, aside from their occupations, originally did not have any religious, ethnic or other distinguishing features.[58]

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appropriate within a Japanese context. The Tokugawa era term *eta* [a term referring to defilement or filth] is now considered particularly derogatory. (Kitaguchi 1999)

[58] During the Tokugawa era, differences were aggravated by dress prescriptions, curfews, and even agricultural restrictions.

With the removal, or rather modernization, of the feudal Tokugawa societal hierarchy the Buraku minority also was formally emancipated.[59] A consequence of the Meiji emancipation was that Burakumin received last names that were indistinguishable from the majority population. Despite the apparent difficulty in discriminating against a group that was now virtually indistinguishable, discrimination of the Buraku minority continues to this day. Until recently, the Japanese government even denied the existence of discriminated minorities in Japan before the U.N., contradicting government policies started in the late 1960s to address discrimination against the Burakumin. (Kitaguchi 1999) A few of the visible elements that remained and were used to discriminate were, among others: maps indicating the historic Buraku districts and villages, high poverty rates among Burakumin, and historically separate registries listing Burakumin households as of the early 18th century. (Alldritt 2000)

During the Meiji era (1868-1912), the first movements originated locally with the goal to elevate the living standards of the Buraku population. As of 1922, a national organization under the name Buraku Liberation League (*Buraku Kaihō Dōmei)* emerged, yet was disbanded during wartime. After World War II, equality of all citizens is once more confirmed in the new constitution, yet discriminatory practices remain. To an extent, Buraku people could still be found out based on the towns they came from, municipal registries, or background checks conducted by employers. Similar to families with *Zainichi*/resident-Korean or non-Japanese backgrounds or connections, Buraku generally would attempt to hide their origins to the outside world in order to prevent open or covert discrimination in social life or on the work floor. As of

[59] The caste system was not entirely abolished, but rather was adapted to the needs and goals of the Meiji rulers. The *Kuge* court-based nobility, for example, was merged with the *Daimyo* caste into a new nobility class of *Kazuko*, and the various nobles were ranked according to European equivalents like dukes, counts, and barons. Noble titles, with the exception of the imperial family, were abolished after the end of WWII.

the 1960s, the Japanese government started assimilation projects to address some of the discrimination issues, thereby officially recognizing the problem for the first time. (Hah and Lapp 1978; Pharr 1990; Reber 1998; Gordon 2010)

While the Buraku population is not the only group that is part of the subject population dominated by the majority population within the Japanese context, it is by far the largest group. The exact size of the Buraku minority is unknown, although various estimates put their number between 1 million and more than 10 million. (BLL 1998; Aldldritt 2000; Gordon 2008) While the government numbers are significantly lower, ranging between 1 million and 2 million, other minorities in Japan are still substantially smaller, both domestic historical minorities like the *Zainichi* or resident Koreans, Ainu, and immigrant groups.[60] The numbers of the Zainichi category are also obfuscated by a number of factors, but the number lies somewhere between half a million and 1 million out of a population of 127 million. The smallest ethnic minority, the

[60] Zainichi Koreans, or resident Koreans, are descendents of the then-imperial Japanese subjects from Korea residing on the Japanese mainland. Although most of them went to Korea after WWII, the approximately 650,000 who stayed lost their nationality, although were permitted as legal residents. Because of the difficult and in part humiliating naturalization process, many opted to remain residents for generations. The Ainu population is an indigenous group of between 25,000 and 200,000 mostly present on the Hokkaido island, with some presence in adjacent Russian areas. Ainu have a distinct language, religion, and cultural tradition from the main population and are also considered to be ethnically distinct.

Official figures stem from the population data of districts depending on *Dōwa*, or assimilation settlements support programs for Burakumin. It is not including Burakumin not in poverty or Burakumin who prefer to be perceived as just poor instead of as living on Buraku assistance programs. (Aldritt 2000)

Ainu population, is since 1997 the only officially recognized ethnic minority in Japan.[61] (Weiner 2009) While Burakumin formally are citizens, unlike the resident Korean minority, they do experience similar levels of discrimination in other areas. However, given the fact that they are citizens and there is governmental recognition of Buraku discrimination and the need to resolve it, they are politically in a much better position.

Similar to BLL, some of the other subject population groups have advocacy organizations. Three organizations compete to represent the resident Korean minority. One is the 1948-founded MINDAN (*Zai-Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan* [Korean Residents Union in Japan]) which has ties to South Korea, whereas its competitor CHONGRYON (*Zai-Nihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai* [General Association of Korean Residents in Japan]) has ties to North Korea.[62] (Mitchell and O'Toole 1997; Chung 2010) Both MINDAN and CHONGRYON advocate the maintenance of Korean identity and connection with North Korea, and discourage assimilation, Japanese citizenship acquisition, and marriages with Japanese. The main difference, aside from affiliation with North or South Korea, lies in the degree to which these principles were advocated, and at least with regard to MINDAN, the staunch anti-assimilationist dogmatic position declined somewhat. As such, both organizations initially presented themselves rather as an advocacy group of foreign citizens in Japan, and not as an ethnic minority advocacy group. However, as Chung pointed out, the positions of both organizations strengthened the position of the Japanese government in excluding resident Koreans as an ethnic minority, and triggered a legitimacy decrease for both organizations among the second and third generation resident

[61] Other smaller ethnic minorities in Japan include: resident Taiwanese/Chinese (descendants of former Japanese imperial subjects from Taiwan), Okinawans/Ryukyuans, descendants of former non-ethnic-Japanese people from Japanese imperial possesions in the Pacific.

[62] Both MINDAN and CHONGRYON also have Korean names.

Koreans. (2010) Over time, MINDAN became the largest and most politically influential resident Korean organization, with about two-thirds of the resident Koreans as its members. Currently MINDAN advocates integration of resident Koreans in Japanese society, by focusing on issues such as demanding local suffrage. The third and youngest resident Korean organization, founded in the 1970s, is MINTOHREN (Minzoku Sabetsu to Tatakau Renraku Kyogikai [National Council for Combatting Discrimination Against Ethnic Peoples in Japan]), which is a younger association and in many ways can be seen as the organizational resultant of declined MINDAN and CHONRYON legitimacy among newer generations of resident Koreans. MINTOHREN is advocating for integration of resident Koreans through a multicultural approach. Unlike the previous two organizations, MINTOHREN holds no formal affiliation with North or South Korea and focuses more on local issues and Japan as its homeland. (Fukuoka and Tsujiyama 1992)

For the purpose of this project, I opted to focus on the Buraku minority, not only because they are by far the largest minority in Japan, but also because of a number of additional considerations. First, Japan was deliberately chosen as a case because of its very young and still-closed status, comparatively speaking, as an immigrant country. This also means that there is a relative dearth of data on how immigrant groups affect political parties. The analysis of the relationship of existing domestic minorities may provide us with an idea of how future relationships evolve between a growing, and/or better-integrated immigrant population and Japanese parties. Second, while Burakumin are citizens, the majority of the resident Koreans are not. Although it would be wrong to argue that relevant political parties do not pay any attention to the plight of the resident Koreans, from an electoral point of view, political parties wouldn't

be as interested in them.[63] Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, despite the fact that Burakumin share ethnic origins with the majority population, throughout history they have been continuously depicted and treated as ethnically or racially different. (Kitaguchi 1999) In fact, the start of what Kitaguchi calls "ethnic difference" theory was perpetuated as of the Tokugawa era, implying that the Burakumin were descendants of Korean immigrants and were considered "Kikajin ('descendants of those who have changed their nationality,' the Japanese as yet having no word for *immigrant*)." (1999, 78-85) Kitaguchi links the Buraku discrimination of the Tokugawa era with anti-Korean prejudices of Japan since the Meiji era. Also, in the modern era there is a lot of overlap with regard to the social realities of resident Koreans and Buraku. On one hand, Koreans that settled in Japan in pre-WWII Japan often engaged in activities typical for Buraku such as selling shoes, creating businesses taken over by the coming generations in modern Japan. (Gordon 2008) On the other hand, neighborhoods historically inhabited by Buraku also exhibited high numbers of resident Korean populations, which is part helped strengthen solidarity and cooperation between both minorities.

While it would be incorrect to state that the Zainichi minority is the same as the Buraku minority, and while some issues central to resident Koreans such as suffrage and political rights are not an issue for Buraku, there are at least a number of social issues rooted in historic discrimination of both minorities, such as poverty, educational disparity, social discrimination by the majority population, and perhaps most importantly a lack of acknowledgement as an ethnic

[63] On party political activity on behalf of resident Koreans, see Chung 2010. While this may also be true for the noncitizen part of the Hispanic and Turkish immigrants in the U.S. and Germany, unlike resident Koreans, substantially more members of both minorities are citizens compared with those who are not. On top of that, the proportion of both Hispanic and Turkish minority members in the U.S. and Germany are significantly higher, especially in particular geographic areas.

minority by the government, that created a shared set of interests. Additionally, deep-rooted, ancient beliefs and fear of pollution mixed with modern ideas of racial purity created an environment apprehensive of those considered to be foreign and impure. In short, while the analysis of BLL mainly reveals the relationship between Japanese parties, and the main advocacy organization of the Buraku population, our insights may help understand the nature of the relationship between political parties and other identity-interest groups representing smaller segments of the subject population as well.

Initially, the BLL was mostly successful at the local level in the 1950s and the1960s. It was not until the late 1960s that pressure from the BLL also had influence on national politics, not just with regard to specific Buraku issues, but also in the field of Human Rights legislation. (Kitaguchi 1999) In 1968, the BLRI (Buraku Liberation Research Institute) was founded with assistance of the Osaka prefecture and city. (BLHRRI 2014) From 1969 until 2002, the Japanese governments invested in Dōwa projects (Assimilation Projects/Policies [dōwa taisaku jigyō]) aimed at improving the education and housing facilities of communities in need. (Gordon 2008) Technically, these types of projects were aimed at the poorest in Japanese society, although in practice most of the beneficiaries were Buraku. The latter is not surprising because the Buraku were proportionally much more severely affected by poverty as a result of centuries of discrimination.[64]

Reflecting the increased scope of the BLL, now also more generally advocating on behalf of human rights for all inhabitants of Japan, the institute's name was changed to BLHRRI (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute) in 1998. The shift from only focusing

[64] In some cases, Buraku would refuse to rely on Dōwa assistance out of fear it would signal to the outside world their Buraku identity.

on Buraku specifically to human rights more generally also could be explained by the fact that the BLL was aware of the Japanese government's intentions to end the Dōwa projects. (Gordon 2008) The end of the Dōwa measures also reduced the BLL's influence on politics, as they were deeply involved in the implementation. The BLHRRI can be described as the research and content pillar of BLL. While the BLHRRI/BLL has several publications, the only regular publication is the bimonthly *Buraku Liberation Newsletter,* which I used for this analysis because it adequately reflects the new programmatic accents the BLL has adopted during the past two decades regarding Buraku rights, but also more generally the human rights of other minorities in Japan.

Politically, the BLL and former Buraku movements have always have been closer to socialist parties, in particular the JSP (Japan Socialist Party) and the JCP (Japan Communist Party). Initially, the BLL was intensely left militant, but gradually became more moderate. (Hah and Lapp 1978) During the time when the national government became involved in the Buraku issue in the early 1960s, political rivalry and disagreements among the militant leftist and moderate Buraku, in part fostered by the JCP, led to a split between Buraku activists supporting JCP or JSP. JCP went as far to create a party-affiliated Buraku advocacy group, *Zenkairen* (National Coalition of Buraku Liberation), yet the independent BLL remained the main advocacy group supported by the Buraku population.[65] (Gordon 2008) Similar to the evolution of RENGO, the implosion of the old JSP in the 1990s provided the BLL with the opportunity to repackage itself as a politically more diverse organization, and while it is generally closer to the DPJ, there

[65] There were more attempts to create alternative national Buraku advocacy groups, yet none of these managed to push BLL from its dominant position. (cf. Gordon 2008)

is some support for LDP politicians as well.[66] BLL has its national office in Tokyo but also has an affiliate national office in Osaka, which can be explained by the larger number of citizens with Buraku background and influence in Osaka-area politics.[67] (BLL 2014a) BLL has community chapters organized by seven larger regional subdivisions, which themselves are grouping several prefectural communities. (BLL 2014b) The BLL has no presence in areas that historically only had a very small Buraku population or none at all, meaning they have no presence in Hokkaido and the northern part of Honshu.[68]

Table 9: Summary Minority/Immigrant advocacy organizations

	USA	**Germany**	**Japan**
Political tradition underlying government – social movement interaction dynamics	Strong pluralism	Neo-Corporatism	Clientelism
Predominant organization type	Moved from individual membership to dual individual membership and community membership organization	Local communities and organizations as members	Local communities and organizations as members
Action area	Fighting discrimination against Hispanic U.S. citizens and immigrant community	Fighting discrimination against Turkish German citizens and immigrant community	Fighting discrimination against Burakumin citizens and defending human rights
Party affiliation	No formal affiliation	Closer to the Greens and Social Democrats	Originally leaning towards JCP and JSP, but now more independently leaning towards DPJ
Influence as compared to each other	Weak at local and national levels	Strong at local and national levels – lower presence in former GDR	Strong at local level in some areas of the country, (in particular Osaka region) but weaker at national level
Member organizations	Hierarchy of LULAC community chapters, organized by state, and member-volunteers	Dual hierarchy of TGD community chapters organized by state grouping several local groups, and separate other federations.	Hierarchy of BLL community chapters, organized by prefecture – no presence in North

[66] Including LDP Diet members with a Buraku background.

[67] The Osaka office that is also home to the BLHRRI has 30 staff members, whereas the national headquarters in Tokyo only has 10. Most prefectural offices have a staff between one and 10. (Correspondence with BLL 2014)

[68] Hokkaido and Honshu are the two most northern of the four Japanese main islands.

Chapter Three: Methodology and Data

Overview

In order to provide an answer to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter One, a content analysis-based method will be employed to compare the programmatic content of extra-electoral identity-interest organizations with that of national election manifestos published by the national political parties. The main assumption is that the programmatic content of the largest national union federations' documents will much better translate the *worker* side of the "workers-vs.-employers" cleavage than any political party does because unions traditionally cater to that demographic, whereas in order to win elections, parties have a need to expand their potential voter reservoirs. In a similar vein, I will explore the extent to which the issues important to the largest segments of the subject population are translated by the national parties. In other words, the level to which party documents correspond with these of identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of these groups will tell us how well parties translate the issues important to the population on one side of a cleavage divide, to what extent these parties can be considered to be representative of that population segment, and to what extent different party systems are representative of that population segment.

Because of practical considerations, I limited the analysis to a selection of the largest and most influential union federations and minority advocacy groups. On one hand, this enables us to lay a foundation for what promises to be an interesting research project with an exciting future research agenda. On the other hand, because it is impossible to include all potential organizations advocating on behalf of the selected populations on the worker and subject-population pole of the two cleavages under analysis, our findings will not be complete. However, while the

inclusion of additional identity-interest organizations representing the workers and subject-population side of the selected cleavages would provide even more accurate results, I contend that by selecting those groups advocating on behalf of the largest segment of the sociological base of the subject-population and worker-cleavage poles, I will at least have a result that approximates models and mechanisms of what I likely would find if it were actually possible to compare the demands of the entire sociological base of both cleavage groups with the programmatic content of parties.

It makes sense to expect a significant difference in topics and emphasis between party manifestos on one hand and extra-electoral organizations' documents on the other. However, the point here is not to establish the obvious fact that there is such a difference; instead, the goals provided by the formulated hypotheses are to measure which parties do a better job translating cleavage alignments of the respective groups, and to discover what trends appear.

1. Methodology - Computerized Content Analysis

The analysis of political parties' ideological, dimensional, policy and cleavage positions has grown as an important aspect of empirical data collection within the field of political science. Dinas and Gemenis distinguish three types of methods either used separately or in combination to do so: expert surveys, opinion poll data, and content analysis of party manifestos. (2009) While there certainly are expert data on the types of organizations analyzed here, I was unable to find uniform formats, in part because of the infinite nature of the interest-organization arena when compared with the electoral arena. Given the unique topic of this project comparing documents of political parties and identity-interest organizations, expert survey data, aside from a potential subjectivity bias, would only be useful for party-centric projects and thus will not be

considered here. Opinion poll data has been considered as a method in earlier drafts, yet given the lack of sufficient uniform survey data on multiple cases over a significantly long time span, this approach also had to be abandoned. Voting results and membership data may say something about the support political parties receive – and membership may say something about non-party-organization support – yet as a variable, they do not really say anything independently about the position a party takes on a cleavage, nor about how well it will translate cleavages. The only pertinent remaining method that is sufficient for this project is content analysis. Aside from that content analysis also enables us to compare party and non-party texts with each other.

Slapin and Proksch classify content analysis methods within the field of political science in two categories: hand-coded methods and computer-based approaches. (2008) The largest project involving hand-coded content analysis is the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto's Project MRG/CMP/MARPOR. (Volkens et al. 2013; also cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) Aside from the enormous time and resources hand-coded content analysis would require for this project – the DGB case, for example, encompasses 77 documents, each between about 40 and 300 pages long, or several million words in total – there are a number of theoretical reasons for not applying this method. The hand-coded approach depends on the subjective judgment of the coder to attach meaning to the coded fragments. Although coders are usually trained in order to avoid too-subjective selections, there remains a significant risk of human bias. On top of the simplification mentioned in Chapter One of only using a left-vs.-right dimension, the coder's subjectivity bias, and the ability to read, translate, and accurately interpret non-native languages, further decrease the quality of the data. An additional, related concern is that findings are often compared to the results of expert surveys.

Since there is nothing similar that is available for the identity-interest organizations included in this project, this method can't be applied here.

An innovation in content analysis of party manifestos and political texts came with the creation of the *Wordscores* software by Benoit et al. (2003; Benoit et al. 2009) As Benoit et al. put it: "Our crucial move is to abandon the notion, which runs throughout most political science content analysis, that the objective of an analyst coding a text is to identify its meaning. Indeed, this notion has been so much taken for granted that it is seldom even recognized as an assumption." (2003, 329) Furthermore, they assert that this focus on a priori attachment of meaning to text prevented the generation of a successful computerized method of content analysis. (329) The identification of meaning of words comes after the step of coding.

The attractiveness of *Wordscores* lies in the ease with which it can be applied to large amounts of data compared with previous techniques. The meaning of words in *Wordscores* is determined by the use of two documents representing opposing ends of the dimension one wishes to analyze. With the exception of filtering out stop words and irrelevant data (e.g. headers and footers, page numbers, dates), *Wordscores* does not rely on human coders to interpret word meaning a priori as with the MRG/CMP/MARPOR data. The accuracy of *Wordscores'* results depends on the similarity of meaning of words over time. One way to ensure this is to have a lexicographic similarity that is as close as possible. In some cases, however, it is impossible to find texts that are similar in word use. For example, in elections for which no manifestos exist, the coder must select data from alternative program data such as speeches, pamphlets, and other publications. I should not expect documents published by identity-interest groups to be any less comparable; in fact, out of the six extra-electoral organizations' texts selected for this project,

half are identical in format in terms of lexicography, while the other half are at least similar enough in terms of lexicography despite different formats.

Regardless of the success of *Wordscores* as a method, some of the underlying assumptions and practical considerations make it less attractive for this project. A first concern is that *Wordscores* relies on the appropriate selection of two reference texts. In a nutshell, the problem is similar to attaching meaning to words in hand coded approaches, as the identification of reference texts may be just as subjective. (Slapin and Proksch, 2008) Additionally, *Wordscores* requires the identification of two documents that demarcate the opposite poles of the distribution. Unfortunately, by doing so, it also impedes the accuracy of the estimate in the case that there are documents that would fall outside the scope of these demarcations with a more dynamic model, and thus would create the risk of an additional bias of not selecting the *best* two documents for this. A more important problem caused by the former problem, and specifically relevant to this project, is that *Wordscores* doesn't deal well with time series; in fact, Benoit et al. argue against using *Wordscores* for time series, as the meanings of words change from election to election. Attempts have been made to resolve this problem by expanding the amount of reference texts, yet problems remain. Slapin and Proksch summarize this as follows:

> "Time-series party positions can be estimated with *Wordscores* if one is ready to make three assumptions. First, the political lexicon remains sufficiently stable over time, second, chosen reference texts include all relevant words over time, and third, the reference texts represent the most extreme positions during the time period." (2008, 708)

For the purpose of this project, I opted to apply *Wordfish,* developed by Slapin and Proksch. (2008) Because *Wordfish* does not require reference texts, the latter two assumptions mentioned in the quote above are unnecessary. Instead, *Wordfish* "… assumes an underlying statistical distribution of word counts, and, […] the ability to use all words in all documents and to estimate

the importance of each of these words." (2008, 708) In terms of dimensionality – or in this case, dichotomous cleavages – "*Wordfish* assumes the principle dimension extracted from texts captures the political content of those texts." (2008, 711) Although Slapin and Proksch warn against using documents in their entirety to determine the position of an organization on multiple dimensions, there should be no problem with regard to the analysis of one dimension or cleavage. (712) If I were to be interested in only foreign policy, for example, running the analysis on the entire text of the manifestos would provide inaccurate results because large segments of text may not deal with it. Yet if I approach the selected documents in their entirety as representative of an organization's position on an underlying abstract structural division, I should not run into this problem.

The one remaining potential problem is the stability of word meaning over time. However, this is a problem that all current existing content analysis methods face when dealing with time series.[69] An advantage of *Wordfish* with regard to this is that "If the political lexicon changes by words entering and exiting the political dialogue, rather than changing meaning, our method does take these changes into account when estimating positions." (711) In sum, *Wordfish* is a methodological tool that best fits the analytical goals set by this project.

Wordfish has only been around for a few years, which explains why the number of studies to date remains relatively low.[70] *Wordfish* is a scaling algorithm that helps to estimate policy positions based on word frequencies. (Slapin and Proksch 2008) The advantages over

[69] Indeed, qualitative studies such as expert surveys are also affected by this because experts' understanding of the meaning of words may also be contingent upon the period in which they were socialized, schooled, and their research took place.

[70] The *Wordfish* website contains software, publications and manuals free of charge: http://www.wordfish.org/index.html

previous content-analysis methods can be summarized as follows: "[…] its ability to produce time-series estimates, the fact that it does not require the use of reference texts because it instead assumes an underlying statistical distribution of word counts, and, lastly, the ability to use all words in every document and to estimate the importance of each of these words." (2008, 708)

The stochastic model that underlies *Wordfish* is a Poisson process that counts a number of events and the frequencies of those events within a set time frame.[71] Slapin and Proksch explain the model as follows:

> This particular distribution is chosen because of its estimation simplicity: it only has one parameter, λ, which is both the mean and the variance. This assumption means that the number of times party *i* mentions word *j* in election year *t* is drawn from a Poisson distribution. This model specification is essentially a Poisson naïve Bayes model […] The functional form of the model is as follows:
>
> $$Y_{ijt} \sim Poisson(\lambda_{ijt})$$
> $$\lambda_{ijt} = \exp(\alpha_{it} + \psi_j + \beta_j * \omega_{it})$$
>
> where Y_{ijt} is the count of word *j* in party *i*'s manifesto at time *t*, α is a set of party-election year fixed effects, ψ is a set of word fixed effects, β is an estimate of a word-specific weight capturing the importance of word *j* in discriminating between party positions, and ω is the estimate of party *i*'s position in election year *t* (therefore it is indexing one specific manifesto).[72] (2008, 709-711)

Before being able to run *Wordfish*, the selected documents need to be carefully processed and a word frequency matrix created. Because the processing of the documents differs from case to case, I will elaborate on this step in the following sections of this chapter. For the step of creating a word frequency matrix, however, the method is uniform. For all documents I used *Jfreq* as

[71] This type of distribution was named after the mathematician Simeon Denis Poisson, which also explains the name of the software *Wordfish*.

[72] For an entire overview of how the right-hand side of the equation is estimated, and a summary of the implementation in *R*, please see Slapin and Proksch 2008: pp. 709-712. For a manual on how to use *Wordfish* in *R*, please see Proksch and Slapin 2009.

word frequency generating and stemming software. (Lowe 2011) To filter out stop words – words without substantive meaning – I used the Porter list. (2001) The advantage of both *Jfreq* and the Porter list, aside from being frequently used for content-analysis purposes, is that the former can recognize German words, and that the latter has equivalent versions for a number of other languages than English, including German. For the original Japanese texts analyzed in this project, I had to include an additional step in the data-processing phase. Although I will elaborate more thoroughly on this in the section on Japanese parties, the nutshell version is that for the word recognition of Japanese characters in a text, I will employ so-called tokenizer software.

For this project, the selected documents will come both from parties and from identity-interest groups. In some cases, the publication of the selected identity-interest group documents will be in line with election years. In other cases there will be gaps, but that should not matter, as the word frequencies of all documents are weighed relative to each other regardless of their publication dates. As stated earlier, the selected documents should be similar from a lexicographic point of view. Indeed, most of the selected documents are very similar in the way they are formulated. After careful consideration of potential problems regarding document selection and validity issues, including extensive correspondence with one of the *Wordfish* creators, Sven-Oliver Proksch, I am confident that the method selected here is very well suited for the purposes of my analysis.[73] Table 10 provides a summary of the documents included here: manifestos, resolution texts, platforms, and in some cases policy-related press statements.

Table 10: Summary data collection

US • Party Organization o Democratic o Republican	*Publication years:* 1960-2012/1992-2012	*Type of documents:* Presidential platforms

[73] For further reading on pitfalls and validity issues, please see: Proksch and Slapin (2009), Franchino and Mariotto (2012). During the data collection phase, I had extensive email and phone contact with Dr. Proksch.

• Interest Groups o AFL-CIO o LULAC	1960-2013 1994-2013	Platform proposals Council Recommendations/resolutions Resolutions Policy platforms Resolutions
Germany • Party Organization o CDU/CSU* o SPD o FDP o PDS/Die Linke o Bündnis 90/Die Grüne • Interest Group o DGB o TGD	1960-2013/1994-2013 1962-2010 1995-2013	Election manifestos** Resolutions Press statements/policy statements
Japan**** • Party Organization o LDP o SDPJ/JSP o DPJ o New Komei o Other*** • Interest Group o RENGO o BLL	1998-2013 1998-2013 1998-2009	Election manifestos **** Press statements Press statements

* For a few elections, CDU and CSU did not participate in the elections as one formation.

** In a few earlier cases, no explicit program was printed and instead an election declaration is used.

*** Minor parties that received representation in the Japanese upper or lower houses in the period of the analysis

**** Although the time period is shorter, I did manage to create a lot of data points because I consider elections for both the upper and lower houses; for both RENGO and BLL, annual data are available.

***** Election programs were not published before 2000; a change in the election law changed this. Some of the programs from before that time that were used for the analysis are in fact basic programs and not specifically tailored to one election.

Proksch et al. demonstrated that even a comparison of newspaper interview responses can be similar enough to conduct this type of analysis in a credible way. (2010) Franchino and Mariotto also demonstrated that different formats of documents are not an obstacle for comparison as long they are lexicographically similar. (2012) As long as I include documents covering policy-related content, while controlling for idiosyncratic terminology – for example, the use of "It is resolved that" in resolution texts – the use of different formats (e.g. platforms,

resolutions, press statements) should not be an obstacle to the analysis. For each of the case chapters, I will provide a more thorough discussion of the selected documents in the following sections.

Computerized content-analysis methods such as *Wordscores* or *Wordfish* usually do not include proxy variables. Either a manifesto was published for an election year and it is included, or no manifesto was published and there is no data included to fill this void. Absent manifestos are generally explained in two possible ways: irretrievable data or lack of publication. Only in the first case – the fact that some data may not be retrievable, accessible, or otherwise not usable for the analysis – the use of a proxy seems justified, as it fills up a void that theoretically could have been filled because data does exist. In the event of the other possibility, the addition of proxies seems unjustified. A potential problem emerges when doing time-series analysis because with the entrance of new parties, the content of their manifestos is weighed against that of those longer-established parties. The potential problem is that in terms of words used, the older programs will weigh more heavily in the analysis than manifestos of new parties. However, *Wordfish* in particular takes into account this changing context, making it much more suitable to time-series analysis. Whereas it may be accurate that the usage of certain words throughout the consecutive party manifestos of an established party will influence the way in which the difference in cleavage positions of the party is measured, the newer manifestos will still influence this measurement, too. To ensure that the analysis doesn't become skewed by words that only have high frequencies in one or few documents, I apply a 20 percent rule previously used in other analyses applying *Wordfish*. (Proksch and Slapin 2009, 334) This means that words

used in less than 20 percent of the documents are not included in the analysis.[74] Making sure that only words used in at least one-fifth of the documents are included ensures that I have a very reliable basis of comparison.[75]

[74] To an extent, the limit of 20 percent is arbitrary. An additional reason why Slapin and Proksch applied it is that it would guarantee that only words that were present in at least two elections were used. Given that this project involves multiple cases and decades, I chose the 20 percent cutoff as a practical way to filter out data that would only skew the analysis but not really contribute to it, and to create a uniform mold that would guarantee the use of words that are used in different years *and* by different organizations.

[75] A minor concern is that the included organizations only represent one side of a cleavage, whereas organizations on the opposite end of the spectrum are not included here. In particular with the union federation cases, the addition of employer organizations might seem feasible. The short answer to this is yes, this might add to even better results. However, just like a building can only be built once a foundation is created, it matters to focus first only on one type of organization in comparison with political parties. By making a comparison between one specific interest group and political parties, I can draw clear conclusions that will help us create a future research design involving several extra-electoral organizations *and* political parties from opposite sides of a cleavage. It should also be noted that in some cases, there may not be an organizational emanation *opposite* pole, such as an advocacy organization representing the dominant group in a society.

Although the organizations selected within the three cases are by far the largest of their kind, one could argue that including more organizations would provide an even better analysis. My response to this concern would be in line with the one above: Yes, this is definitely an element considering for a future research agenda. However, unlike the electoral arena, the arena of extra-political mass organizations is not a closed system. Although I agree that exploring more organizations would definitely be an element for a future research agenda, one purpose of this analysis is to provide a clear basis justifying such an agenda by focusing on organizations that could be considered *market leaders* in their field.

2. Data Collection: US, Germany, Japan Case Studies

2.1 United States

2.1.1 Parties

For the U.S. parties, I selected the 28 presidential election platforms since 1960. Although presidential elections are not the only type of elections that could be understood as *national*, there are a number of reasons why the Congressional elections were not included. First, there is too much irregularity and difference in the documents that were produced. Weak party discipline and coherence, or the "empty vessels" nature of both U.S. parties, only contribute to this lack of a clear national program in non-presidential election years. (Katz and Kolodny 1994) With a few exceptions, nearly all national conventions of both parties have been held during presidential election years.[76] This could be explained by the fact that candidates for the House and the Senate during non-presidential election years rely on the local party organizations. It would be incorrect to state that there are no texts available at all. The 1994 Republican "Contract with America" and the 2010 "Pledge to America," or the Democratic "100 hours plan," are but a few of such texts.[77] In terms of both content and format, however, they differ significantly from each other. On one hand, they are often much more succinct than presidential platforms, and on the other hand, the content may range from that of a strategic guideline to that of an electoral pamphlet. The CMP/MRG/MARPOR project, currently the largest manifesto research database, does list the non-presidential election years, yet doesn't hold any data at all for midterm elections. (Volkens et al. 2013) As a consequence of the lack of a regular midterm convention cycle and accompanying texts, the content of the House and Senate candidates also will reflect the state or

[76] The DNC, for example, only held national conventions for midterm elections in 1974, 1978, and 1982.

[77] GOP website: http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/solutions/a-pledge-to-america.pdf

district level much more than the national presidential platforms. This constitutes an additional reason not to consider the few texts that could be considered as midterm platforms.

Table. 11: Approximate word count for Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2012.

Year	Democratic Party – total words	Republican Party – total words
1960	**16,106**	10,683
1964	**20,129**	8,743
1968	**16,794**	10,016
1972	**25,618**	24,410
1976	**21,205**	20,476
1980	**38, 186**	34,569
1984	**37,234**	27,400
1988	4,841	**35,856**
1992	8,558	**28,548**
1996	18,110	**27,840**
2000	24,223	**34,558**
2004	17,754	**41,788**
2008	**25,997**	23,618
2012	26,565	**31,355**

Bold-printed totals are the largest number of words used by a party for that election year.

2.1.2 Identity-Interest Organizations – AFL-CIO

Because the types of documents addressing national politics varied over the years, and because the AFL-CIO changed its national convention cycle, four different categories of primary sources had to be consulted: AFL-CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and Republican Conventions (published 1960-1984), AFL-CIO Executive Council recommendations taken from the biannual AFL-CIO Executive Council reports of 1985-1993, AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-CIO biannual conventions 1995-1999, and the AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-CIO quadrennial conventions 2001-2013. These texts represent a level of lexicographic similarity that is more than sufficient to be adequate for a successful content analysis comparison with presidential platforms.[78]

[78] AFL-CIO adopted resolution texts of the quadrennial national conventions are available online from 2001-2013. (See links in bibliography) Older convention resolution texts are available at the George Meany Archives at the University of Maryland at College Park (UMD).

Before getting into the analysis, itself, I shall elaborate on why the selected AFL-CIO data are the best available and sufficient for a successful analysis. The four main criteria for data selection I adhered to were content, lexicographical similarity, date of publication, and length. With regard to content, it was important to select documents that focus on the national policy agenda; documents pertaining to state, local, or regional matters – in as far as they did not have national political significance – thus were not included. In addition, topics that were related to issues pertaining to internal union matters and other topics not directly significant for the national policy agenda also were excluded.[79]

In terms of lexicography, two elements were important to withhold texts for consideration: First, texts should be worded in a similar fashion, and second, since the presidential platforms are more prospective in nature – they deal with future intentions and significantly less with accomplishments – documents considered also should be mostly prospective in nature. The third criterion, date of publication, is relevant because the goal is to make the AFL-CIO documents as comparable as possible with presidential platforms. The advantage of the AFL-CIO platform proposals addressed to the Democratic and Republican parties is that their format is closest to the publication of the party platforms.[80]

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[79] The most obvious examples of excluded data were texts on AFL-CIO constitutional changes, internal organizational matters, or texts specifically related to internal member-union issues.

[80] The disadvantage might be – our analysis will either confirm or deny this – that the AFL-CIO proposal platforms are slightly watered-down versions of the AFL-CIO programmatic stance, as the explicit point of these documents is indeed to serve as a template for both parties' platforms. The preface of the 1964 AFL-CIO platform proposals mentions that they are "in identical language" as the policies adopted at the AFL-CIO national conventions. Notwithstanding this, the selection made will still reflect a more pragmatic stance, as these documents are addressed specifically to both parties and not to the AFL-CIO membership. A difficulty is that ever since the AFL-CIO ceased

The last criterion, length, implies that documents included should preferably go beyond the content of a leaflet or summary. Although strictly speaking, short documents can be compared together with substantially longer ones with *Wordfish*, as a rule, longer is better. (Slapin-Proksch 2008) The "AFL-CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions," 1960-1984, are shorter when compared to the platform texts of both parties – usually more than 50 pages – yet this difference doesn't matter that much. They also provide an idea of what to focus on when selecting documents from other AFL-CIO sources. Based on the above, AFL-CIO platform proposals 1960-1984, AFL-CIO Executive Council recommendations that served as texts for AFL-CIO resolutions 1960-1993, and adopted resolution texts 1995-present were selected.

For the period of 1960 to 1993, I deliberately opted for the Executive Council recommendations in the Executive Council Reports instead of the texts of adopted resolutions. There are a number of reasons why I did so. They most closely resemble the presidential platform documents not only in lexicography but also in length. The resolutions, themselves, contain a lot of words that would need to be filtered out, such as names, locations, debates, voting proceedings, etc. On top of that are adopted, tabled, and rejected resolutions not separated and instead listed chronologically, making it even more difficult to separate the relevant ones accurately. In many cases, resolutions were subsumed in other resolutions, their names changed, or referred to the Council.[81] Also, constitutional resolutions, resolutions pertaining to local and

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to publish platform proposals in 1984, the only documents that can be deemed appropriate for the period are the biannual national convention texts from 1988-1999 and the quadrennial national convention texts from 2001-2013.

[81] In this case, they require further deliberation by the Council before being submitted again for a vote. (The current AFL-CIO internal governance rules such as the constitution and convention rules can be consulted at: http://edit.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/Conventions/2013/Rules-and-Governance)

internal union organizational matters, all of which aren't germane to the topic of the analysis here, are listed in a similar fashion. The texts of the Executive Council report recommendations, however, not only correspond for the most part with the resolution texts adopted on topics relevant to this analysis, in terms of length, they also are much more succinct and more comparable to the AFL-CIO platforms and presidential platforms. The aforementioned "AFL-CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions" were an additional check in terms of content. For the years 1993 and afterward, I did select the adopted resolution texts. The reasons for doing so are that AFL-CIO proceeding reports for this period clearly provide information on which resolutions got adopted, that there are many fewer but longer resolutions, and the Executive Council reports become much more succinct and eventually did not contain sections on recommendations of the Executive Council anymore. Instead, these find their way to the Convention as Executive Council resolutions.

The first AFL-CIO dataset contains the 28 Presidential Democratic and Republican platforms from 1960-2012 and 26 AFL-CIO documents from the same period. Table 12 gives a breakdown of the included AFL-CIO documents.

Table 12: AFL-CIO data used for Dataset I-III[82]

Year	Total words	Type of document
1960	10,090	Platform
1964	19,469	Platform
1968	24,146	Platform
1971	12,613	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1972	30,938	Platform
1973	16,012	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1975	15,478	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1976	43,663	Platform

[82] Democratic and Republican Conventions (published 1960-1984), AFL-CIO Executive Council recommendations taken from the biannual AFL-CIO Executive Council reports 1985-1993, AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-CIO biannual conventions 1995-1999, and the AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-CIO quadrennial conventions 2001. The word count for both Democratic and Republican platforms can be found in the appendix.

1977	19,318	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1979	19,251	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1980	14,988	Platform
1981	15,537	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1983	17,089	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1984	7,517	Platform
1985	19,461	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1987	20,895	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1989	21,374	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1991	18,725	Council Recommend./Resolutions
1993	19,240	Adopted Resolutions
1995	33,202	Adopted Resolutions
1997	26,702	Adopted Resolutions
1999	37,100	Adopted Resolutions
2001	8,923	Adopted Resolutions
2005	14,788	Adopted Resolutions
2009	19,120	Adopted Resolutions
2013	40,426	Adopted Resolutions

Although *Wordfish* does not require us to define the poles of the dimension we're interested in, I do need to provide two documents that indicate the direction of the dimensionality.[83] A potential problem for the analysis of both U.S. cases emerges from selecting a good negative document. The positive direction can be defined easily by selecting one of the early AFL-CIO documents. Because of that, if I define the *negative* direction by selecting a Republican Party platform, I run *a* risk of selecting on the dependent variable because there are only two parties the platforms analyzed could belong to. I wrote there is "*a* risk," which is not the same as stating, "I will by default generate a biased analysis." Since *Wordfish* is blind to the origin of the documents analyzed – meaning it can't tell the difference between AFL-CIO, Democratic, or Republican documents – and only estimates content similarity, I still should have an accurate analysis, even if I define the negative direction by selecting a Republican platform. Unlike *Wordscores* and other methods, *Wordfish* is sensitive to the entry of new words into the

[83] As mentioned in the first section, this allows for considerable flexibility and increased accuracy of our data, as the two selected documents define opposing, or negative and positive, directions of a dimension, yet not its opposing endpoints as with *Wordscores*.

word matrix, and thus it is sufficient to select only one identifier document for each cleavage pole for the entire time series.

The way I resolved this potential risk for both U.S. cases – LULAC and the AFL-CIO – is by running two independent analyses controlling for this potential, yet unlikely, risk. One analysis will encompass a negative directional document that is a Republican Party platform. The other analysis's negative directional document will be a text combining Democratic and Republican platforms of the same year. On one hand, this second analysis could aggravate the distance in content between the AFL-CIO and both parties. On the other hand, it enables us to compare with the first analysis and to determine how significant the selection of a Republican document weighs. After a careful reading of the included texts, I opted to select the 1968 "AFL-CIO platform proposals to the Democratic and Republican Conventions" as a positive identifier text, and a merged version of the 1968 Democratic and Republican presidential platforms and a 1968 Republican document as negative identifiers. I also created a second version with the 1968 Republican Party document as negative identifier. Although I have data since 1960, I opted to use 1968 as the identifier year for two reasons: First, at this point, the realignment in U.S. politics can definitely be considered to be complete, meaning that atavisms of the prior party alignments will not be reflected as much in the party platforms, and second, I have more data points from 1968 onward for the AFL-CIO. [84]

[84] I was lucky in finding digitized versions of all the presidential election platforms from 1960-2012. (Wooley and Peters 1999) Unfortunately, only a few of the AFL-CIO documents existed in digitized versions. Only the last four quadrennial AFL-CIO national convention documents from 2001-2013 could be found in digitized versions. None of these data could be obtained in digitized form through communication with the AFL-CIO. The bulk of the used data could be retrieved at the University of Maryland after the transfer of the AFL-CIO George Meany Archives was completed in the summer of 2013. Unfortunately, because many materials still needed to be reorganized, it was

After all texts were spell-checked, they were saved as text files and were run in *JFreq*.[85] (Lowe 2011) *JFreq* enables us to create different versions of .csv files that serve as a basis for the eventual data matrix entered in *Wordfish*. Before I created stemmed and non-stemmed versions via *JFreq*, I loaded the program with the Porter list for English in order to remove stop words. (2001) For this analysis, a few more words were added to this list that were part of typical phrasing of resolution language used: whereas, therefore, furthermore, resolved, resolution.

After this was done, I created two .csv files, one using the *JFreq* stemmer, one without a stemmer function. The point of having two versions is to establish to what extent stemming has a significant effect on the analysis results. Previous research by Slapin, Proksch, and others indicated that such an influence at best would be limited; however, I still wanted to make sure that this would also be the case here. (2008; 2009) By using the stemmer function in *JFreq*,

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impossible for the staff at the UMD library to also provide me with the AFL-CIO proposals of 1960-1984. Three of the more recent ones could be tracked down and purchased via Amazon. The remaining seven other AFL-CIO platform proposals were retrieved after extensive searches in cooperation with the Johns Hopkins Milton S. Eisenhower Libraries' Interlibrary Loan staff. In particular, Ms. Jennifer Eidson (UMD Library) and Ms. Sharon Mollock (JHU ILL) were a great help to me.

All the platform proposal documents and other texts needed to be scanned, manually corrected, and spellchecked. Because the bulk of the documents were older and most are printed small on two-sided, thin, telephone-book-quality pages, the process of correcting sentences and words after scanning was a labor-intensive process. Only a negligible amount of the scanned texts ended up being corrupted. Aside from removing recurring formal phrases typical for resolutions as discussed above, it was necessary to also change words that had undergone spelling reforms. One example of an often-recurring word is *employes*, which has been changed to the current spelling *employees*. Whenever possible, older and/or alternative forms of spelling were changed into uniform spelling to ensure the analysis would yield the best possible results.

[85] Files in .txt format with UTF-8 Ascii coding

words are reduced to their stems.[86] Among other things, stemming could help to correct for possible spelling variations that were overlooked during the document-processing stage. An additional advantage of stemming is that the number of words used across documents is maximized, because all words with one stem are reduced to one word. The obvious disadvantage is that words with apparently the same stem, in particular compound words, might get lost in the process. These advantages and disadvantages are an additional reason to run all datasets in stemmed and non-stemmed versions. Once the different .csv files were created with *JFreq*, I ranked the word frequencies and excluded those words that did not appear in at least 20 percent of all documents. After this, I finally could run all files in *Wordfish*.

2.1.3 Identity-Interest Organizations – LULAC

Initially, the idea was to collect data since the realignment in U.S. politics about the 1960s. LULAC was established in 1929, so there were good reasons to expect the availability of sufficient data as of the 1960s. However, a number of factors made it possible to conduct a thorough analysis only as of the mid-1990s. There are three main reasons why there is

[86] The stem of the former examples of *employe* and *employee* would be the same: *employ*. Although stemmer functions and spell-check make up for words that changed in spelling over time, exceptions occur. In other cases, differences in spelling *could* indicate a deliberate political choice. For example, in texts published before the 1980s, both *Peking* and the Wade-Giles-based transliteration *Peiping* were used before the Pinyin-based transliteration *Beijing* came into vogue. Through a spell-check, one could replace all mentioning of Peking and Peiping with Beijing. However, since it was communist China that adopted the Pinyin transliteration of Beijing as the accurate equivalent, it would make sense to keep all three forms of spelling, as one indeed could argue that non-usage of the Pinyin transliteration was in part a deliberate choice. Examples like this are rare, yet they do occur occasionally. For the mentioned example here, it will probably not matter that much, as the frequency with which the Chinese capital is mentioned will probably not be as relevant as those of many other words.

insufficient usable data to conduct the type of analysis this project is concerned with before that period. First, although LULAC was conceived as a national organization, for a very long time its focus was on the southwestern U.S. region, in particular from the 1960s on. Even today, despite a rapidly increasing presence of Latino communities across the U.S., the regional stronghold of the organization remains in southern and western states such as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Florida, and California. (Brown 2014; Martinez 2009)

This regional focus in part explains why it took a long time before national legislative programs were created instead of a mostly regionally focused agenda. According to LULAC National Executive Director Brent Wilkes, LULAC did not develop any national legislative platforms before 1994.[87] The earliest one is also rather short in comparison with future platforms. (See Table 1 below) With regard to style and themes, the LULAC legislative platforms as of the mid-1990s resemble closely the platforms of the two large U.S. parties and that of other organizations, such as the previously discussed AFL-CIO. There is also an evolution with regard to the adopted resolution texts from LULAC national conventions. While examining resolution text compilations from the 1990s compared with later decades, the resolutions appear to become less regional and more nationally focused. This is exemplified both by the form in which they are presented and the content they cover.

The second factor that explains why only a reliable analysis of the past two decades was possible is the sparse availability of earlier documents. Some data prior to 1994 are available at the LULAC archives at the University of Texas in Austin, yet proved to be highly incomplete, non-uniform, sparse, and sometimes illegible. While the period is shorter than for the AFL-CIO case, it does cover two decades in which the segment of the Latino population as part of the total

[87] I met with Mr. Wilkes at the LULAC national office in Washington, D.C., on October 18, 2013.

U.S. population increased significantly, expanding the potential of the Latino vote to become the crucial pivot in Presidential elections. A request for the folders containing adopted resolutions of LULAC conventions prior to 1994 yielded no further usable data.[88] On one hand, sources such as *LULAC News* back issues are relatively easily available, the content of these documents is often pamphleteered, non-uniform in format, and lexicographically diverse, and it summarizes and reduces programmatic stances of the organization too much to be useful for the ambitious, in-depth analysis this project is concerned with.[89] Adopted resolution documents for that period, on the other hand, are only sparsely available, and in no way are complete enough to draw reliable conclusions from them. On top of that, many of the data were partially illegible, as some of the resolutions were recorded as notes.

I was able to obtain digitized legislative platforms and resolution texts as of 1994. In a conversation at the national LULAC office in Washington, D.C., Wilkes informed me that prior to the mid-1990s, only resolutions had been adopted at LULAC annual conventions. The legislative platforms that had been instituted since the '90s resembled the national political parties' platforms even more than resolutions in terms of lexicographical style. While it was thus not possible to collect pre-1994 data as complete and comprehensive as data after that, the

[88] The LULAC archives at the University of Texas-Austin consist of a collection of various smaller, donated archives. While they could be useful for research that is historical and more qualitative, the available data was unfortunately not suitable for this project. Of the 1980s resolution texts, only very few were available and often as handwritten copies and nonuniform formats. The dearth of resolution texts prompted me to stick with the years between 1994 and 2014 for this analysis, as I feared that inclusion of sporadic fragments of a resolution corpus might skew they results too much.

[89] Even if I were to select elements from LULAC News issues that appear relevant, it would only open the door to a more subjective selection, something I deliberately tried to avoid for this project.

current corpus of documents ranges an era of two decades and 18 different data points, which are likely to yield some insights into the shifts and trends I am looking for.

Two types of documents were considered for this analysis: annual national policy/legislative platforms from 1994-2013, and the texts of adopted resolutions at LULAC national conventions from 1995-2013. These two types of documents are the most detailed with regard to the programmatic content of the organization and are lexicographically similar to political party platforms. From these texts, I created two different datasets, LULAC I and LULAC II. As stated above, it is important to remember that despite its national agenda, the organization is still most visible and strong in its core region, the southwestern U.S. and Florida. The content of the resolutions and the national platforms reflect this bifurcation. While many of the LULAC resolutions have a stronger regional focus, though often with national ramifications, such as border control and immigration-related issues, the LULAC policy platforms reflect a decidedly national focus. Since both the resolutions approved at the LULAC national conventions and the LULAC policy platforms can be counted as the programmatic documents of the national organizations, it was important to create datasets that reflected this. Dataset I comprises LULAC national convention resolution texts *and* policy platforms for the years 1994-2013. Dataset II only includes the LULAC national policy platforms for the years 1994-2013. If there is a difference in the results between both datasets, it then would make sense to attribute this difference to the inclusion of the more regionally focused resolutions in Dataset I

For a good analysis, the word matrix drawn from the collected documents should consist of at least a few thousand words. (Slapin and Proksch 2008) Although the legislative platforms, themselves, already could be used for an analysis, as a general rule for content analysis, the more words, the more reliable the results. Obviously, the included documents should still meet the

standard of being lexicographically similar enough to documents they are compared with. For LULAC, the full resolution texts and legislative programs for each year were combined in one document to achieve this goal. Table 13 below shows the total number of words per document after headings, page numbers, and other minor elements not part of the resolutions/platforms had been deleted.

Table 13: LULAC data texts

Year	Resolutions words	Total number resolutions	Missing resolutions	Platform words	Total words
1994	-	-	-	252	252
1995	5,309	20	-	4,295	9,604
1996	-	-	-	-	-
1997	-	-	-	2,340	2,340
1998	7,851	25	1 Er	2,942	10,793
1999	16,681	59	-	3,112	19,793
2000	10,586	42	-	2,263	12,849
2001	12,607	44	-	-	12,607
2002	11, 921	45	3 Sp	1,851	13,772
2003	8,914	31	1 Sp	2,370	11,284
2004	22,019	74	1 Sp	2,759	24,778
2005	9,109	46	1 Sp / 16 Er	3,176	12,285
2006	9,166	34	2 Sp	3,247	12,413
2007	15,347	45	1 Er	3,297	18,644
2008	18,020	59	-	3,311	21,331
2009	16,601	54	1 Sp	2,588	19,189
2010	9,097	27	2 Sp	3,052	12,149
2011	16,373	39	-	4,195	20,568
2012	6,955	23	1 Sp	3,990	10,945
2013	15,618	37	2 Sp	4,369	19,987

Sp: Spanish
Er: error/corrupted document

As of 1994, platform texts are available and as of 1995, with some exceptions, the resolution texts were available.[90] In a few cases, resolutions were entirely drafted in Spanish, mostly for those resolutions concerning Spanish-speaking U.S. territories Puerto Rico and Guam. In those cases, they were not considered for the analysis because the currently available content analysis software can't process different languages together. A number of resolution files could not be

[90] The year 1996 is missing in its entirety. Mr. Wilkes mentioned that prior to his becoming the first LULAC National Executive Director in 1997, record-keeping was not done as systematically as it is today.

processed because the files were corrupted, illegible, or both.[91] However, the number of missing resolutions only constitutes a fraction of the total amount of data, and the effect of it can be expected to be marginal.

After compiling these data in a readable electronic data format, stop words and irrelevant data were removed from the documents, and the words were stemmed for one version of each dataset. The data considered irrelevant with regard to content only encompass the final sections of resolutions that list names of presenters and petitioners of a resolution, the signatory formula of the national LULAC president, and the date and place of signing. The list used to filter out stop words such as "a," "the," etc. was the Porter stop word list, which also was used to filter out stop words in *JFreq*. (2011) Because a number of words in the documents are very specific in the wording of resolutions, a few additional words were added to the Porter list; these words were "whereas," "resolved," "furthermore," and "resolution." Once the raw word matrices were created, the words were ranked by frequency and all words that appeared in less than 20 percent of the documents were thrown out. Just as with the AFL-CIO case, keeping words particular to a few documents or a few years easily could skew the results too much. After the datasets were pre-processed, they could be run in *Wordfish*. As negative and positive identifier documents, I once more opted to create two different versions. For the first version of each dataset (stemmed and not stemmed) the Republican platform of 1996 and the LULAC platform of 1995 were used respectively as negative and positive identifier documents.[92] Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of Hispanic voters consistently vote Democratic, it would be reasonable

[91] In most cases, this involved defunct web links.

[92] Note that there was no LULAC platform proposal available for 1996, which is why I opted for the closest by then published edition of 1995.

to expect the Democratic platform to be closer to the LULAC agenda.[93] (Pew 2012) Although a more neutral proxy-negative identifier document was used for the AFL-CIO case, I included one such version here to for both datasets merely to reconfirm that the difference is negligible, and by extent also that the *Wordfish* method is robust as previous results suggested. The second version (stemmed and not stemmed) for both datasets has the LULAC 1995 document as positive identifier, and a combined Democratic-Republican platform as negative identifier.

2.2 Germany

2.2.1 Parties

Most of the party programs were available in digital format and, at least for those published as of the 1990s, they were also machine-readable. In some cases, texts had to be scanned in their entirety and then were corrected manually after they were reconverted from image formats into machine-readable text.[94] Table 14 gives an overview of the party manifestos used for this project, including the manifestos of represented parties for all federal/general German elections since 1961.[95]

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[93] Even with Hispanic support for Republicans at its highest for the period 1980-2012, Republicans received only 40% of the Hispanic during the presidential election in 2004 compared with the 58% received by Democrats. (Lopez et Al. 2012)

[94] The manual correction, and in some cases text reconstruction, proved to be a lengthy and extremely intensive process.

[95] The two exceptions here are the 1980 maiden manifesto of the German greens, Die Grünen, and the 2013 manifesto of the German liberal party FDP. I included both in the analysis because despite the one-time failure to break through the 5% threshold and the failure to obtain directly elected representatives, both parties significantly shaped German politics, both are well-established parts of the party system, and even their lowest scores by far outrank any other smaller parties.

Table 14: Available German national party manifestos 1961-2013

Legislature	CDU/CSU*		SPD	FDP	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen**	PDS/Die Linke***
1961	x	WA	x	WA	-	-
1965	x	WA	x	-	-	-
1969	x	x	x	x	-	-
1972	x		x	x	-	-
1976	x		x	x	-	-
1980	x		x	x	x	-
1983	x		x	x	x	-
1987	x		x	x	x	-
1990	x	x	x	x	x	x
1994	x		x	x	x	x
1998	x		x	x	x	x
2002	x		x	x	x	x
2005	x		x	x	x	x
2009	x		x	x	x	x
2013	x		x	x	x	x

-: Not applicable either because party did not exist yet, or because no program or other election documents were published.
WA: Only a *Wahlaufruf* – call to elections – or *Aktionsprogram* with fewer words than a regular program/manifesto was published.
*: CDU/CSU only for the years 1961-69 and 1990, both parties published separate election programs.[96]
**: Until 1990 "Die Grünen," renamed into "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen" after the absorption of/merger with Civil Rights groups in former East Germany.
***: Until 2005 "PDS," renamed into "PDS/Die Linke" after merger with WASG for the Federal elections of 2005.
Sources: Benoit et al. (2009), the Hans Seidel Stiftung (CSU), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (CDU), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (SPD), Friedrich Naumann Stifftung (FDP), Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (PDS) [the party acronyms in brackets refer to the party that is affiliated with the aforementioned research institutes.

The regular manifestos range from 50 to more than 300 pages, or between 20,000 and 100,000 words total. The few *Wahlaufrufe* [Calls to vote] that were included are usually less than ten pages long, but in lieu of missing manifestos, even short documents are useful for analysis because they tend to include many of the words that can be deemed party keywords or topics. (Slapin and Proksch 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2011) Many of the party programs could be found in digitized and machine-readable format at the "Political Documents Archive" project of

[96] Since 1972, CDU and CSU have joint election programs. In 1983 and 1987, both parties had a joint and a separate election program, yet despite some small differences, they were the same. The 1990 programs of CDU and CSU were once again significantly different, in part because the Bavarian CSU had considered competing with the CDU in the new Länder in the former GDR. (Hans Seidel Stifftung 2014)

Mannheim University. (Benoit et al. 2009) For many of the older manifestos, however, I needed to consult the research institutes affiliated with the included parties.[97] Encoding of the documents was off in some cases, so that encoding format had to be made uniform in all texts.

2.2.2 Identity-Interest Organizations – DGB

Data collection for the DGB case would have been immensely more difficult without the help of the Friedrich Ebert Stifftung (FES). Through their international office in Washington, I was able to borrow hard copies of the entire proceedings documents for all the DGB *Bundeskongresse* [federal/national congresses/conventions] since 1960. Only for the national conventions of 2006 and 2010 were digitized, machine readable versions available. (DGB 2013/2014) The DGB texts used for this project were drawn from the *Ordentliche Bundeskongresse* [regular national conventions] since 1960; from the sixth in 1962 to the 19th in 2010. Aside from the Ordentliche Bundeskongresse, the DGB also organized four Außerordentliche Bundeskongresse [extraordinary national conventions] in: 1963, 1971, 1981, and 1996. The latter four were not considered, as their content only covers internal DGB matters and comprehensive *DGB-Satzung* [DGB-constitution] reform. Over the years, DGB also organized a number of specialized conventions such as the *DGB-Frauenkongresse* [Women congress] or the *DGB-Jugendkongresse* [Youth congress], and *Länderkongresse* on the state level. Texts from the latter types of conventions also were not withheld for this analysis, as the topics were either too specified or

[97] From some I was able to obtain new scans instead of the published scans. Some of the scans of older SPD programs on the FES website, for example, were so bad that it was impossible to get optical recognition software to read them. Upon my request, the FES kindly rescanned and republished both programs and sent me the machine-readable output within a day. A list of the research institutes' websites/services I consulted is included in the bibliography.

only pertained to the state level, and were more irregular. From the 14 selected DGB documents that align to an extent with the German federal electoral cycle, a sub selection of resolution texts was made based on the relevance for this project and the approval status. Resolutions covering internal DGB organizational matters, union internal matters, and constitutional amendments are not considered, as these topics are not germane to this analysis. Every resolution text within the convention protocols also lists the *Empfehlung* [here: determination] regarding the approval of those resolutions. Only two of the seven determination categories mean that a resolution indeed has been approved. The German version of these categories prepared by the DGB for the 20th national convention can be found in the appendix.[98] The two categories meaning approval of the resolution by the delegates are *Annahme* [adopted] and *Annahme in geänderter Fassung* [adopted in changed version]. The texts of resolutions that come with the determination *Annahme* are approved in their totality. For the second category the original resolution is listed, yet comments with regard to the parts that have been changed for acceptance are mentioned in the margins. In most cases, these changes are minor changes in wordings, yet in certain cases entire sections are deleted or parts of other resolutions are subsumed. During the pre-processing phase, all of these changes had to be taken into account while compiling the texts used for the content analysis.

After concluding the data-collection phase, all party and DGB documents needed to be appropriately corrected and formatted before running *Wordfish*. For many of the party manifestos, processing went quickly because many documents already had been formatted

[98] This document was not publicly available. It was provided to me after communication with the *Abteilung Organisationspolitik und –entwicklung* [Department Organisationpolitics and –development] of the DGB *Bundesvorstand* [DGB national leadership].

properly; for many of the older manifestos and a significant number of newer ones, however, the scans needed to be processed with optical recognition software to make them machine-readable. After that, all the errors needed to be corrected sentence by sentence. No digitized versions were available for the DGB texts. Contrary to the AFL-CIO, the DGB did not publish any comparable platform proposals, and instead only produced adopted resolution texts.[99] Aside from running optical recognition on small-printed, telephone-paper pages, there were a number of additional processing obstacles. First, I needed to select only the adopted resolutions and, if necessary, add the changes to the original text. After that, it was necessary to check for errors sentence by sentence. Given the quality of the paper, the quality of the scans was far from good, and the correcting process was labor-intensive. For both party manifestos and DGB resolution texts, spelling had to be corrected in accordance with the most recent German spelling reform. In order to create the word matrix, I ran all 77 documents through *JFreq*. (2011) To stay uniform with the previous analysis on LULAC and AFL-CIO, I used a Porter stop word list for German words, and for the stemmed version I used the *JFreq* stemmer. *Jfreq* allows for automatically changing upper case letters to lower case, which is a big advantage when analyzing German texts. The resulting.csv files formed the basis for the word matrix to be fed to *Wordfish*.[100]

[99] The DGB does publish small, pamphlet-like documents that call members to vote, yet these are neither regular nor substantial enough to distill the organization's policy stances on the wide aray of topics discussed in their resolutions and party programs.

[100] In addition to the Porter stop words list, I added a few other unsubstantive words that frequently occurred: aktionsprogramm, bundeskongress, begründung, angenommen, abgelehnt, antragsteller, bundesvorstand, betr., ordentliche, ordentlicher, ordentlichen, dgb-bundeskongress, möge, mögen, beschliessen, beschließen, delegierten, seite, wortlaut, antrages, anträge, anträgen, bescluss, beschluß, antrag, erledigung, erledigt, nummer.

After running *Wordfish* a first time, I noticed that many words seemed garbled and odd. I checked the word matrix .csv files again and detected an encoding problem. *JFreq* was designed to read German *Umlaut* signs (üäö) and the *Eszett* sign (ß), however, the data in the word matrix file were not properly read. Luckily, the problem was not related to *JFreq* but merely to the fact that the original texts were encoded differently than *JFreq*.[101] After ensuring the encoding issue was resolved, stemmed and non-stemmed output versions were created and processed with *Wordfish*.[102]

After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two reference texts for the DGB case were selected. For the DGB case, policies with regard to the redistribution of wealth and the role of the state are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1969 DGB adopted resolutions as positive identifier text and the 1969 FDP program as negative identifier text. While the German Christian Democrats and conservatives might have been an alternative, at least with regard to the two above-mentioned issues, the FDP is the better choice.

[101] The original raw German text data was ISO-8859-1 encoded (the default in MS Word), but the default encoding used by Jfreq is UTF-8, and it was just splitting words on characters in the range 0x80-0xFF because it didn't recognize those as valid letters in UTF-8. Although many of the output results were still useful and accurate, a large number of unusual outputs occurred. For example, the word *Beschäftigung* [Occupation] would end up split up as Besch and ftigung, neither would make any sense in German.

[102] In terms of data, the DGB case was the largest case with the highest number of unique words in the final word matrix. Not entirely surprisingly, the data had to be run on a much more powerful engine overnight.

2.2.3 Identity-Interest Organizations – TGD

TGD, founded in 1995 and thereby the youngest of the six non-party organizations that will be analyzed, provides a number of digitized press statements and publications since 1996.[103] Lexicographically, much of the content will be similar, although there will be less data for the earlier years. There are two types of documents I used for this analysis. The first are the press statements by TGD collected in one document per publication year. The press statements provide comments on various policies relevant to the population in Germany with a Turkish background, and include the formulation of demands or suggestions by TGD with the goals of fighting discrimination of Turks and Muslims in Germany and fostering of integration. The bulk of the statements would be in response to an incident or policy implementation that attracted national attention. TGD will provide an analysis and suggestions for policy improvement or change. Over the years, the number of press statements grew significantly; while all data were collected up to 2013, none was included for 2014.

The second types of documents are the so called *TGD-Thesen* [TGD theses] that were published as of 2006. (2006; 2007; 2013) These theses are elaborate programmatic texts comparable to sections of party programs addressing a thematic cluster of policy issues, such as religion and gender. Because TGD is an umbrella organization that attempts to find a consensus between the various geographical, vocational, and other communities of Turks in Germany, the detail of the *TGD-Thesen* is remarkable. The *TGD-Thesen* on women and gender equality, for

[103] Unfortunately, older material, in particular the TGD periodicals, is only available at the TGD archives and is not available to the public; several requests regarding these data were denied.

example, provide a well-argued, lengthy, 10-point policy program in order to address carefully discussed problems.[104]

Part of the activity of the TGD is to promote policy change. To this end, similar to other interest groups, it drafts legislative proposals often based on the *TGD-Thesen* documents and points mentioned in various press statements. The way the annual data listed here were constructed is by the collection of the German written press statements and the valid *TGD-Thesen* texts. This means that while a *TGD-These* may have been published years earlier, it is also included for those years in which it is still valid. One could compare this, for example, to a political party adopting programs for two elections in which certain sections don't differ much from each other with regard to wording and content. I can justify including data here this way because the texts in question are supposed to be valid for the years under analysis, while party programs are only valid for one specific election. Additionally, in instances where I could trace changes in the content of *Thesen* texts, these changes were included for the relevant years. While the *TGD-Thesen* texts are definitely focused on policy at the national level, the press statements do deal to some extent also with more local issues – state level of the *Bundesländer*.

Table 15 lists all the documents used and the total word count. In a few cases, comparable to Spanish resolutions for LULAC, TGD statements were only written in Turkish. Inclusion of these was not possible for the reason that the software used can't be applied to two different languages at the same time. However, despite the exclusion of these data, I am

[104] A problem with the availability of the *TGD-Thesen* is that the web content is periodically adapted. The documents listed in the table above reflect the data available during the period data were collected for the TGD case and may differ slightly from the current content. The current theses were last updated in 2011 and 2012. I obtained original copies of the theses as they were published. In 2006, the first versions of the gender-equality and religion policies were published, in 2007 the media thesis, and in 2013 the theses about racism and integration.

confident that the remaining texts are sufficient for the analysis because only a small part had to be excluded. None of the TGD data was corrupted nor was affected by encoding issues. After lecture of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two reference texts for the TGD case I selected. For the TGD, case policies with regard to the majority-vs.-minority culture and immigration/integration are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 TGD press statements as positive identifier text and the 1998 CDU-CSU program as negative identifier text.

Table 15: word count and document types for the TGD case

Year	Total words	Type of document(s)	Missing data
1996	398	2 PR	1 TK
1997	5,334	15 PR	3 TK
1998	828	3PR	-
1999	1,796	5 PR	-
2000	1,821	4 PR	-
2001	3,523	8 PR	-
2002	2,183	8 PR	4 TK
2003	2,030	8 PR	2 TK
2004	2,177	6 PR	-
2005	2,297	7 PR	3 TK
2006	17,674	5 PR / 2 TS	2 TK
2007	24,243	6 PR / 3 TS	4 TK
2008	26,532	8 PR / 3 TS	3TK
2009	26,651	13 PR / 3 TS	5 TK
2010	28,872	26 PR / 3 TS	4 TK
2011	14,498	18 PR / 3 TS	5 TK
2012	17,656	30 PR / 3 TS	6 TK
2013	23,648	39 PR / 5 TS	6 TK

PR: Press release
TK: Press release in Turkish only
TS: "These" – detailed program position published by TGD

2.3 Japan

2.3.1 Parties

The Japanese parties considered for the analysis here are only those that have been consistently represented in the Japanese upper house or House of Councilors (HoC) and lower house or House of Representatives (HoR) since the electoral reform of the Lower House in 1993. There are two main reasons why I limit our analysis to the time after 1993. First, because of the traditionally strict electoral legislation, manifestos were a novelty in Japanese politics and

weren't published until the late 1990s. Second, although a change of the electoral system was not the only factor, let alone the most important, the electoral reform of the HoR helped end the unchallenged dominance of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party [Jiyū-Minshutō]) as the leading party.[105] Although the earlier SNTV electoral system, itself, does not facilitate one-party dominance, it was a contributing factor to the clientelist relationship between voters and the LDP candidates of their constituencies.[106] The main change in 1993 was that SNTV was replaced by a combination of FPTP (First Past The Post) and PR (Proportional Representation) system still allowing for more room for smaller parties to enter the party system, while strengthening party coherence. Of the current 480 seats, 180 are elected based on PR from 11 multimember districts spanning the entire country.[107] The remaining 300 are elected based on FPTP single-seat constituencies comparable to British House of Commons elections or the U.S. House of Representatives. Similar to Germany, every voter casts two votes: a PR vote and a single

[105] Cf. Baker and Scheiner 2007: While the electoral reform may have had *an* effect, it does not adequately explain LDP dominance. This would also explain why over two decades later, despite being far less dominant, the LDP remains *the* key player in Japanese politics.

[106] An earlier reform in 1982 had introduced partial proportional representation to the HoC. Of the 242 HoC seats, 146 are elected in the 47 single and multiseat prefectural districts by SNTV, while 96 are elected based on PR. SNTV (Single Non Transferable Vote) voters cast one vote in a multiseat constituency; the seats are awarded to the three candidates with the highest number of votes. The level of proportionality depends on the number of seats per electoral districts; if there are few seats per district, SNTV, as was the case for Japan, will tend to be less proportional.

[107] Originally the number of seats was 500, with 200 PR-based seats. However, only the 1996 election was for 500 seats; as of the 2000 HoR, 480 were elected.

constituency vote.[108] Three changes that in part originated from the reform became visible as of the election of 1996 and persisted afterwards. First, the traditionally strong level of factionalism within parties decreased, while the parties, themselves, became stronger in the sense that campaigns became more party-centered and less about individual candidates, with perhaps the exception of party leaders.[109] (Curtis 1999; Reed 2003) Second, local elites were less capable of gathering votes for specific candidates compared with the past. Instead, a more volatile electorate and decreasing electoral participation became more commonplace. (Curtis 1999) Third, a majority of the voters did not perceive the LDP anymore as the only party that was capable of governing the country.[110]

The reason for not including all parties is that many of the ones that emerged in that period either remained unsuccessful in attracting voters, or emerged as split-offs from larger parties, often dissolving or merging with other parties within a few years' time. On top of that, most of these parties quickly became defunct or were absorbed into other parties, making it difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve any of the manifesto documents. The five parties that were consistently represented in the Diet since the reform of 1994 are: LDP, DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan), SDPJ (Social Democratic Party of Japan), JCP (Japanese Communist Party), NKP (New Kōmeitō Party (Justice Party/Buddhist; *new* added to differentiate from the old Kōmeitō

[108] The main difference would be that the results of the FPTP and PR votes aren't linked as in the German case, so no things such as *Überhangmandate* occur.

[109] As of the 2001 House of Representatives, the charisma of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his internal reforms within the LDP only strengthened these factors. (Kabashima and Steel 2010)

[110] Although the LDP had a few coalition experiences in 1976, 1979, and 1983, when the LDP found itself shy of a few seats of a majority, it wasn't until the 1993 elections that the party fell so far behind that it was forced to form a coalition with its traditional opponent the JSP.

Party).[111] LDP and JCP are the only two parties that were also present in the previous party system. SDPJ is a successor party of the previously second-largest party the JSP, whereas NKP is a merger of various smaller parties and the old Kōmeitō Party. The DPJ emerged in 1998 and replaced JSP/SDPJ as the second-largest party and the main challenger of the LDP.

Table 16: retrieved election manifestos

Year + Election	LDP	DPJ	New Komeito (NKP)	SDPJ (JSP)	NNP	PNP	YP	Restoration
1998* HoC	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
2000 HoR	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
2001 HoC	X	X	X	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
2003 HoR	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
2004 HoC	X	X	-	X	NA	NA	NA	NA
2005 HoR	X	X	X	X	NA	X	NA	NA
2007 HoC	X	X	X	X	X	X	NA	NA
2009 HoR	X	X	X	-	X	NA	NA	NA
2010 HoC	X	X	X	X	NA	NA	X	NA
2012 HoR	X	X	-	X	NA	NA	X	-
2013 HoC	X	X	-	-	NA	NA	NA	NA

X: Election manifesto
-: missing data
*: For 1998, some parties only published a base program. As this was often also their first program published, it was included.

For most of these parties, it was possible to retrieve manifestos in particular by searching on Japanese search engines and party websites, and by consulting party headquarters (cf. Table 16).[112] In some cases, there were either no manifestos published or they weren't accessible. The one big missing chunk of data is the JCP manifestos. JCP does have many lengthy outside publications from which one could construct proxy manifestos. However, because there are too many formats from which to make an objective selection, it seemed best to leave JCP out altogether. A theoretical reason rooted in empirical fact that also makes this omission acceptable

[111] The abbreviations listed here are those generally accepted in English; the "J" is added sometimes.

[112] The "Manifesto Project Database" provides some Japanese manifestos but is highly incomplete compared with the data gathered here. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/parties/540 - accessed march 2014

is that JCP as a party has lost most of its historical significance with regard to its presence in the national Diet, in particular for the period under analysis, which is integrally post-cold-war.

While *Wordfish* can operate with Japanese signs, *JFreq*, the program I used to compute the data files to feed into the former program, does not read Japanese signs. Additionally, many of the Japanese texts use quite different forms of encoding of text documents. Encoding becomes relevant when preparing the data files needed to feed *Wordfish*. Non-uniform encoding may provide errors or unexpected omissions. While differences in encoding also occur with texts in the same language, I noticed that this was much more pronounced with the texts in Japanese. As a consequence, the step of translation was necessary for those texts that had no English equivalent authored by the organizations. The first step then was to ensure that encoding was uniform for all files, where needed files were appropriately converted, in this case to UTF-8. The second step involved applying a tokenizer program to the Japanese election manifestos. Because Japanese words, unlike European languages, don't consist of signs that are connected, only context allows the reader to identify the separate word meanings. A tokenizer or word-segmentation program does just that; it will identify the words in a text by grouping the kanji, hiragana, and katakana characters in a way that makes contextual sense. Given the relatively short length of the Japanese manifestos, 30 to 40 pages, I opted for the use the *Kuromoji* morphological analyzer. (Atilika 2011-12) After applying a tokenizer, I count the word frequencies after which the words are translated. In order to ensure adequate translations, a Japanese political scientist assisted me with the translations, and a computer encoding specialist with knowledge of Japanese assisted me with the software.[113] Where needed, texts were processed via *Jfreq,* after which the .csv files were fed into *Wordfish* for analysis.

[113] Hitomi Nakamura and Erik Bray.

2.3.2 Identity-Interest Organizations - RENGO

For a good set of data containing the programmatic positions of RENGO, I compiled texts organized annually from the online available press statements at the RENGO website. The content of the acquired mirrors the topics relevant to the Japanese workers' movement and sufficiently resembles lexicography. In terms of length, all annual compilations go beyond a few hundred words and are at least 1,000 words long, although the average is far higher than that. (See Table 17)

Table 17: total words per annually compiled RENGO document

Year	**Total words**
1998	6,700
1999	23,167
2000	7,541
2001	6,198
2002	5,401
2003	10,299
2004	9,192
2005	3,067
2006	19,339
2007	10,084
2008	4,356
2009	4,787
2010	5,514
2011	2,629
2012	4,470
2013	1,989

While the data were available in digitized formats, it was still necessary to be appropriately corrected and formatted before running *Wordfish*. Also, encoding had to be double-checked to ensure that the analysis wouldn't run in error. The data included here, compilations of press statements from 1998 to 2013, run parallel with the period in which Japanese parties started publishing election manifestos on a regular basis, and coincide with the post-bubble Japanese party system. While our data are thus limited to the past two decades, they enable us to provide in-depth research on a relatively under analyzed period in Japanese politics, in particular because

of the novel approach of comparing content of the relatively new and overwhelmingly dominant labor federation RENGO and the relevant parties.

To stay uniform with the previous analysis on LULAC and AFL-CIO, I used a Porter stop word list for English words, and for the stemmed version I used the *JFreq* stemmer. Because the original texts used here were already translated by the authoring organization, the intermediate step of applying a tokenizer and consulting the help of translators familiar with political science data and coding could be skipped. The resulting.csv files formed the basis for the word matrix to be fed to *Wordfish*. An important reason why I opted to consider only English-written and -translated texts for the Japanese cases is the uniformity of the project research design. Although word frequency and stop-word/stemmer software exists for Japanese script, it is not compatible for other languages; the word frequency software used for this project, *JFreq*, and the stop-word list, based on Porter, are currently only applicable to a dozen European languages.[114]

After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two reference texts for the RENGO case were selected. For the RENGO case, policies involving the redistribution of wealth and the role of the state are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 RENGO press statements as positive identifier text and the 1998 LDP program as negative identifier text. Compared with the other major parties, LDP appeared the least similar.[115] The

[114] An additional difficulty with regard to multi-case content analysis including Japanese texts is that Japanese, itself, employs three different character systems: kanji, hiragana, and katakana. Translation was thus inevitable for this project with the exception of those documents for which a translation by the original authoring organization was available.

[115] The exception was the newly founded Restoration Party. However, because only one manifesto was available, selecting this party would skew the output too much.

other major parties, DPJ, JSP, and also the Buddhist-inspired New Kōmeitō Party, all appeared closer to RENGO, in particular JSP.

2.3.3 Identity-Interest Organizations - BLL

Of all organizations under analysis, the BLL was the by far the most obscure and the most difficult organization for which to find consistent data. Because they are the only regular and freely available publications authored by the BLL, I opted to use publications by BLL's research institute, the BLHRRI (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute). While the BLHRRI/BLL has several publications, the only regular publication is the bimonthly *Buraku Liberation News,* which I used for this analysis, as it adequately reflects the accents over the years of the BLL programmatic content. The topics cover specific Buraku issues as well as Human Rights, as both topical segments became largely intertwined for the BLL, and the publication reflects the goals and interests of the BLL very well.

The content of the acquired mirrors the topics relevant to the Japanese workers' movement and sufficiently resembles lexicography. In terms of length, all annual compilations go beyond a few hundred words and are at least 1,000 words long, although the average is far higher than that. (See Table 18) Unfortunately, I could not obtain data past 2009.

Table 18: total words per annually compiled BLL document

Year	Total words
1998	22167
1999	23759
2000	22750
2001	21840
2002	15698
2003	10462
2004	17806
2005	32180
2006	44278
2007	29296
2008	25294
2009	2953

While the data were available in digitized formats, it was still necessary to be appropriately corrected and formatted before running *Wordfish*. Also encoding had to be double-checked to ensure that the analysis wouldn't run in error. The data included here, compilations of press statements from 1998 to 2009, run parallel with the period in which Japanese parties started publishing election manifestos on a regular basis, and coincide with the post-bubble Japanese party system. While our data are thus limited to an even smaller period than for RENGO, they still enable us to provide in-depth research. Unlike RENGO, the other extra-electoral organization for the Japan case, BLL is a much older organization. The publications by the BLHRRI used here are available as of 1981. However, because no comparable electoral manifestos were produced by Japanese parties prior to the late 1990s, these data unfortunately could not be included.

To stay uniform with the previous analysis on LULAC, AFL-CIO, and RENGO, I also used the Porter stop word list for English words, and for the stemmed version I used the *JFreq* stemmer. Because the original texts used here were already translated by the authoring organization, the intermediate step of applying a tokenizer and consulting the help of translators familiar with political science data and coding could be skipped. The resulting .csv files formed the basis for the word matrix to be fed to *Wordfish*.

After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two reference texts for the BLL case I selected. For the BLL case, policies involving human rights and minority protection and discrimination are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 BLL publications as positive identifier text and the 1998 LDP program as negative identifier text. Similar to the RENGO case, compared with the other major parties, LDP appeared the least

similar.[116] The other major parties, DPJ, JSP, and also the Buddhist-inspired New Kōmeitō Party all appeared closer to RENGO, in particular JSP. In the case of BLL, New Kōmeitō appeared somewhat closer than in the RENGO case.

3. Concluding remark

In this chapter, I explained why the selected method is the best currently available one and adequate for the purposes of this project. For each of the selected identity-interest organizations, I selected documents that are both representative of the organizations' content and that are sufficiently comparable to election manifestos of the national parties of the three country cases. Because of the infinite arena identity-interest organizations exist in, and because of practical limitations that were discussed above, the current selection of identity-interest organizations is the most optimal. The current text selection will at least be sufficient to test our hypotheses and to draw some general conclusions about the cleavage alignments of the populations these groups in represent. The following two chapters that present and provide a discussion of the research results will illuminate which of the three hypotheses can be confirmed, and which ones will need to be rejected or amended. The intensive data collection process and the rigor of the selected method paved the way for potential future projects addressing the findings in the following two chapters.

[116] The exception was the newly founded Restoration Party. However, because only one manifesto was available, selecting this party would skew the output too much.

Chapter Four: Party systems and Cleavage translation

Overview

In this chapter, I discuss the testing of the two hypotheses that relate to the characteristics of two-party, multiparty, and dominant-party systems. The first hypothesis to be tested, responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time (H1), relates to the level of responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation depending on the party system. The second hypothesis, level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time (H2), relates to the differences in cleavage translation among parties within the same party system.[117]

> H1: In a two-party system, parties will be or become less responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a multiparty system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less responsive to cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over time.
>
> H2: In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage slightly stronger than the other. In a multiparty system, several parties will compete to attract the votes of a cleavage-based organization; therefore I should expect cleavage translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, cleavage translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage translation by the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level.

	H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
2-party system	Parties are or become less responsive	One party will be slightly more responsive than other
Multiparty system	Parties become more responsive over time	Party responsiveness will fluctuate over time across parties
Dominant party system	Dominant party is or becomes less responsive, other parties will have higher-level responsiveness	Party responsiveness will fluctuate higher among other parties, but remains stagnant at low level for the dominant party

[117] The time period the hypotheses apply to is 1960 to present.

In order to find out whether the hypotheses hold for the cases examined, and to examine whether they only hold for one or both cleavages analyzed in this project, I decided to devote one section to union federations and the other to minority group organizations.

1. Labor Union Federations

Below are eight figures that provide a visual representation for the *Wordfish* data outputs retrieved for the various datasets. The first two figures show the results for the two different U.S. datasets. (Figures 6-7) The next five figures are data from the German dataset divided for the sake of visual clarity. (Figures 8-12) The last figure shows the data for the Japanese dataset. (Figure 13) The original data output transcripts for all figures can be found in the appendix. Although I processed stemmed and unstemmed versions of the datasets, I opted to only use the unstemmed ones because there did not appear to be any significant differences between stemmed and unstemmed results.[118]

1.1 AFL-CIO

As discussed in Chapter Two, the erosion of influence on politics of organized labor would lead us expect that these interests became less and less translated by the two major U.S. political

[118] Only for the Japanese dataset no stemmed version was created. My reasoning for doing so was threefold. First, stemming had no significant effect for other datasets examined so far. Second, the data available for the Japanese dataset was much more limited, as the documents were substantially shorter. Stemming might have simplified the results too much. Third, the usage of a tokenizer and translation of texts may have caused minor changes here and there. Stemming would potentially inflate these changes.
The data in the appendix underline the relative unimportance of stemming. For more on stemming cf. Publications by Slapin and Proksch (2008).

parties – which was also reflected by our hypotheses. Our analysis indeed will have to confirm if this is actually the case, or if the articulation of workers' interests by political parties goes against this expectation. Another expectation here is that, given the historical stance of the Republican Party throughout much of the twentieth century has been consistently focused on eroding organized labor's power, I should expect more proximity between the Democratic platforms and AFL-CIO documents than between Republican platforms and AFL-CIO documents.



Figure. 6: Dataset I: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, not stemmed

The results from dataset one show that the programmatic content of both parties on one hand, and the AFL-CIO on the other, are gradually drifting apart. For the most part, the Democratic Party appears to be somewhat closer to the AFL-CIO, yet in recent years it seems as if this

relationship was reversed, rendering the Republican platforms closer to the AFL-CIO's. However, the relative closeness of one of the parties to the AFL-CIO's content seems trivial when compared with the increasingly large gap between AFL-CIO and the two parties. The AFL-CIO's documents appear to be very consistent with each other over time, with some smaller differences between the AFL-CIO's platform proposal texts and the other documents. The period from 1960 to 1968 exhibits the largest fluctuations between party estimates. The data suggest that 1964 in particular was one of stronger polarization between Republicans and Democrats, whereas in 1960 and 1968, both parties' stances on workers' issues are almost identical.

For both the Democrats and Republicans, the estimates appear to have gotten slightly more positive again in the past two decades, yet they are still far away from the positions recorded for the pre-Reagan era. The AFL-CIO estimates are relatively consistent with a few minor fluctuations. As of 1995, the year the AFL-CIO leadership was renewed and the organization invested highly into reconnecting with its grassroots, surprisingly, the estimate values decrease for three consecutive convention texts after 1995. It is not until 2005, the year that the CTW split off, that the profile of the AFL-CIO becomes somewhat more outspoken again. The general trend after 2005, possibly influenced by the economic crisis of 2007, is that both parties' and AFL-CIO's estimates appear to grow closer again, yet still not even close to the levels of the pre-Reagan era.



Figure 7: Dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, not stemmed (only platforms)

The data used for dataset II only include part of the data in Dataset I, as only the AFL-CIO platform proposals and the party platforms for the corresponding years were analyzed. Despite only looking at part of the data used in Dataset I, the position estimations are almost completely in line with those of said Dataset II, including the larger distance between Republicans and Democrats for 1964. In addition, just as with the first dataset, the effects of stemming and using a more neutral direction document are marginal. The results of the three other versions of Dataset II are also included in the appendix. The only difference is that the estimates for parties and those for the AFL-CIO are closer to each other. This makes sense because I expected that the AFL-CIO platform proposals, which were explicitly addressed to both parties, would be more compromising in terms of their content.

Table 19: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012

Election year	Democratic Platform	Republican Platform	Winner	Loser
1960	**-0.29117 ***	-0.32686	**Kennedy D**	Nixon R
1964	**-0.09747 ***	-0.66087	**Johnson D**	Goldwater R
1968	-0.36540	**-0.32405 ***	**Nixon R**	Humphrey D
1972	**-0.12112**	-0.55083 *	**Nixon R**	McGovern D
1976	**-0.14168 ***	-0.59194	**Carter D**	Ford R
1980	**-0.29487**	-0.74078 *	**Reagan R**	Carter D
1984	**-0.66905**	-0.94259 *	**Reagan R**	Mondale D
1988	**-0.96299**	-1.14718 *	**H. W. Bush R**	Dukakis D
1992	**-1.20713 ***	-1.39039	**Clinton D**	H. W. Bush R
1996	-1.69490 *	**-1.39963**	**Clinton D**	Dole R
2000	**-1.34706**	-1.40575 *	**G. W. Bush R**	Gore D
2004	**-1.51306**	-1.65937 *	**G. W. Bush R**	Kerry D
2008	**-1.24528 ***	-1.24580	**Obama D**	McCain R
2012	-1.41265 *	**-1.09375**	**Obama D**	Romney R

*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform.

Table 19 provides an overview of which presidential candidates won the election and the levels of similarity of each party's presidential platforms when compared to the AFL-CIO's platform and resolution texts. The overall trend is that the Democrats appear to translate workers' demands slightly better for most of the period from 1960 to the present. The three exceptions are the first Nixon platform, the second Clinton platform, and the second Obama platform.[119] The other trend is that both parties are translating workers' issues decreasingly during the analyzed period.

With regard to incumbents running for re-election, regardless of party or outcome, the platforms move to a more negative position. Another potential trend – although more speculative – that can be inferred from table 19 is that 8 out of 14 winning platforms were those less representative of workers' demands.

[119] While it may appear strange that the Obama platform is scored more right two elements should be considered. First, these differences are very small. Second, as an incumbent, the Obama campaign may have attempted to focus on those voters who were deemed less of a certainty, pulling the text more to the right, whereas the Romney campaign may have been doing the opposite.

The data from Dataset III, which only includes the alternate AFL-CIO documents and party platforms, confirm the trends that could be observed from the analysis of both Datasets I and II, which contain platform proposals and resolutions. For Dataset II, I used the 1971 AFL-CIO text as positive marker, and the 1972 Republican text as negative marker. Despite the use of a subset of Dataset I, and different directional documents, the results stay in line with those of Dataset I and II. The only difference is that the scores for both parties are slightly more positive for the dataset only using platform proposals, Dataset III.

1.2 DGB

Figures 8 through 12 display the estimates of the by far largest, and oldest, national labor advocacy organization in Germany, DGB, compared to individual party scores.



Figure 8: DGB compared to CDU and CSU scores



Figure 9: DGB compared to SPD scores



Figure 10: DGB compared to FDP scores



Figure 11: DGB compared to Bündnis90/Die Grünen scores



Figure 12: DGB compared to PDS/Die Linke scores

What is striking is the sharp drop of the scores for the three older parties after 1976. CDU-CSU (*Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* [German Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – Christian-social union in Bavaria]), FDP (*Freie Demokratische Partei* [German liberal party; Free Democratic Party, and SPD (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland* [Social-democratic party Germany]), all appear to become much more distant as of 1980. While it is tempting to attribute this change to the entry of the Green party in 1980 and topics more emphasized by the latter party, the way *Wordfish* works wouldn't allow this because all programs, regardless of publication year or party, are weighed against each other. A major difference between the party manifestos before 1980 and after for the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP is length. Before 1980, some of the programs available only take up a few pages and have significantly fewer words than later manifestos, averaging between 459 and 2,411 words, while the SPD documents after 1976 are significantly longer. While an analysis comparing lengthy documents with short ones is not impossible, the analysis will become more accurate as the pool of potential words to compare increases. It is thus plausible to assume that the relative positive party scores from before 1980 can be attributed to the shortness of available texts. Having just a few hundred words in some texts when compared with more than 10,000 in others, in particular after filtering out stop words and non-substantial words, will reduce score accuracy because of the dearth of remaining words.

Despite having word counts ranging between 3,423 and 25,258, the SPD also scores significantly more positively before 1980 than after. While some documents are significantly shorter, like the 1969 document that has 3,423 words, this in itself would not explain why the scores after 1980 become much more negative for SPD documents. In other words, these results indicate that the SPD must have moved away from the DGB in terms of content after 1976. A

number of elements explain this change in content. First, as of 1966 until 1982, the SPD governs in a coalition and for the first time since the foundation of the FRG, and as of 1969, as the leading party. Participation in governments led to a stronger internal party opposition that was keen on rewriting the basic SPD program; in particular it was interested in making the SPD back in line again with traditional Marxist ideology that had characterized the party before the implementation of the Godesberger Programm in 1959. In short, the 1959 Godesberger Programm moved the party away from a revolutionary socialist- and Marxist-inspired mass party toward a pluralistic, social-democratic catch-all party. (Hintersatz 2006) Indeed, a new, basic party document called "Orientierungsrahmen 85" [Orientation-frame 85] was adopted as new, guiding, base document in 1975, yet the adoption proved to be a Phyrric victory for the SPD left-wing. On one hand, many of the proposals steering the SPD back into the pre-Godesberg direction were rejected. On the other hand, many of the pro-Godesberg and right-wing SPD cadres adopted "Orientierungsrahmen 85" in part to avoid party splits, in particular because of the upcoming national elections. The content of the document was soon forgotten and the party moved even further away from its traditional, socialist roots. While this is certainly not the only explanation, the combination of becoming a governing party that had to compromise with the two political foes to the right, and an internal defeat of the leftist SPD cadres, explains in part why the SPD drifted further away from DGB after 1976.

A second element worth mentioning here is the resolution of some important issues that had plagued the Federal Republic since its creation: the relationship with the GDR, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union. On one hand, the *Ostpolitik* [East-politics] of the Brandt governments partly defused the troubled relationships with the GDR and other Eastern bloc states, and paved the way for the acceptance of what is now the eastern border of the unified

Germany. On the other hand, it also enabled SPD leaders to treat Marxist elements within the party with communist sympathies as not unifiable with the SPD's pluralist party doctrine. One should bear in mind that the student revolts of the late 1960s and terror attacks of radical left-wing groups like the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion [Red Army Faction]), all occurred during years with SPD-led governments. Additionally, the end of the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s and the subsequent first major economic crisis in the early 1970s could also be related to this result.

Lastly, and in part related to the previous two elements, certain topics receive much more attention after 1976, such as the environment and foreign policy. In particular, there was the creation of a Green party, *Die Grünen*, which with regard to certain topics traditionally embodied by the SPD, positioned themselves much more away from the center. The creation of a political force with a more left-leaning profile, as well as the internal defeat of traditional socialist cadres, may have contributed to a move of the SPD to the center after 1976. While much of the above is speculative, it would explain a shift in content, while length of texts would only explain a much smaller part for the shift in pre-1980 SPD programs when compared with post-1980 ones. As of the 1980 elections, the SPD is a party that has led governments and now competes with the CDU-CSU for the favor of voters, making it less attentive to its traditional ideological base than before that time, and it receives competition from the new Green party.

Aside from the drop of scores for the three traditional parties after 1976, the shift to more positive scores for the 2013 election stands out. I could trace some of the changes in content to specific political changes of the last decade. Looking at the SPD scores since 1980 there isn't really any significant difference until 2013. Even the shift from a more traditional social-democratic ideology toward *Dritter Weg* politics – analogous to Tony Blair's third way politics –

under Gerhard Schröder, only resulted in minimal differences. Two factors that may explain a partial shift in content in 2013 are on one hand the growth of other parties to the left, and on the other hand, the position of the SPD vis-à-vis the CDU-CSU, in particular with regard to the last two so-called *Grand Coalitions* of recent.

The first factor is the opposition to the left. Given the appearance of the Green party in the 1980s and the PDS in 1990, the SPD has always dealt with some level of competition from parties that were considered further left. Schröder's policies, however, led to a split within parts of the SPD leading to the creation of WASG (Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative [Work and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative]) in 2004. Many of the WASG cadres consisted of former SPD members and labor union members. As of 2007, WASG fused with the former GDR communist party PDS into the new left party *Die Linke*. Until then, the PDS had only been successful in the former GDR Länder. The significance of the fusion with WASG lies in the fact that as Die Linke, the unified party managed to get small-yet-important footholds in several old Länder, resulting in a number of Länder-parliament-seats comparable to that of other smaller parties such as FDP or Bündnis90/Die Grünen. In particular, in the Land of Saarland, where Die Linke had the support of former SPD Chancellor-candidate Oskar Lafontaine, the party did well. For the regional elections in the Saarland in 2009, for example, Die Linke gained 21.3 percent of the votes coming from 2.3 percent in 2004, whereas the SPD had only a few percentage points more, with a total of 24.5 percent. Although Die Linke lost some terrain again in 2013, it remains the third-largest party in the Saarland, with 16.1 percent. While the success of Die Linke in the other old Länder was not as impressive as in the Saarland, the party managed to gain a foothold in the regional parliaments of Bremen, Hamburg, and Hessen.

The second factor is the position of the SPD versus the other larger party, the CDU-CSU, in particular with regard to the Grand Coalitions. The first Grand Coalition between CDU-CSU and SPD lasted from 1966 till 1969. The big difference with the current party system is that at the time, there was only one opposition party, the FDP. Additionally, the 1966 CDU-CSU-SPD coalition was an uneasy partnership that had originated when the FDP's departure from the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition, which was created in 1963. The next two Grand Coalitions occur four decades later as the consequence of election results, not as a result of a coalition partner's departure from the coalition. The common factor that made both large parties coalesce in 1966 and again in 2005 and 2013 was the lack of a workable alternative. In both coalitions the SPD was the junior partner, leaving the prestige of the Chancellor position to the CDU-CSU's candidate, Angela Merkel. The successful entry of Die Linke in the old Länder, and the lack of a clear, distinct profile between SPD and CDU-CSU as a result of Grand Coalitions, together explain sufficient pressure on the SPD to realign its program closer to the demands of its traditional base again. This explains in part also why the CDU-CSU's score becomes more positive for 2013, yet still much less positive than the SPD score for 2013.

Although I only have very recent evidence to support the following claim, the creation of Die Linke has most likely contributed to the party-program content growing closer to the DGB scores when compared to previous PDS scores. At first sight, it may seem odd that the scores of the PDS were not more positive, because after all it was supposedly a successor of a socialist workers' party. What should not be forgotten, however, is that the PDS emerged as a protest party against the removal of all GDR remnants, was critical of the EU, and a range of other issues that put it at odds not only with other political parties, but to an extent also with the goals of the DGB.

Table 2	CDU-CSU		SPD	FDP	Bündnis90/Die Grünen	PDS/Die Linke	Winning Coalition	Opposition
1961	0.43696 c		0.80927 b	0.91280 a			CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD
1965	0.03103 b		0.98431 a				CDU-CSU, FDP 1966: CDU-CSU, SPD	SPD 1966: FDP
1969	0.84469 a	0.60867 c	0.83410 b				SPD, FDP	CDU-CSU
1972	0.71538 b		0.87812 a	0.51179 c			SPD, FDP	CDU-CSU
1976	0.74626 c		0.78072 b	0.89707 a			SPD, FDP	CDU-CSU
1980	-1.10318 b		-1.09917 c	-1.10658 a	0.96995 d *		SPD, FDP	CDU-CSU
1983	-1.08472 d		-1.10242 b	-1.10542 a	-1.09036 c		CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Die Grünen
1987	-1.09724 c		-1.10242 b	-1.09691 d	-1.14283 a		CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Die Grünen
1990	-1.10534 b	-1.10187 c	-1.09980 d	-1.10960 a	0.91474 f	-1.09261 e	CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen
1994	-1.03702 a		-1.02990 b	-1.02791 c	0.89569 e	-0.98702 d	CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen
1998	-1.10282 c		-1.10699 b	-1.10970 a	0.91775 e	-1.09653 d	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen	CDU-CSU, FDP, PDS
2002	-1.03928 a		-1.02027 d	-1.03565 b	0.80007 e	-1.02722 c	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen	CDU-CSU, FDP, PDS
2005	-1.03689 b		-1.01006 c	-1.10803 a	0.76262 d	0.92118 e	CDU-CSU, SPD	FDP, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Die Linke
2009	-1.02869 b		-1.01269 d	-1.04006 a	0.80743 e	-1.01740 c	CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Die Linke
2013	0.73982 b		0.83569 c	-0.79037 a *	0.85477 d	0.92887 e	CDU-CSU, SPD	Bündnis90/Die Grünen, Die Linke

Table 20: scores per party *Major party that did not obtain any seats for this legislature. Letters a to e indicate most negative (a) to most positive score (up to e) of each election year.

Table 20 above ranks the scores per party, *a* indicating the most negative scores in an election year, *e* or *f* indicating the most positive score in an election year. DGB was left because for all years, the DGB documents were the most positive scores. The most striking result is that the Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Union 90/The Greens) could claim to be the party whose program most closely resembles the demands of the working class as embodied by DGB.[120] The PDS/Die Linke (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus/The Left [Ex-communist party in the former GDR; Party of democratic socialism]) does obtain a number of very positive scores, but this appears to happen after the enlargement of the party and name change to PDS/Die Linke in 2005.

In Table 21 below, I counted the totals per ranking for each party. The FDP manifestos received the most negative scores, with nine of the most negative scores for the 14 published manifestos. However, taken into perspective, it seems that the three older parties' electoral programs' scores evolve parallel to each other, in particular for FDP and SPD, but to a large extent also for CDU-CSU. The higher fluctuations among CDU-CSU manifestos could be attributed to differences in program accents between CDU and CSU.

Table 21: Rankings of scores per party Germany/DGB

	Total manifestos	**a <**	**b <**	**c <**	**d <**	**e <**	**f <**
CDU-CSU	17	3	7	6	1	-	-
SPD	15	2	7	3	3	-	-
FDP	14	9	1	2	1	-	-
Bündnis90/Die Grünen	10	1	-	1	3	4	1
PDS/ Die Linke	7	-	-	2	2	3	-

Another trend is that the DGB estimates remain relatively constant over time, while it is the parties' estimates that display fluctuation. The CDU-CSU estimates fluctuate the most heavily,

[120] After the unification, a segment of the anti-GDR government protest-movement joined the Green party under the banner *Bündnis 90,* referring to the year of the union.

while the estimates for Bündnis90/Die Grünen remain relatively constant. Unlike the U.S. case, there don't appear to be any trends related to incumbency. However, future research using the coalition agreement texts aside from individual party programs and DGB texts potentially could shed more light on this.[121] Despite there being a significant gap between party and DGB estimates, it is not as pronounced or rather dramatic as for the U.S. case. Furthermore, there is no comparable downward trend.

1.3 RENGO

For the Japanese case, our data are limited to the end of the 1990s because prior to that, no real election platforms were produced. An advantage, however, is that because of the different electoral cycles for Japan's House of Councillors and House of Representatives, I still have a sufficient amount of data points. As discussed in Chapter Three, Japan underwent significant changes in its electoral and party system that opened the way for a more competitive party system challenging LDP dominance (Liberal Democratic Party [*Jiyūminshutō*]). Although several authors pronounced the death of the 1955 system, so far the LDP continues to be the dominant force in Japanese politics, and it remains to be seen whether I can actually conclude that LDP isn't the dominant party anymore. The DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan [*Minshutō*]) successfully replaced the JSP /SDP(J) (Social Democratic Party [*Shakai Minshu-tō*]) as largest competitor for the LDP, but was only in office from 2009 until 2012.[122]

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[121] What should also be taken into account here is that at least at the national level, the PDS/Die Linke is disregarded as a potential coalition partner for the other parties.

[122] The DPJ-SDPJ-PNP Coalition under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio until his resignation in 2010, and the same coalition led by Kan Naoto until 2012 respectively. JSP (Japan Socialist Party) was the predecessor of SDP; JSP imploded in 1996, leading to splits and the creation of SDP.

The Japanese party system has a long history of party split-offs resulting in minor formations in the Diet that often disappear in the coming elections or get absorbed by larger parties. Figure 13 includes the largest parties that had representation in the Diet for the entire period of the analysis, with the exception of the JCP (Japanese Communist Party [*Nihon Kyōsan-tō*]) and the Japan Restoration Party (*Nippon Ishin no Kai)*.[123] For the more recent years, I could also find data for some smaller parties and included it, while LDP, DPJ, NK (New Komei [*Kōmeitō*; best translated as „Justice and Fairness Party"]), SDP, together with JCP represent the parties that have been represented consistently.[124]



Figure 13: Japanese RENGO dataset 1998-2013. The position of the Japan Restoration Party (*Nippon Ishin no Kai*) with a score of -5.99993 had to be excluded, as it completely skewed the figure thereby defeating the purpose of having a figure. This extreme right party only participated in the 2012 election before dissolving like many of its predecessors.

[123] As discussed in Chapter Three, no information was available for the JCP.

[124] NK is closely affiliated and inspired by Buddhist sect Sōka Gakkai following the teachings of the thirteenth century monk Nichiren. Although the NK programs don't contain many religious concepts, the inspiration of the NK is religious. Nearly all party members are also Sōka Gakkai members.

The texts included were all significantly shorter than for the U.S. or German case, mainly because the practice of writing electoral manifestos is a very recent phenomenon in Japan. However, the results obtained from analyzing electoral manifestos and RENGO documents did yield a number of significant results.

The most obvious trend is that DPJ consistently is relatively close to RENGO, whereas the other parties score much more negatively. Only two younger, minor parties, NPN (New Party Nippon [Shintō Nippon]) and PNP (People's New Party [Kokumin Shintō]), come anywhere close to the result of DPJ. With the exception of the outlier for the Restoration party (-5.9), all results are within the 0.5 to -0.5 range, which suggests that there is a much closer relationship between the union federations in Japan than in the U.S.[125]

Another clear trend is that RENGO scores remain consistent over time with very little changes. Another trend is that the LDP does not really change its position; for 2005 and 2007, the scores of the LDP appear to become even more negative. While it is difficult to confirm whether the LDP's scores will be increasingly distant from RENGO, it may not matter as much, as the scores are already very distant as is. RENGO, as a labor union federation founded in 1989, is relatively young. As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the goals of the fusion of previous union federations into RENGO was to gain more influence on politics. This led to a much greater independence from the SDP and JCP, and although RENGO favors DPJ, it did not tie itself as strongly to it as previous union federations had to parties in the past. As with Germany, the gap between the major union federation estimates and those of parties is by far not as dramatic as the gap in the U.S. case.

[125] Restoration or Japan Restoration Party is a short-lived (September 2012-September 2014) far-right party; remnants merged with another smaller party into the Japan Innovation party (*Ishin no Tō)* in 2014.

Election	LDP	DPJ	NK	SDP	NPN	PNP	YP	Restoration	Coalition***
1998 HoC	-0.13248 b	0.34406 c	-0.35781 a	-0.13248 b	-	-	-	-	LDP, SDP, other**
2000 HoR	-0.16248 b	0.34406 d	-0.22015 a	-0.06155 c	-	-	-	-	LDP, other
2001 HoC	-0.13702 a	0.34802 c	-0.12628 b	-	-	-	-	-	LDP, other
2003HoR	-0.10789 b	0.36659 d	-0.43177 a	-0.05690 c	-	-	-	-	LDP, NK, other
2004 HoC	-0.06033 b	0.35846 c	NA	-0.35747 a	-	-	-	-	LDP, NK, other
2005 HoR	-0.29757 b	0.36761 e	-0.30596 a	-0.06037 c	-	0.10748 d	-	-	LDP, NK
2007 HoC	-0.35335 b	0.37886 e	-0.26385 c	-0.42254 a	0.10422 d	*	-	-	LDP, NK
2009 HoR	-0.09045 b	0.35717 d	-0.15946 a	NA	0.04256 c	NA	NA	-	DPJ, SDP, PNP
2010 HoC	-0.15423 a	0.37176 e	-0.15129 b	-0.12395 c	-	NA	-0.01916 d	-	DPJ, SDP, PNP
2012 HoR	-0.09456 c	0.35040 e	NA	-0.11520 b	-	NA	-0.07695 d	-5.99993 a	LDP, NK
2013 HoC	-0.09067 a	0.35887 b	NA	NA	-	-	NA	NA	LDP, NK

Table 22: Estimate scores for parties present in the Japanese Diet House of Councillors and/or House of representatives for which I could obtain electoral manifestos. No data could be obtained for JCP despite representation in all of the above legislatures. For most of the defunct parties, no manifesto data could be retrieved.

-: party was not represented and/or did not take part in elections;

NA: party was represented but no data were available

* Data for the 2007 PNP manifesto ended up being corrupted due to an unknown encoding error

** Other here refers to defunct minor coalition partners

*** Coalitions listed for HoC election years are the coalition that was in power at the time and are not the result of that election as it is the HoR election that determines the governing coalition government.

House of Councillors elections parties not included above: 2013[242]: JCP (11), others (4 seats); 2010[242]: JCP (6 seats), NRP (2 seats), Sunrise Party (3 seats), Happiness Realization Party (1 seat), Independents (2 seats); 2007[242]: JCP (7 seats), Independents (13 seats), 2004[242]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), 2001[247]: JCP (20 seats), Liberal Party (8 seats), New Conservative Party (5 seats), others (2 seats); 1998[252 seats]: JCP (8 seats), Liberal (6 seats), New Party Harbinger (3 seats), Reformers Network party (3 seats), Second Chamber Club (1 seat), Independents (26 seats).

House of Representatives elections parties not included above: 2012[480]: JCP (8 seats), others (10 seats), independents (5 seats); 2009[478] JCP (9 seats), others (2 seats), independents (9 seats); 2005[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), independents (18 seats); 2003[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (6 seats), independents (11 seats); 2000[480]: JCP (20 seats), Justice Party (24 seats), Conservative Party (7 seats), Liberal Party (18 seats), others (6 seats), independents (15 seats).

Table 23: rankings of scores per party Japan/RENGO

	Total Manifestos	a <	b <	c <	d <	e <
LDP	11	3	7	1	-	-
DPJ	11	-	1	3	3	4
NK	8	5	2	1	-	-
SDP	8	2	2	4	-	-
NPN	2	-	-	1	1	-
PNP	1	-	-	-	1	-
YP	2	-	-	-	2	-
Restoration	1	1	-	-	-	-

Looking at Table 23, the scores of NK are the most negative and for the most part are much further removed from those of other parties, including LDP. In eight elections, NK has the five most negative scores. A potential explanation here is that the topics of the NK are completely different from those articulated by RENGO. Because of the religiously inspired basis of NK, I could even suggest that the NK positions itself perhaps more positively on a cleavage not under analysis in this project: the religious-vs.-secular cleavage.

What also can be seen in the figure is that the SDP scores are very close to the LDP scores for virtually every election year, on average scoring a bit more positively, although the differences seem trivial. A plausible explanation for this could be that despite the successful entry of the DPJ to the detriment of the SDP, the SDP continues to attempt to attract voters that vote for LDP. One might also argue the opposite, that it is the LDP that sees the SDP voter as potential new LDP voter; however, given the more comfortable position of the LDP, this is unlikely. The scores of NK for the most part are much further removed from those of other parties, including LDP.

What was briefly mentioned in Chapter Three is that the traditional left-vs.-right dimension used by the Manifesto Database Project, but also in other comparative projects, isn't that useful in the Japanese case, because much of the policy differences evolve around international politics issues. (Proksch et al. 2011) The first DPJ Prime-Minister, Hatoyama Yukio, even formally resigned because of the inability to keep his campaign promise of revising the status of the U.S. base in Okinawa.[126] In terms of proposals related to the economy, the DPJ and LDP agendas are much more similar than with those of other parties, so the different scores of DPJ and LDP can be explained only partly by differences in economic policy, but other policy issues, particularly foreign policy, are probably more important. One issue that may certainly contribute to differences in economic policy is the existence of a strong faction, with the LDP supported by local farmers and other predominantly rural interests. Reed suggested that the more urban-focused DPJ competition might feed into a potential existing rural-vs.-urban cleavage. (2003) However, Kabashima and Steel argue quite the opposite by pointing to the fact that if such a cleavage might have been salient at some point, the changes in Japanese politics during the past decades, and particularly the actions of LDP's then-leader Koizumi Junichiro, led traditional rural LDP support to dwindle. (2010)

Labor Unions	**H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time**	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
US	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties display decreased cleavage translation over time	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties translate weakly, but a slightly stronger translation by the Democrats.
Germany	Hypothesis not confirmed: The parties' estimates drop and only in 2013 appear to	Hypothesis confirmed: fluctuation appears to be relatively widespread,

[126] An additional and perhaps more important reason for Hatoyama's resignation was a finance scandal that cost him a lot of his own and his party's popularity. (NPR 2010)

	resemble pre-1980 levels	particularly for CDU-CSU
Japan	Hypothesis partially confirmed: The dominant party has low, stagnant responsiveness, but other parties have both higher – particularly NK – and lower levels of responsiveness	Hypothesis confirmed: Dominant party has low, stagnant scores, while fluctuation is higher among other parties, with the exception that DPJ scores are much more constant than those of LDP

2. Minority and Immigrant Organizations

Below are the eight figures that provide a visual representation for the *Wordfish* data outputs retrieved for the various datasets. The first two figures show the results for the three different U.S. datasets. (Figures 14-15) The next five figures are in fact data from the German dataset split into five for the sake of visual clarity. (Figures 16-20) The last figure shows the data for the Japanese dataset. (Figure 21) The original data output transcripts for all figures and can be found in the appendix. Although I processed stemmed and unstemmed versions of the datasets, I opted to only use the unstemmed ones because there did not appear to be any significant differences between stemmed and unstemmed results.

2.1 LULAC

Figures 14 and 15 show the results for the first and second datasets for LULAC. Dataset I combines the LULAC resolutions of annual conferences with the LULAC platforms. The second dataset only represents the annual LULAC platforms.



Figure 14: LULAC Dataset I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed



Figure 15: LULAC Dataset II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn is that the gap between the LULAC estimates and the party estimates is that this gap is large and growing. Whether I control for regional impact of LULAC or not – the inclusion or exclusion of the more regionally focused resolution texts – the results for both parties remain between the -1.0 and -1.5 range. The data controlled for regional impact suggest that the Republican platforms are somewhat closer to the LULAC estimates. However, if I exclude resolutions, then the Democrats appear closer to LULAC. In both cases, however, both parties remain so far away from the LULAC estimates that these differences seem hardly significant. This discrepancy, as little as it may be, does suggest that one of the venues for future research may be to focus on specific U.S. regions with larger Latino populations.

Comparing the first dataset with the second, the scores for early LULAC platforms are significantly closer to those of both parties, and in fact are further away from most LULAC scores. However, this discrepancy is easily explained by pointing to the relatively short length of the first two LULAC platforms, with each only a few hundred words. After excluding stop words and other unsubstantial words, this only leaves few words that are used for computing the scores in *Wordfish*. In essence, it is unlikely that the scores of LULAC platforms for 1994 and 1995 are closer to the scores of both parties, but instead it is an effect of limited data. This is also confirmed if I look at the scores for Dataset I that comprise both platform and resolution texts.

Table 24: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012 for LULAC dataset I.

Election year	**Democratic Platform**	**Republican Platform**	**Winner**	**Loser**
1992	-1.2590 *	**-1.2332**	**Clinton D**	H. W. Bush R
1996	-1.3553 *	**-1.2102**	**Clinton D**	Dole R
2000	-1.3166	**-1.2035 ***	**G. W. Bush R**	Gore D
2004	-1.3780	**-1.1683 ***	**G. W. Bush R**	Kerry D
2008	-1.2309 *	**-1.0877**	**Obama D**	McCain R
2012	-1.3622 *	**-1.0004**	**Obama D**	Romney R

*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform.

Table 25: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012 for LULAC Dataset II.

Election year	Democratic Platform	Republican Platform	Winner	Loser
1992	**-1.1253 ***	-1.2185	**Clinton D**	H. W. Bush R
1996	**-1.1625 ***	-1.1797	**Clinton D**	Dole R
2000	**-1.0918**	-1.1950 *	**G. W. Bush R**	Gore D
2004	**-1.1665**	-1.2717 *	**G. W. Bush R**	Kerry D
2008	**-1.0297 ***	-1.0784	**Obama D**	McCain R
2012	**-1.1090 ***	-1.1117	**Obama D**	Romney R

*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform.

If I look at the estimates in relation to who won the election (tables 24 and 25) I find that there is no evidence that suggests that incumbency or any other factors affect the estimates.

I already touched upon the fact that while LULAC is the largest and most influential advocacy group for the largest minority group in the U.S., the Hispanic population, there are of course other advocacy groups representing that what can be described as subject population vis-à-vis the non-Hispanic Caucasian dominant population. On one hand, an inclusion of NCLR data would make the data for the Latino group even more accurate. On the other hand, the most influential organizations advocating on behalf of other segments of the U.S. subject population, such as the NAACP with regard to African-Americans, or Native American organizations, could help complete the picture of how the subject population's political positions differ from those of both major parties. Future research also including these organizations may help clarify some of the above results. In particular, it may help confirm whether some trends that appear trivial from the above data may indeed be confirmed or not. Furthermore, future research may also help us identify what differences exist, and what trends I can establish, between scores for advocacy groups of different segments of the U.S. subject population.

2.2 TGD

Figures 16 through 20 display the estimates of the largest, and oldest, national immigrant and ethnic minority advocacy group in Germany, TGD, compared to individual party scores.



Figure 16: TGD compared to CDU-CSU scores



Figure 17: TGD compared to SPD scores



Figure 18: TGD compared to FDP scores



Figure 19: TGD compared to Bündnis90/Die Grünen scores



Figure 20: TGD compared to PDS/Die Linke scores

No party estimate comes close to the TGD results. The only difference there seems to be among parties is that the estimates for two youngest parties, Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, are closer to the -0.5 mark than the estimates for the other parties, which are closer to the -1 mark. No party exhibits a large amount of fluctuation. The data suggest that issues relevant to the Turkish community, and by extension many issues relevant to the immigrant population in Germany, are slightly more relevant to Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, but these issues don't appear to be among the highest priorities of parties.

The estimates for TGD, itself, fluctuate more in its earlier years, in part due to the relative youth of the organization; however, this fluctuation remains within or near the 1-to-1.5 range. What may partly explain the higher fluctuation of earlier TGD scores are much shorter texts and the fact that elaborated policy documents of TGD – the *TGD-Thesen* – were not developed yet.

Table 26: scores per party *Major party that did not obtain any seats for this legislature

Table 8	**CDU-CSU**	**SPD**	**FDP**	**Bündnis90 /Die Grünen**	**PDS/Die Linke**	**Winning Coalition**	**Opposition**
1994	-0.8354 b	-0.7943 c	-0.8767 a	-0.5439 e	-0.6024 d	CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen
1998	-0.8267 c	-0.8540 a	-0.8401 b	-0.7379 d	-0.6087 e	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen	CDU-CSU, FDP, PDS
2002	-0.8140 b	-0.7786 c	-0.8806 a	-0.7536 d	-0.6876 e	SPD, Bündnis90/Die Grünen	CDU-CSU, FDP, PDS
2005	-0.8129 c	-0.8158 b	-0.8864 a	-0.7181 d	-0.6985 e	CDU-CSU, SPD	FDP, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke
2009	-0.8006 b	-0.7854 c	-0.8956 a	-0.6443 e	-0.6861 d	CDU-CSU, FDP	SPD, Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke
2013	-0.7540 b	-0.7283 c	-0.8083 a *	-0.6235 d	-0.6180 e	CDU-CSU, SPD	Bündnis90/ Die Grünen, Die Linke

Table 27: rankings of scores per party Germany/TGD

	Total manifestos	a <	b <	c <	d <	e <
CDU-CSU	6	-	4	2	-	-
SPD	6	1	1	4	-	-
FDP	6	5	1	-	-	-
Bündnis90/Die Grünen	6	-	-	-	4	2
PDS/ Die Linke	6	-	-	-	2	4

Table 26 lists the scores per party for each election year; Table 27 ranks the scores from the most negative (a) to most positive (e). The most-positive and second-most-positive estimates went entirely to PDS/Die Linke and Bündnis90/Die Grünen. Although the content of the FDP programs pays more attention to individual liberties, and is more progressive with regard to many ethical issues – such as euthanasia and same-sex marriage, but also religious freedom and migration – when compared with CDU-CSU, one would expect the FDP scores to be more positive than the CDU-CSU scores. However, for five out of six manifestos, the FDP had the most negative score. While the differences between scores of parties are very low, they may indicate some trends that may help guide future research incorporating other minority advocacy groups in future analyses.

In Chapter Two, I addressed the regional distribution of the Turkish community in Germany, which to an extent also applies to other immigrant groups. Populations with Turkish and immigrant backgrounds tend to be more present in urban centers of the former West German Länder and Berlin.[127] Another element that is not captured by a study of party scores at the national level is the scores of parties that are only represented in the regional parliaments. While

[127] The much smaller Vietnamese community, which is also the largest minority with a Southeast Asian background, is the exception. Many North Vietnamese, and later people from the unified Vietnam, came to the former GDR as of the 1950s. The largest Vietnamese communities in Germany are still present in the urban centres of the former GDR including Berlin. (Wolf 2007)

extreme-right parties failed to gain any representation at the national level, there have been a number of occasional successes in the regional Länder parliaments. Because these types of parties, such as the 1964 founded NPD (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [National democratic party of Germany]), tend to fulminate against immigrants and people with Islamic faith, it would make sense to include these insofar as they are represented at the regional level. Adding an analysis of the regional tier may be a good way to improve results of future studies, and perhaps the focusing on areas with stronger minority presence may yield results that could help us confirm or reject the weak trends of our current analysis.

A big difference in comparison with LULAC is that TGD is an advocacy organization for a population group that constitutes both the overwhelming majority within the subject population (Turks) and population with a non-EU immigration background. Minorities without an immigration background within Germany's 1945 borders exist, but are very small and geographically concentrated in small areas of the country.[128] In other words, this may mean that our findings for TGD can be assumed to be more accurate with regard to the entire subject-vs.-dominant cleavage than those I obtained for LULAC.

[128] The approximately 60,000-strong Slavic Sorb-population in the Southeast corner of the former GDR, and the approximately 10,000-strong Danish minority in Schleswig. The German Roma and Sinti population is more geographically dispersed but also are very small in numbers.

2.3 BLL

Figure 21 displays the estimates of the largest, national subject minority advocacy organization in Japan, BLL, compared to individual Japanese party scores.



Figure 21: BLL compared to Japanese party scores

For the Japanese case, our data are again limited to the end of the 1990s because prior to that, no real election platforms were produced. Just as in the case of RENGO, the most obvious trend is that DPJ consistently is relatively close to RENGO, whereas the other parties score much more negatively. Compared with our previous analysis with RENGO included, the earliest score of DPJ in 1998 is much closer to BLL than RENGO. What may explain this is that for 1998, I had to rely on the basic programs of parties because it wasn't until 2000 that manifestos specially tailored to the upcoming election appeared. The DPJ's basic program of 1998 scores better for BLL, probably because issues like human rights, equal opportunity, participatory democracy, and fairness are featured prominently. (DPJ 1998)

Election	LDP	DPJ	NK	SDP	NPN	PNP	YP[129]	Restoration	Coalition***
1998 HoC	-0.06896 b	0.33702 c	-0.38647 a	-0.06896 b	-	-	-	-	LDP, SDP, other**
2000 HoR	-0.10357 b	0.33702 d	-0.16226 a	-0.01524 c	-	-	-	-	LDP, other
2001 HoC	-0.07588 a	0.35631 c	-0.05810 b	-	-	-	-	-	LDP, other
2003HoR	-0.05158 b	0.35316 d	-1.2242 a	-0.00735 c	-	-	-	-	LDP, NK, other
2004 HoC	-0.04601 b	0.35503 c	NA	-0.40793 a	-	-	-	-	LDP, NK, other
2005 HoR	-0.27012 b	0.35643 e	-0.32637 a	0.00534 c	-	0.15198 d	-	-	LDP, NK
2007 HoC	-0.33794 b	0.35621 e	-0.27312 c	-0.55680 a	0.17002 d	*	-	-	LDP, NK
2009 HoR	-0.00501 b	0.33595 d	-0.12548 a	NA	0.09389 c	NA	NA	-	DPJ, SDP, PNP
2010 HoC	-0.10903 a	0.35123 e	-0.10741 b	-0.08334 c	-	NA	0.00063 d	-	DPJ, SDP, PNP
2012 HoR	-0.05418 c	0.33412 e	NA	-0.06228 b	-	NA	-0.04885 d	-5.99999 a	LDP, NK
2013 HoC	-0.03875 a	0.35892 b	NA	NA	-	-	NA	NA	LDP, NK

Table 28: Estimate scores for parties present in the Japanese Diet House of Councillors and/or House of Representatives for which I could obtain electoral manifestos. No data could be obtained for JCP despite representation in all of the above legislatures. For most of the defunct parties, no manifesto data could be retrieved.

-: party was not represented and/or did not take part in elections;

NA: party was represented but no data were available

* Data for the 2007 PNP manifesto ended up being corrupted due to an unknown encoding error

** Other here refers to defunct minor coalition partners

*** Coalitions listed for HoC election years are the coalition that was in power at the time and are not the result of that election as it is the HoR election that determines the governing coalition government.

House of Councilors elections parties not included above: 2013[242]: JCP (11), others (4 seats); 2010[242]: JCP (6 seats), NRP (2 seats), Sunrise Party (3 seats), Happiness Realization Party (1 seat), Independents (2 seats); 2007[242]: JCP (7 seats), NPN (1 seat), Independents (13 seats), 2004[242]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), 2001[247]: JCP (20 seats), Liberal Party (8 seats), New Conservative Party (5 seats), others (2 seats); 1998[252 seats]: JCP (8 seats), Liberal (6 seats), New Party Harbinger (3 seats), Reformers Network party (3 seats), Second Chamber Club (1 seat), Independents (26 seats).

House of Representatives elections parties not included above: 2012[480]: JCP (8 seats), others (10 seats), independents (5 seats); 2009[478] JCP (9 seats), others (2 seats), independents (9 seats); 2005[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), independents (18 seats); 2003[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (6 seats), independents (11 seats); 2000[480]: JCP (20 seats), Justice Party (24 seats), Conservative Party (7 seats), Liberal Party (18 seats), others (6 seats), independents (15 seats).

[129] YP: Your Party (*Minna no Tō)*

Only two younger minor parties, NPN and PNP, score anywhere near the result of DPJ. With the exception of the outlier for the Restoration party (-5.9), almost all results are within the 0.6 to -0.6 range, which is a slightly larger range than for the RENGO case and suggests a generally closer relationship between the union federations in Japan than in the U.S. or Germany. In fact, unlike for the RENGO case, most party scores for BLL are about 0 or are within the 0-0.6 range. There are two trends that are similar to what I found for the RENGO case. First, NK scores more negatively than most other parties; in the BLL case, it scores even more negatively. The second trend that reappears is the closeness of LDP and SDP in every election despite the fact that SDP scores fluctuate more.

Another trend is that BLL scores are relatively constant over time with small changes, something I also found for most scores of all other identity-interest organizations in all three cases. The exceptions to this were the earlier scores for TGD, and the second LULAC dataset due to significantly shorter documents. Another trend is that the LDP does not really change its position; for 2005 and 2007, the scores of the LDP appear to become even more negative, but the LDP scores are more positive when compared to the RENGO case.

Table 29: rankings of scores per party Japan/BLL

	Total Manifestos	**a <**	**b <**	**c <**	**d <**	**e <**
LDP	11	3	7	1	-	-
DPJ	11	-	1	3	3	4
NK	8	5	2	1	-	-
SDP	8	2	2	4	-	-
NPN	2	-	-	1	1	-
PNP	1	-	-	-	1	-
YP	2	-	-	-	2	-
Restoration	1	1	-	-	-	-

Based on the scores per party per election in Table 28, I ranked the most negative score (a) to the most positive (up to e) in Table 29 above. As expected, NK has the most negative scores, with five out of eight programs having the most negative scores, followed by LDP. What our data

don't show, similar to the TGD and LULAC data, is how the geographic distribution of the Buraku population affects their national political position. In Chapter Two, I mentioned that the BLL was mostly organized in the west and south of Japan, but also that it had no presence in the northern part of the country.

Minority Organizations	**H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time**	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
U.S.	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties display decreased cleavage translation over time	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties have low scores, Democrats have slightly stronger translation when not controlling for regional impact.
Germany	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Although the evidence is weak, there appears to be a general upward trend for parties to become more responsive	Hypothesis not confirmed: very low level of fluctuation among parties
Japan	Hypothesis partially confirmed: Dominant party has low, stagnant responsiveness, but other parties have higher or lower levels of responsiveness	Hypothesis confirmed: Dominant party has low, stagnant scores while fluctuation is higher among other parties, but DPJ scores fluctuate little

3. Future research agenda considerations

A first point to conclude is that future research will have to delve more into the hypotheses confirmed and address shortcomings of those that couldn't be confirmed. The results of the data presented here helped to confirm some of the hypotheses posed, but it was impossible to confirm some hypotheses with the data available.

For the U.S. case, I could confirm Hypotheses One and Two for both organizations I examined. For the German case, the first hypothesis could only be confirmed for TGD, yet had

to be rejected for DGB. Hypothesis Two could not be confirmed for TGD but could be for DGB. For the Japanese case, I could confirm both hypotheses for both RENGO and BLL, yet with regard to the first hypothesis, I could only do so partially. While the proposed hypotheses appear robust for the selected two-party-system, and solid for the selected multiparty system, one aspect that is on the future research agenda is the formulation of both hypotheses so that I can derive clearer results for multiparty systems. One venue through which I might obtain even better results for multiparty systems could be the inclusion of coalition agreement texts aside from individual party programs.

In the results I obtained for the union federations advocating on behalf of the worker side of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage, each case allowed for conclusive statements because it was possible to distinguish relatively clear directions the parties took in relation to them over time. For the minority organizations that represented the largest segment of the respective subject populations, however, the trends I could establish were very weak. While I can expect that the same model will apply to similar identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of segments of the subject population, the weak trends suggest that in order to confirm or reject these trends, I may need to seek ways to obtain data so that it better reflects the entire subject population instead of just the largest segment. One reason for doing so is that with the U.S. case, for example, minorities that are largely non-immigrant, such as African-Americans, may have interests that differ to an extent from those of the Latino groups, for whom large segment has a bigger stake in immigration issues. The point of this would be to see to what extent the various larger identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of the subject minority population are closer to each other or not when compared to parties.

Another aspect with regard to minority identity-interest organizations that was raised by examining the results for TGD, and to a lesser extent also BLL, is that an analysis such as provided by this project might be rendered even more complete by additionally focusing on other tiers aside from the national level, in particular those areas with larger concentrations of the subject population.

Chapter Five: Sociological base and cleavage translation

Overview

In this chapter, I discuss the testing of Hypothesis Three, which relates to the sociological base of both the examined cleavage pole and the identity-interest organizations that were analyzed. In short, I will test whether a change in size of sociological cleavage-based group has an effect on how well parties translate the demands formulated by the identity-interest organizations representing that group. As mentioned in previous chapters, I opted to select the largest and most influential identity-interest group for this analysis because of the infinite nature of the identity-interest organization arena compared with the electoral arena.

For the union federations, I identify the sociological base narrowly as workers in the sense of traditional labor, or the segment of industrial employees active in the secondary sector. While I recognize that there is a potential that employees who do not fit this category also may identify as working class, I opted to define the sociological base more narrowly and traditionally because it was also defined as such in previous literature, including Lipset and Rokkan, but also because the uniqueness of this project cautions against assuming a too-generous interpretation of a sociological base. (1967; Sartori 1990) For the minority organizations, I identify as a sociological base the specific minority that the selected identity-interest organization aims to represent.

In the previous chapter, I tested how parties, depending on the party system, would perform in translating cleavages, assuming the selected identity-interest organizations are representative for the cleavages under analysis. Hypothesis Three addresses questions with regard to the change in size of the cleavage-population base and its effect on the content-

similarity relationship between parties and identity-interest groups. In other words, I examine whether the growth, stagnation, or decrease of the sociological base of the selected identity-interest organizations will have an effect on the content of electoral manifestos, or whether the way party manifesto content remains unaffected by those conditions. The time period to which the following hypothesis applies is from 1960 to the present.

> H3: Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political parties will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is experiencing stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth.

	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
Two-party system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases
Multiparty system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases
Dominant-party system	Dominant party will be less responsive – Other parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases

In order to find out whether the hypothesis holds for the cases examined, and to examine whether they only hold for one or both cleavages analyzed in this project, I devoted one section to union federations and the other to minority-group organizations. The figures presented in this chapter will display the relationship between the discrepancy in scores between parties and identity-interest organizations and the size of the sociological base of the identity-interest organizations under analysis. For reference to the discrepancy in scores between parties and identity-interest organizations, please see figures 6-21, and tables 20-23 and 26-29 of Chapter 4.

1. Labor Union Federations

1.1 AFL-CIO

Figure 22 provides an overview of the evolution of the total employed population in the U.S. since 1960. For the entire period of time this number increases, which is in proportion with the continuous growth of the U.S. population through births and immigration. What can also be taken from Figure 22, however, is that the proportion of employees forming the traditional segment of the population represented by unions has been significantly shrinking during the same period.



Figure 22: Total private goods-producing employment compared to private service-providing employment and government-employed 1960-2013 (in thousands, seasonally adjusted). Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014



Figure 23: Evolution of the industrial worker population as percentage of the entire U.S. private sector-employed population 1960-2013. Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014

Figure 23 displays the percentages of traditional industry jobs compared to the total private employed population. The share of goods-producing and manufacturing industries decreases from about one-third of private sector-employment in 1960 to about 12 percent in 2013; the service-providing sector increases dramatically during the same period. While there is a segment of the population in the service-providing sector that is also represented by AFL-CIO, the amount of AFL-CIO member unions catering to this type of employee remains relatively low compared with unions representing traditional labor. While part of the low unionization rates compared with those of other OECD countries can be explained by the efforts mentioned in Chapter Two that companies use to undermine unionization legislation, this is also reflected in

the unionization rates for the secondary and tertiary sectors; unionization rates for the service sector are half the rate for labor jobs.[130] (cf. table 30)

Table 30: Employees represented by unions - Totals and percentages per group (in thousands, seasonally adjusted).

	Government	Government percentage	Private, service-providing	Private, service-providing percentage	Private goods manufacturing	Private goods manufacturing percentage
2003	8185	41.5	5686	7.3	3555	14.9
2004	8131	40.7	5523	7.0	3403	14.3
2005	8262	40.5	5636	7.0	3295	13.6
2006	8172	40.1	5509	6.7	3151	12.7
2007	8373	39.8	5702	6.8	3149	12.7
2008	8676	40.7	5885	7.0	3164	13.4
2009	8677	41.1	5561	6.8	2651	12.7
2010	8406	40.0	5424	6.6	2437	12.1
2011	8321	40.7	5438	6.5	2510	12.1
2012	8072	39.6	5440	6.4	2390	11.3
2013	7900	38.7	5522	6.4	2592	11.9

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014 [131]

[130] Examining the unionization rates of U.S. public employees, a sector that is comparable in size to the U.S. goods-manufacturing sector, the rates are double the average OECD rates; about 40 percent of federal, state, and local employees are unionized. (Table 30) In other words, the public sector, which is much better insulated from companies' efforts to circumvent organized labor, scores much higher with regard to unionization rates, suggesting that if a comparable level of protection existed in the private sector, one could expect higher unionization rates there as well.

[131] The number of union members is consistently about 3 percent lower than the total number of represented employees because a small percentage of nonmembers may still receive representation through unions. The goods-manufacturing industry numbers are the combined totals of mining, construction, and manufacturing; manufacturing accounts for about two-thirds of private, nonagricultural, goods-producing employment. Although some more general unionization data is available as of 1983, sector-specific data only is available as of 2003.



Figure 24: Discrepancy in estimates between Democratic and Republican parties and identity-interest organization for AFL-CIO Dataset I, 1960-2013, not stemmed.[132]

Figure 24 displays the discrepancy in content estimates for each party, and the AFL-CIO. When compared to the decreasing size of the U.S. employed labor population, the discrepancy in scores increases continuously. Aside from the fact that the Democrats in general have slightly more positive scores. The major conclusion I can draw is that the generally decreasing traditional labor population has an effect on the direction in which party-program content evolves. The smaller the size of the population of the traditional-labor side of the workers-vs.-owners cleavage, the less the program of each party will reflect demands made by the selected identity-interest organizations speaking on behalf of this population.

[132] A detailed list of all discrepancy scores can be found in the appendix.

An important caveat is that while the traditional sociological base of the cleavage decreased in proportion, other segments of the employed population are also partly represented by unions, or may be experiencing significant obstacles to becoming organized. The so-called *pink-collar* workers, for example, as well as less-educated, non-industry employees, may very well identify as worker despite the fact that they are employed in the service-providing sector. However, while I can speculate that the potential reservoir of employees identifying as working class is much higher than that of only the workers employed in the secondary sector, future research will have to provide conclusive evidence for this.

While one also could argue that increasing part-time employment and unemployment may have created a more vulnerable pool of employees that has an even lesser opportunity to unionize despite potentially identifying as worker, the increase of more vulnerable part-time positions was in proportion with the increase of the total active population. (cf. table A.1 in appendix) The unemployment rates vary more across the years, with a generally increasing tendency. However, fluctuations are much higher and also appear to be very dependent on economic crises. Unemployment rates for the U.S. since 1960 vary between 3.4 percent (lowest 1969) and 10.8 percent (highest 1982) (U.S. Department of Labor BLS 2014). A more plausible explanation for the low unionization rate in the U.S. is the aforementioned lack of incentives for corporations to abide by labor regulations, particularly those allowing for organization, while increases in unemployment and part-time and temporary jobs only played a minor role in this. In other words, the current data make it difficult to make any conclusive statements on how this affected the relationship between organized labor and both U.S. parties.

Aside from the observations made in Chapter Four, I can conclude for Hypothesis Three that I can confirm it. A decrease of the sociological base of the identity-interest organization also

leads to increased discrepancy in content between the AFL-CIO and both parties. While there is a slight difference between Democrats and Republicans, the scores for both parties are becoming increasingly negative.

1.2 DGB

Figure 25 provides an overview of the total active German population from 1960 to 2013. While the employed population increased, the rate of increase is relatively low, particularly when compared with that of the U.S., where the employed population more than doubled in the same time period. The jump from the 1980s to the 1990s can be explained by the German unification in 1990. As with the U.S. case, the German employed population remains the same in proportion with its general population size, meaning that in this case, both are relatively stagnant, with only a small level of increase.



Figure 25: Total German active population for election years 1960-2013 (in thousands). Source: DESTASIS 2014.



Figure 26: Total employed population active in secondary sector as percentage of total employed population Germany for election years 1961-2013. Source: DESTASIS 2014.

Until 1980, the secondary sector in Germany remains above 40 percent. In the years 1950-1970, the size of the secondary sector fluctuates between 42.9 percent (1950 minimum) and 49.2 percent (1965 maximum). After 1975, a steady decline set in, but the period of 1975-1980 is marked by a stable number about 41 percent. The big, continuous decline from 40 percent to about 25 percent today starts as of 1980. (cf. Table A.2 in appendix)

As can be taken from table A.2 in the appendix, similar to the U.S., the tertiary sector grew enormously compared with the traditional labor sector and the now-marginal agricultural sector. This change, however, was not as pronounced as for the U.S. case. The proportion of goods-manufacturing employees versus service-providing employees changed from a ratio of 5-to-4 to a ratio of 1-to-4. On one hand, the change is stronger in the German case; on the other

hand, the amount of goods-producing jobs remains higher in Germany. The general trend toward a dominant service-providing sector on the labor market, however, is the same.

Another important difference with the U.S. is the amount of service-providing employees who are unionized. Table 31 provides the numbers of employees unionized per sector because these data were recorded (1994). Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter Two, a competitor of DGB, DBB, did even better with regard to the representation of the service sector as well as public servants. In short, the DGB and German unions in general have a much better balance between goods-producing and service-providing sectors compared with their U.S. counterparts. However, the data below suggest that the secondary sector is by far still the dominant one within DGB.

Table 31: DGB Membership per sector 1994-2013 (in thousands).

	Total member-ship	**Goods-produ-cing***	**Service-provi-ding**	**Public ser-vants**		**Total member-ship**	**Goods-produ-cing**	**Service-provi-ding**	**Public ser-vants**	**Other ***
1994	9768	6015	2784	762	**2004**	7013	2963	1729	419	1900
1995	9354	5727	2651	748	**2005**	6778	5868**		489	420
1996	8972	5449	2554	662	**2006**	6585	5710		483	391
1997	8623	5205	2457	642	**2007**	6441	5591		473	376
1998	8310	4960	2431	621	**2008**	6371	5548		464	358
1999	8036	4854	2288	573	**2009**	6264	5456		460	NA
2000	7772	4680	2222	556	**2010**	6193	3636		302	NA
2001	7899	4526	2598	569	**2011**	6155	3579		297	NA
2002	7699	4402	2448	548	**2012**	6151	3604		291	NA
2003	7363	4217	2323	505	**2013**	6142	5351		445	NA

Source: DGB (2014)

As of 2005, these numbers aren't differentiated anymore because the differentiation between both categories for the obligatory retirement taxation was dropped. In a nutshell, the differentiation between secondary and tertiary jobs for retirement purposes yielded to large differences, prompting the shift toward a system that provided retirement benefits based on the number of years employees paid into the fund. The blurring of both old categories *Arbeiter* (blue-collar-workers) and *Angestellte* (white-collar-workers) in the German case point to an

evolution that may have occurred in other industrialized democracies, including the U.S., with regard to how class identity is experienced. While speculative, one could argue that the traditional Weberian link of occupation, skills, and class has weakened, whereas the Marxist connection between ownership of resources – the means of production – and class has increased. However, whether such a shift indeed has taken place can't be confirmed based on the current data. What can be confirmed is that the traditional labor class is the group that is still the most dominant group in German union activity. Because of that, I can safely assume that DGB continues to predominantly represent those employees who identify as workers.

Figure 27 provides the discrepancy in scores between DGB and party scores for the traditional three parties: CDU-CSU, SPD, and FDP.[133] Figure 28 does the same for Bündnis90/Die Grünen, PDS/Die Linke, and DGB for election years 1980-2013.

[133] For brevity's sake, Iopted for the CDU scores to establish the discrepancies for those years in which both CDU and CSU published manifestos independently.



Figure 27: Discrepancy in scores between CDU-CSU, SPD, FDP, and DGB for election years 1960-2013. Source: DESTASIS



Figure 28: Discrepancy in scores between Bündnis90/Die Grünen, PDS/Die Linke, and DGB for election years 1980-2013. Source: DESTASIS

With regard to part-time, temporary employment and unemployment, the trend is that the segment of more vulnerable employees increases. This is worth mentioning because these trends will affect not only the service-providing employees, but also traditional labor. As can be seen in Table 32 below, the number of full-time employees decreases while the number of part-time employees increases. Although the unemployment rates are only a few percentage points higher when compared with those of the U.S., the tendency is increasing, unlike in the U.S., where the rates are fluctuating more across time. Until 1980, German unemployment rates remained less than 5 percent, and from 1980 until the present, it was between 5 percent and 12 percent. (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014) Because these trends also will have affected the traditional labor segment of the employed population, I can surmise that the segment of the population that identifies as worker may be somewhat larger than the size of employees active in the secondary sector.

Table 32: Full-time and part-time employees 1976-2013 (in thousands).

	Full-time employed	**Part-time employed**		**Full-time employed**	**Part-time employed**
1976	18.520	1.419	**1994**	24.890	3.348
1977	18.435	1.445	**1995**	24.659	3.459
1978	18.590	1.498	**1996**	24.165	3.574
1979	18.996	1.577	**1997**	23.660	3.620
1980	19.289	1.665	**1998**	23.423	3.785
1981	19.133	1.731	**1999**	23.801	3.678
1982	18.696	1.776	**2000**	23.890	3.929
1983	18.364	1.783	**2001**	23.689	4.120
1984	18.205	1.835	**2002**	23.308	4.255
1985	18.497	1.881	**2003**	22.658	4.288
1986	18.779	1.951	**2004**	22.202	4.311
1987	19.006	2.039	**2005**	21.802	4.365
1988	19.148	2.117	**2006**	21.815	4.530
1989	19.404	2.215	**2007**	22.070	4.773
1990	19.972	2.396	**2008**	22.443	5.003
1991	20.632	2.541	**2009**	22.165	5.202
1992	20.850	2.680	**2010**	22.306	5.389
1993	25.454	3.142	**2011**	22.683	5.670

Source: BPB Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (German Federal central for political education) 2013. The listed numbers are only for employees who are required to pay social security. Categories excluded here are civil servants, self-employed, aiding family members, professional military, and civil- and military service recruits.

With regard to our hypotheses, the evolution of the population that I consider as a sociological base for the type of identity-interest organization like DGB has evolved in a similar way as in the U.S. case. Employment in the secondary sector has been significantly reduced from about 1-in-2 to 1-in-4. Looking at discrepancies in scores, the numbers for the three traditional parties, CDU-CSU, SPD, and FDP are markedly more positive in the economic boom years of the Federal Republic between 1950 and 1970, when the secondary-sector employment still constituted 40 percent of the workforce. As the percentage of people employed in the secondary sector starts its freefall as of the mid-1970s, a sharp rise in discrepancies can be observed as of 1980 between the scores for the three previously mentioned parties on one hand and DGB scores on the other. In short, although the shift in discrepancies is much more abrupt as in the U.S. case, also here it seems that a decline in size of the sociological base of the selected identity-interest group has an effect on content similarity between parties and DGB.

Looking at the scores of the Green party, and as of 2005 that of PDS/Die Linke, it appears that the parties perceived as being more to the left than the SPD have lower discrepancy rates. For the most part, the discrepancy rates are stagnant, but both parties appear do a better job in translating the workers' side of the cleavage than do the three traditional parties. In short, this means that I can tentatively confirm the hypothesis; in times where the labor market boomed, the scores of parties and DGB were much closer. As of the 1980s, the share of traditional labor declined, resulting in a sharp increase of discrepancy rates. The exceptions are the two younger parties, which appeared after the decline of the traditional working class had already set in. With regard to Hypothesis Three, this means that I can confirm our hypothesis. One caveat is that a

subject for future research could be what this means for parties that appear later in the political arena.

1.3 RENGO

Of the three examined union federations, RENGO is the youngest, founded in 1989. Although part of its roots go back to the aftermath of WWII, unlike the AFL-CIO and DGB, the organization is significantly younger, and in part also was an attempt to escape the deadlock the former union federations found themselves in during the pre-1993, LDP-dominated, clientelist political climate. In short, as was also discussed in Chapter Two, prior to RENGO, the influence of union federations on national politics was severely limited because their close connections with parties that were default opposition parties. Though RENGO was created a few years before the current Japanese party system emerged, in terms of its political significance, it is part of this new political arena.

Figure 29 provides an overview of the employed population in Japan since 1989. Unlike the U.S. case, the employed population isn't increasing, but instead shows signs of a decrease. Although the Japanese case is similar to the German case in that it is generally stagnant, the future trend appears to point to a structural decrease, whereas for now, the German case still appears to resist such a trend. A potential explanation is the relatively low rate of immigrant labor, in particular when compared with the U.S., but to an extent also with Germany. (cf. Chung 2010)



Figure 29: Employed population in Japan from 1989 to present (in thousands). For reference, the numbers of the years right before the bubble burst are included; our data analysis starts with 1998 (bar marked in black). Source: JMIAC 2014.



Figure 30: Percentage of secondary sector in total employed population Japan 1989-2013. Source: JMIAC 2014.

Figure 30 provides us with the percentage of the secondary sector of the entire employed population in Japan from the foundation of RENGO in 1989, a few years before the bursting of the asset price bubble, which led to the so-called lost 10 years (Ushinawareta Jūnen) or also the lost 20 years (Ushinawareta Nijūnen) until the present. (cf. table A.3 in appendix) Despite the economic burst-of-the-bubble crisis, the service-providing sector manages to increase, while the goods-producing sector is in a steady decline. Similar to Germany, but unlike the U.S., is that the total employed population stagnates in part as a result of a stagnated population growth. A factor that potentially explains the already-visible trend of a decrease in population could be attributed to the relatively low contingents of immigrant workers on Japanese soil as an effect of the still-relatively-closed immigration policies that severely limit the expansion of immigrant labor. While there are signs of a decrease in the entire employed population, a clearly decreasing trend can be observed for those employed in the secondary sector. At the start of our measurements in 1998, the percentage of the secondary sector is still 31.67 percent; by 2013, this proportion has continuously shrunk to 24.22 percent, comparable to the size of the same sector in Germany.



Figure 31: Discrepancy in scores between the four larger parties and RENGO compared with the Japanese active population during election years 1998-2012 (in thousands). Source: JMIAC (2014)



Figure 31bis: Discrepancy in scores between the three smaller parties and RENGO compared with the Japanese active population during election years 1998-2012 (in thousands).[134] Source: JMIAC (2014)

[134] The position of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) was excluded, as its score of -5.99993 dramatically skewed the graph, thereby preventing the figure from adequately demonstrating the differences between the other parties.

Figures 31 and 31bis display the discrepancy in scores between parties and RENGO in relation to the size of the active population during the election years for HoR and HoC from 1998 to 2012.

A first observation is that the discrepancies in scores for the three smaller parties listed in Figure 31bis are smaller than for the three older Japanese parties, LDP, SDP, and NK. The more important observations, however, can be drawn from Figure 31. For none of the four parties could I argue that there is a connection between the size of secondary-sector population and score discrepancies. Indeed, looking at the shape of the population stacks of Figure 30 and compare for these parties, there are no recognizable patterns. Even the one party that has at least part of its origins in the labor movement, the SDP, doesn't follow a clear pattern. Another important observation is that the discrepancy in scores for DPJ remains low, regardless of the decrease in size observed in Figure 30. DPJ's discrepancy in scores appears unaffected, but the DPJ program content may have come so close to RENGO that a point of saturation could have been reached.

Unemployment rates remain low when compared to those of the U.S. and Germany, yet a general increase from below 3 percent before 1994 to a rate between 3 percent and 5 percent occurs, peaking at 5.3 percent in 2002. (JMIAC 2014) After 2012, unemployment rates are less than 4 percent again. While unemployment could have had an effect on the reservoir of potential secondary-industry workers, the average unemployment rate of about 4 percent for the time period under analysis seems too low to have any significant effect on this.

Table 33: Upper rows display the number of workers in industrial unions, lower rows in italics display the total of industrial and service-sector unions.

	2000 (12)	2001 (13)	2002 (14)	2003 (15)	2004 (16)	2005 (17)	2006 (18)
RENGO	7,173,000	7,001,000	6,829,000	6,694,000	6,595,000	6,543,000	6,522,000
	7,314,000	*7,120,000*	*6,945,000*	*6,807,000*	*6,726,000*	*6,672,000*	*6,649,000*
ZENROREN	802,000	780,000	787,000	764,000	745,000	723,000	701,000
	1,036,000	*1,012,000*	*1,018,000*	*993,000*	*978,000*	*954,000*	*932,000*
ZENROKYO	258,000	247,000	169,000	160,000	154,000	150,000	139,000
	261,000	*250,000*	*172,000*	*166,000*	*160,000*	*156,000*	*152,000*
	2007 (19)	**2008 (20)**	**2009 (21)**	**2010 (22)**	**2011 (23)**	**2012 (24)**	**2013 (25)**
RENGO	6,622,000	6,623,000	6,687,000	6,732,000	6,699,000	6,693,000	6,706,000
	6,750,000	*6,761,000*	*6,832,000*	*6,876,000*	*6,839,000*	*6,839,000*	*6,844,000*
ZENROREN	684,000	663,000	647,000	635,000	620,000	607,000	592,000
	911,000	*894,000*	*883,000*	*869,000*	*860,000*	*837,000*	*827,000*
ZENROKYO	132,000	128,000	124,000	118,000	113,000	110,000	109,000
	150,000	*144,000*	*140,000*	*133,000*	*128,000*	*125,000*	*124,000*

Source: JMIAC (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau)

Table 33 provides an overview of the proportion of industrial workers compared with service-providing sectors for the three larger Japanese union federations, including RENGO. While RENGO was created in part to respond to the changes in the labor market, the number of service-providing employees remains relatively low; this is also the case for the two other larger union federations. In other words, the largest Japanese union federation continues to be dominated by its traditional sociological base. While a segment of the service-providing employees is unionized through company unions not affiliated with any of the three large federations, the trend of service-employee unionization in Japan is more similar to that of the U.S. than Germany, in the sense that the rates are much lower. However, I also should consider that the goods-providing sector in Japan is still much larger in proportion compared to the service-providing sector in the U.S. or Germany.

With regard to Hypothesis Three, a general conclusion I can draw is that the continuously decreasing sociological base for the worker-vs.-owner cleavage was not reflected by any discernible trends as to how political parties' content evolved vis-à-vis RENGO. DPJ is the exception in the sense that the scores are the lowest and remain constant, regardless of the continuous decrease of the importance of the secondary sector.

Labor Unions	**H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups**
U.S.	Hypothesis confirmed: The decrease of sociological basis of the cleavage translates into decreased party scores compared with AFL-CIO
Germany	Hypothesis confirmed: Higher party scores during times of expansion of the sociological-basis cleavage, decline and stagnation during times of decline and stagnation
Japan	Hypothesis rejected: With the exception of a relatively constant score for DPJ, no trends could be identified despite a continuous decrease of the sociological basis of the cleavage.

2. Minority and Immigrant Organizations

2.1 LULAC

Before testing our hypothesis, I first should have an idea of the evolution in size of both the dominant U.S. population and the selected segment of the subject population. If I were to take the entire population that would fit the subject-population category for the U.S., it would consist of all groups that are not non-Hispanic whites. As discussed in earlier chapters, for the purposes of this analysis, I decided to focus on the largest and fastest-growing segment of the U.S. subject population because it is most likely to yield results from which I can at least in part make inferences for the entire subject population. Table 34 provides an overview of the proportion of said groups compared with the total U.S. population.

Table 34: U.S. Population by race 1950-2010 (in thousands).

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Total Population	150697	179323	203210	226545	248709	281421	308745
White	134942	158831	178119	188371	199686	211460	223553
Black	15042	18871	22539	26495	29986	34658	38929
Hispanic	2021	5814	8920	14608	22354	35305	50477
Am. Indian., Eskimo, Aleut	343	551	795	1420	1959	2475	2932
Asian and Pacific Islander	321	980	1526	3500	7273	10641	15214
Some other race	48	87	230	6758	9804	15359	19107
Two other races	-	-	-	-	-	6826	9009

Source (incl. Category descriptions): US Census Bureau



Figure 32: Discrepancy in scores between parties and identity-interest organization for LULAC Dataset I comparing U.S. Hispanic population from 1994 to present (in thousands)[135] Source: U.S. Census Bureau

[135] To calculate the discrepancy in scores, the annual LULAC score was calculated together with the most recent available presidential platform.

Because the U.S. census data are limited, in the sense that I only have new data for each beginning decade, I listed the same number for all years per decade. Obviously, the real numbers will be in between those numbers, and particularly for the Hispanic population, it would be fair to assume that there is a sharply increasing trend.

Table 35: Presidential election participation rates by race.

	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
White	64%	66%	66%	64%	70%	61%	62%	67%	66%	64%
Asian	NA	NA	NA	NA	54%	46%	43%	45%	47%	48%
Black	51%	54%	61%	55%	59%	53%	57%	60%	65%	67%
Hispanic	43%	46%	50%	48%	52%	44%	46%	47%	50%	47%

Source (incl. Category descriptions): Pew Research (2013)

Table 35 above displays the participation rates of major racial groups in the U.S. presidential elections since 1976. While the electoral participation is lower than for the African-American segment of the subject population, the rate of electoral participation of Latino voters is still significantly higher in terms of absolute numbers when compared to other minorities.

What can be surmised from tables 34 and 35 and Figure 32 is that despite the enormous increase of the Latino population, both parties have done little with regard to their platforms to address the demands of this group. What remains a consistent finding for both datasets is that neither party translates the demands on behalf of the Latino community by LULAC very well. One reason that might explain the relative lack of inclusivity toward demands from the Hispanic community is that they still "punch below their weight," meaning that despite a rapidly increasing number of Hispanic citizens and voters (and by extension an increasing group of illegal Latino residents), the number of eligible voters is still much higher than the number of Hispanic voters who do participate, still lagging behind the presidential and midterm election participation rates of African-Americans and Caucasian-Americans. (Krogstad 2014; Taylor et al. 2012) However, the argument that parties ignore the Latino population because their electoral

participation rate is lower is invalidated because the dramatic increase also results in a higher Latino vote despite an electoral participation rate that is lower than for African-Americans or the non-Hispanic white majority. While our hypothesis only takes into account size of the group, and not political engagement, it is nonetheless an important element that should be pointed out.

During the 1990s, the Hispanic minority became the largest minority group, during a pace of expansion only equaled by the Asian-American population, while the growth rates of whites and African-Americans remained relatively modest. These shifts within the U.S. population have important implications for our hypothesis. While it is true that a party can't address the demands of all identity-interest organizations, particularly if there are incompatible issues, this is very different from parties' not reflecting most of the demands of the largest of such identity-interest organizations representing the largest segment within the subject population. With regard to the comparatively high electoral participation rates of African-Americans, however, future research should include identity-interest organizations, in particular NAACP, to determine whether electoral participation rate or subject population size matter more.

On the basis of the data presented here, Hypothesis Three has to be rejected. The demands of the selected identity-organization are not well translated by parties despite the dramatic growth of the Hispanic population. An important caveat is that the inclusion of other identity-interest groups might yield more positive results for parties. However, even if other organizations like NAACP or NCLR were to be included, it is unlikely that parties would be more responsive, at least not because of the size of the respective subject population.

While outside of the scope of this project, the analysis of the above case suggests that the inclusion of other identity-interest organizations representing other segments of the subject population, in particular African-Americans, may yield more insight into their validity. Not only

is the latter minority much older, but the roots of a national organizational translation reach back much further. Additionally, an analysis of lower-tier levels – in this case, states with high concentrations of minorities – and the inclusion of other significant identity-interest organizations may help to test and reformulate our hypothesis.

2.2 TGD

Figures 33 displays discrepancies in scores between the five German parties and the largest, and oldest, national immigrant and ethnic minority advocacy group in Germany, TGD, compared with the size of the Turkish-German population since 1994. The numbers on the horizontal are based on the number of Turkish nationalizations plus the cumulative total of Turkish citizens naturalized since 1998. (cf. tables 36 and 37 below) The pre-1998 Turkish naturalizations were not included, meaning that the actual numbers will be even higher than those displayed here.



Figure 33: Discrepancy in scores between German parties and TGD compared with the Turkish-German population 1996-2013 (in thousands).[136] Source: DESTASIS (2014)

Table 36: Naturalizations of Turkish citizens since the revision of the German citizenship and nationality legislation of 2000, including cumulative total of naturalizations since 1998.

Year	Annual naturalizations	Cumulative amount naturalized	Year	Annual naturalizations	Cumulative amount naturalized
1998	56,994	NA	**2006**	33,388	549141
1999	100,324	157318	**2007**	28,861	578002
2000	82,861	240179	**2008**	24,449	602451
2001	76,573	316752	**2009**	24,647	627098
2002	64,631	381383	**2010**	26,192	653290
2003	56,244	437627	**2011**	28,103	681393
2004	44,465	482092	**2012**	33,246	714639
2005	32,661	515753	**2013**	NA	NA

[136] Analogous to the way the discrepancies in scores were calculated for LULAC, the closest available electoral platform was compared to the respective TGD score. A list with all numbers of discrepancies in scores can be found in the appendix.

Source: BAMF (Bundesamt fur Migration und Flüchtlinge) and DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German Ministry of the Interior.

Table 37: Total population including foreigners compared to foreign, EU (and prior to that European Community), and Turkish population (in thousands).

	Total population	**Foreign total**	**EU/EC**	**Turkish**		**Total population**	**Foreign total**	**EU**	**Turkish**
1967	59948	1806	596	172	**1991**	80275	6067	1698	1779
1968	60463	1924	641	205	**1992**	80975	6670	1719	1854
1969	61195	2381	709	322	**1993**	81338	6977	1750	1918
1970	61001	2738	784	469	**1994**	81539	7118	1779	1965
1971	61503	3188	1215	652	**1995**	81817	7343	1811	2014
1972	61809	3554	1187	712	**1996**	82012	7492	1839	2049
1973	62101	3991	1278	910	**1997**	82057	7419	1850	2107
1974	61991	4051	1288	1028	**1998**	82037	7308	1854	2110
1975	61645	3900	1250	1077	**1999**	82163	7336	2299	2053
1976	61442	3852	1180	1079	**2000**	82260	7268	2329	1998
1977	61353	3892	1163	1118	**2001**	82440	7318	2343	1947
1978	61322	4006	1145	1165	**2002**	82537	7348	2299	1912
1979	61439	4251	1169	1268	**2003**	82532	7342	2346	1877
1980	61658	4566	1211	1462	**2004**	82501	7288	2108	1764
1981	61713	4721	1234	1546	**2005**	82439	7289	2144	1764
1982	61546	4672	1216	1580	**2006**	82315	7256	2523	1738
1983	61307	4574	1167	1552	**2007**	82218	7255	2562	1713
1984	61049	4405	1142	1425	**2008**	82002	7186	2584	1688
1985	61020	4482	1549*	1402	**2009**	81802	7131	2589	1658
1986	61140	4662	1560	1434	**2010**	81752	7199	2663	1629
1987	61238	4286	1408	1453	**2011**	80328	7339	2822	1607
1988	61715	4624	1449	1523	**2012**	80524	6640	3050	1575
1989	62679	5007	1516	1612	**2013**	80767	7012	3366	1549
1990	79753**	5582	1644	1694					

*First year including the 15 EU member state nationals.
** Reunification year. Source: DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German Ministry of the Interior.

The slightly more positive and slightly increasing respective scores for Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke indicate that the presence of people with Turkish backgrounds may have some effect on policy proposals of both parties. On average, the scores for all German parties are closer to the TGD scores in contrast to the difference between LULAC and both major U.S. parties. TGD is relatively young as an organization, yet the sociological base has been consistently present in German society since the 1970s. The lack of a national organization until the mid-1990s in part explains the late politization of issues relevant to the population in Germany with an immigrant background, particularly the Turkish-German community.

Table 37 displays the number of foreign nationals compared with German and EU citizens. Until the late 1990s, the number of Turkish citizens increases; indeed, a look at more detailed data from the German federal statistical bureau confirms that Turkish citizens remain by far the largest non-German population group in Germany. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the decline in the number of Turkish citizens after that is explained by the new citizenship legislation and sharply increased numbers of naturalization of Turks. For Hypothesis Three, the data suggest that size of the sociological base of TGD has only little bearing on the translation of issues relevant to the Turkish community, and by extension, that many issues relevant to the immigrant population in Germany are slightly more relevant to Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, but that overall immigrant/minority issues are not among the highest priorities of parties. While there appears to be a slight increase in importance for other parties, this increase is very small.

I can tentatively confirm Hypothesis Three, meaning that the discrepancies in scores become smaller as the size of the sociological base of the group increases. While the size of the Turkish minority has increased, the group also experienced a number of significant changes for the time period under analysis. On one hand, the increase rates of the 1990s is dwarfed by those of the 1970s and 1980s, now more or less remaining stagnant, which is true for the general immigrant population. On the other hand, a large number of Turks acquired German citizenship, which in part blurred our data. Additional research focused on regional levels where migrant minority populations are larger, and on additional immigrant and minority organizations, needs to be conducted to bring data that could allow for a stronger confirmation. Complementary to the analysis of lower-tier levels, I should attempt to include identity-interest organizations that predate TGD even if they never managed to grow beyond the local scope.

2.3 BLL

Figure 34 displays the discrepancies in scores between Japan's four main parties and BLL per election year. Figure 34bis does the same for the minor parties.



Figure 34: Discrepancy in scores between the four Japanese main parties and BLL for years 1998-2013.



Figure 34bis: Discrepancy in scores between the smaller Japanese parties and BLL for years 2005-2012.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the exact size of the Buraku population is unknown. One of the major elements that Chung pointed out in explaining why Japan is the only industrialized country with a fourth-generation immigrant problem is the fact that phenotypically speaking, almost all immigrants are indistinguishable with the majority of ethnic Japanese. (2010) This invisibility also applies to the Buraku population, contrasting sharply with many minorities in Western European countries and the U.S. While an estimation, let alone time-series data, for the Buraku population isn't available, I can assume that this population has remained relatively constant for the time period under analysis. The total size of the subject population did increase since the mid-1980s, but despite this increase, particularly for immigrants from China, the Philippines, and Brazil, the proportion of foreign residents as part of the total population remains less than 2 percent. (JMIAC 2014) The Buraku population thus remains by far the largest segment of the subject population.

Because the Buraku population over the centuries evolved together with the general population, I surmise that it makes sense to assume that the current Buraku population has reached a level of stagnation similar to that of the general population. Consequently, I opted not to include a population number here, and instead listed the discrepancies in scores per election year for HoR and HoC 1998-2012. Figures 34 and 34bis are based on the assumption that the Buraku population remained stagnant, at least for the two decades under analysis. Even if I had the opportunity of including data from other identity-interest organizations, in particular those advocating on behalf of the second-largest segment of what can be described as the subject population of Japan, the resident Korean minority, the latter group only represents a very small

share of the total population of 127 million, and its size is also stagnant in proportion to the general population. (JMIAC 2014)

With regard to Hypothesis Three, I should then expect a stagnation of the positions of political parties, because the Buraku population and also other categories that could be seen as ethnic minorities underwent no significant levels of expansion for the time period under analysis. Significant levels of fluctuation, or the absence of any trends that reflect this stagnation, suggest that the political importance of issues translated by the BLL has little or no effect on party programs. Indeed, looking at the scores for all parties, I cannot distinguish any trend that is either increasing or decreasing. The discrepancies in scores for the three smaller parties are much higher than in the RENGO case, and are more in line with the discrepancies in scores of the other parties. Although the DPJ appears to have the most constant discrepancies in scores, also here the fluctuations are much more pronounced.

In those instances in which there is fluctuation, the fluctuation appears to be independent of the size of the subject population but remains, save for a few exceptions, within a relatively small range. Hypothesis Three can be tentatively confirmed because despite some fluctuation, these fluctuations appear to be small overall. An additional caveat is the absence of any trends, which would caution us to revise our hypothesis. However, more research, particularly with regard to the potential effects of future immigration on politics, will be necessary to conclusively confirm this. Similarly for the two German and U.S. ethnic minorities, the Buraku in particular tend to concentrate in specific regions and urban centers, in this case, the urban areas of western and southern Japan. An analysis of different administrative tiers, both locally and regionally, compared with the national level also may yield more conclusive results.

Minority Organizations	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
US	Hypothesis rejected: Growth population-basis cleavage does not translate into increase party scores
Germany	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed
Japan	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Stagnation is reflected in stagnation of party scores

3. Future research agenda considerations

With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and most influential union federations provided a solid set to see to what extent parties did indeed translate the interests of the secondary-sector employees, or the traditional sociological base of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. Because this project is laying the foundation for a larger future research projects, I deliberately defined the worker side of the cleavage conservatively as only the segment of traditional industrial workers. Future research will have to expand on this by examining how and whether other segments of the employed population also could be argued to identify as those on the worker side, particularly in the light of increased unionization rates among tertiary-sector employees.

With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that in order to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity-interest organizations need to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the relevance of minority groups on politics by including an analysis of the regional and/or local tiers, depending on the concentration of the respective minority groups. However, particularly for the U.S. case, it appears unlikely that the inclusion of additional identity-interest organizations translating demands made by subject minorities would be much different from the

results I obtained for LULAC. If both U.S. parties ignore demands from the largest Latino advocacy organization, which not only represents the largest, but also the fastest-growing minority group in the U.S., I can speculate that it is unlikely that either party would do better for smaller segments of the subject population.

Conclusion

This project has addressed the question of what causing this dysfunction of representation through political parties. In particular, I analyzed how well parties translate cleavages by focusing on two specific cleavages, worker-vs.-owner and subject-vs.-dominant population. I did this by examining the relationship trends between two categories of the most tractable social movement organization types, political parties and the largest and most influential identity-interest organizations translating one pole of the two cleavages under analysis. To do so, the programmatic content of party manifestos spanning several decades was compared with programmatic documents of major interest groups representing large segments of a population with cleavage-based identities.

By selecting the largest and most influential identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of the largest segments of a distinct sociological group at one pole of a cleavage, I argued that such a selection would at least be sufficiently indicative of the interests of that specific segment, and perhaps also indicative of the mechanisms at work with regard to the entire population on that pole.

In this final chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications and the main findings, and case-specific findings, and I address future research agenda concerns. Below is a summary of the hypotheses and expectations formulated in Chapter One that were tested in the two previous chapters.

> H1 - Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time:
> In a two-party system, parties become less responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a multiparty system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less responsive to cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over time.

H2 - Level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time:
In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage slightly stronger than the other. In a multiparty system, several parties will compete to attract the votes of a cleavage-based organization; therefore I should expect cleavage translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, cleavage translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage translation by the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level.

H3 - Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation related to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups:
Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political parties will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is experiencing stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth.

	H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
2-party system	Parties become less responsive	One party will be slightly more responsive than the other
Multiparty system	Parties become more responsive over time	Party responsiveness will fluctuate over time across parties
Dominant party system	Dominant party becomes less responsive, other parties will be more responsive	Party responsiveness will fluctuate higher among other parties while it remains stagnant at low level for the dominant party

Table 1: expectations H1 and H2

	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
Two-party system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases
Multiparty system	Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases
Dominant-party system	Dominant party will be less responsive; other parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases

Table 2: expectations H3

1. Theoretical implications and main findings

I want to start by pointing out that any future research based on this project will have to take into account that an expansion of the cleavages under analysis, but also the addition of more identity-interest organizations – just as in the case of this project – likely will require intensive data

collection and processing. This section will point out some general findings and implications, while I reserve the case-specific issues for the next section. In terms of general tendencies, there are several elements I could establish.

First, the body of literature on social cleavages suggests that for many cases, the worker-vs.-owner cleavage remains relatively salient, despite a decrease in salience. Perhaps our most important finding is that the data from this study suggests otherwise. Either this cleavage had been conflated with a general left-vs.-right division – which actually doesn't say much about politics, as it may mean different things in different contexts – or other cleavages became more salient, or all cleavages lost salience. While this conclusion is not completely original, because at least some scholars studying parties have argued as much, it is nonetheless significant because this study is the first to actually create a more solid evidence base rooted in a complementary basis of party and identity-interest group research.

Second, the scores of all identity-interest organizations remain relatively constant over time, with the exceptions of TGD and LULAC. However, in contrast with the estimates for party manifestos for the same party, which generally display a much higher level of fluctuation, these fluctuations appear less significant. For the earlier TGD and LULAC texts, I could attribute the higher fluctuation levels to the shorter text amounts available. But even these fluctuations remained modest when compared with parties. Parties, on the other hand, exhibit much higher levels of fluctuation across all three cases, with only few exceptions. With regard to the U.S. scores, it appears that the scores of Democrats and Republicans are very close, yet still fluctuate at about the same rate together. For the German case, all parties, even the smaller ones, exhibit considerable levels of estimate fluctuation over time. The only exception seems to be DPJ in Japan. Unlike parties, they consistently translate similar, yet not identical, interests of

sociological groups much better over time. This finding supports my argument that identity-interest groups are a much better vehicle for cleavage expressions than parties.

The third and fourth findings relate to the findings for organizations translating the worker-vs.-owner cleavage compared with those for the subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage. For the results I obtained for the union federations advocating on behalf of the worker side of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage, each case allowed for relatively conclusive statements because it was possible to distinguish relatively clear directions the parties took in relation to them over time. Granted, this was less the case for the Japanese data, yet also here I could at least observe some tendencies.

Our fourth finding is that for the minority organizations that represented the largest segment of the respective subject populations, however, the trends I could establish proved to be relatively weak. While I can expect that the same model will apply similar identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of segments of the subject population, the weak trends suggest that in order to confirm or reject these trends, I may need to seek ways to obtain data that better reflects the entire subject population instead of just the largest segment. One reason for doing so is that with the U.S. case, for example, minorities that are largely non-immigrant, such as African-Americans, to an extent may have interests that differ from those of Latino groups, in which a large segment has a bigger stake in immigration issues. The point of this would be to see how close the various larger identity-interest organizations advocating on behalf of the subject minority population are to each other compared with parties.

A fifth main finding, again with regard to minority identity-interest organizations, that was raised by examining the results for TGD, and to a lesser extent BLL, is that an analysis such as that provided by this project might be rendered even more complete by additionally focusing

on other tiers aside from the national level, in particular those areas with larger concentrations of the subject population. Given the long history of LULAC's presence in the southwestern U.S., an examination of state-level political texts also might yield results complementary to the national data.

With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and most influential union federations provided a solid set to see how far parties did indeed translate the interests of the working class. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that in order to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity-interest organizations must to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the relevance of minority groups on politics by including an analysis of regional tiers, local tiers, or both, depending on the concentration of the respective groups.

Also, the relative size of the demographic base of cleavage-identity organizations may explain why the workers-vs.-owners cleavage appeared better translated by parties than the subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage. One reason to select the worker-vs.-owner and subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage was that with the exception of some cases like Belgium, Canada, or Switzerland, the second cleavage is assumed to be less salient in the majority of the cases, whereas the first is more salient. However, with the advent of global immigration, the second cleavage may become salient even in those cases that traditionally had no subject population or only a very small one. However, while immigration figures in some countries are rapidly increasing, the question remains whether this increase in size actually did have any effect on party politics. In particular, I looked at the largest minority groups in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. In the first case, immigration of the Hispanic group has been continuous

and they became the second-largest segment of the population before the dominant population. In Germany, the Turkish population grew significantly between the 1970s and the 1990s and is now slowly at a point of stagnation in line with a general stagnation of the German population. In Japan, I analyzed the Buraku minority because immigration, while slightly increased in recent decades, remains relatively insignificant. For the Buraku group, I could assume that the proportion of the total population remains the same. Contrary to the union federation data, the general trend I could observe is that regardless of the case and minority group analyzed, the effects of changes or stagnation of the minority group appeared to have only modest, if not trivial, effects upon party political agendas compared with similar evolutions among the traditional worker population. While our data suggest that the relatively small proportion of the population segment may be an important, if not the most important, factor in why the subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage wasn't translated well by parties, I should acknowledge that in those two cases in which considerable growth of the subject population segment under analysis occurred, the Turks in Germany and the Latino population in the U.S., the parties' positions did not change that much. A caveat is that at least for the German case, I could argue that there is a weak tendency for the Green party and the left fringe to be more attentive to the interests of the Turkish community. This very much in contrast to the U.S., where despite a rapidly increasing proportion of the Latino population and increased expansion and professionalization of LULAC appear to have little or no effect on both parties. These two former elements suggest that party systems do matter with regard to how well cleavages can become translated. The literature on this, particularly the work by Arend Lijphart, suggested as much, yet so far, identity-interest organizations were not included in the evidence presented. Although future research will have to

confirm this, these differences suggest that proportional representation systems are indeed better than two-party majoritarian party systems.

In Chapter One, I briefly touched about the potential increase of political apathy in established democracies. While it was not part of the hypotheses formulated, it was a consideration that deserved the type of preliminary research conducted for this project before I am also able to have a better idea to successfully explore the problem of political apathy. What was meant is that the disconnection from political parties might also occur in the arena of identity-interest organizations. Political apathy thus not only means a retreat from electoral politics, but also from political involvement of the masses in democracy as such. The current data I obtained from the three cases under examination did not provide a clear answer to this question. On one hand, the union data in all three cases seem to confirm that there is also a general decline in union membership. However, I need to be careful with surmising that this is the result of political apathy. First, there is the original focus of unions on traditional workers in the secondary economy. While there is a modestly increasing unionization happening in the tertiary sector, it is too soon to tell whether we're in a period of transition or decline of unions. Second, regardless of the loss of importance of traditional manufacturing labor, in particular in the German and Japanese cases, unionization rates remained relatively stable during the past few decades. An additional caveat is that in as far as I was able to track membership for the subject-population identity-interest organizations, particularly LULAC and TGD, it appears that these organizations increased their membership bases. It is of course possible that there is no apathy at all, but instead one cleavage is in decline and one is expanding, at least in terms of the number of people actively supporting it by joining and/or supporting an identity-interest organization.

2. Case-specific findings

Below are the summaries of the findings for all hypotheses from Chapters Four and Five. For the German case, the first hypothesis could only be confirmed for TGD, yet had to be rejected for DGB. Hypothesis Two could not be confirmed for TGD but could be for DGB. For the Japanese case, I could confirm both hypotheses for both RENGO and BLL, yet with regard to the first hypothesis, I could only partially do so. While the proposed hypotheses appear robust for the selected two-party system and solid for the selected multiparty system, one aspect that should be on a future research agenda is the formulation of both hypotheses so that I can derive clearer results for multiparty systems. For Hypothesis Three, there appears to be a difference between the data I obtained for the union federation organizations and that of the minority organizations. The size of the sociological basis appears to only have had a significant impact on the relationship between parties and union federations, yet little to modest effect on the relationship between subject-group organizations and parties.

Labor Unions	**H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time**	**H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time**
U.S.	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties display decreased cleavage translation over time	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties translate weakly, but a slightly stronger translation by the Democrats.
Germany	Hypothesis not confirmed: The parties' estimates drop and only in 2013 appear to resemble pre-1980 levels	Hypothesis confirmed: fluctuation appears to be relatively widespread, particularly for CDU-CSU
Japan	Hypothesis partially confirmed: The dominant party has low, stagnant responsiveness, but other parties have both higher - particularly NK – and lower levels of responsiveness	Hypothesis confirmed: dominant party has low, stagnant scores, while fluctuation is higher among other parties, with the exception that DPJ scores are much more constant than those of LDP

Minority Organizations	H1: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time	H2: level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time
US	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties display decreased cleavage translation over time	Hypothesis confirmed: Both parties have low scores, Democrats have slightly stronger translation when not controlling for regional impact.
Germany	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Although the evidence is weak, there appears to be a general upward trend for parties to become more responsive	Hypothesis not confirmed: very low level of fluctuation among parties
Japan	Hypothesis partially confirmed: Dominant party has low, stagnant responsiveness, but other parties have higher or lower levels of responsiveness	Hypothesis confirmed: Dominant party has low, stagnant scores while fluctuation is higher among other parties, but DPJ scores fluctuate little

Labor Unions	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
US	Hypothesis confirmed: The decrease of sociological basis of the cleavage translates into decreased party scores compared with AFL-CIO
Germany	Hypothesis confirmed: Higher party scores during times of expansion of the sociological-basis cleavage, decline and stagnation during times of decline and stagnation
Japan	Hypothesis rejected: With the exception of a relatively constant score for DPJ, no trends could be identified despite a continuous decrease of the sociological basis of the cleavage.

Minority Organizations	H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest groups
US	Hypothesis rejected: Growth population-basis cleavage does not translate into increase party scores
Germany	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed
Japan	Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Stagnation is reflected in stagnation of party scores

For the U.S. case, I could confirm Hypotheses One and Two for both organizations I examined. Hypothesis Three could only be confirmed for the AFL-CIO data. On one hand, I could conclude that size of the sociological basis of a cleavage only becomes relevant when a certain threshold size is reached, implying that the reason why LULAC does not appear to weigh on parties' manifestos is because the Latino population it represents has not yet reached a large enough size. However, what is also possible is that the mechanism of size only works in one direction for the U.S. case, meaning that only when the sociological basis of an identity-interest organization declines will a party's position change, but not the other way around.

In their study testing and comparing the impact of different sets of actors on politics as suggested by four theoretical models explaining U.S. democracy, Gillens and Page found that it is mostly the preferences of economic elites and non-identity, or what they termed "business interest groups," that are being reflected by American policy making. (2014) Although their method and theoretical framework differ from the one used here, their findings confirm some of the trends of this project. One of the main findings of my study is that the U.S. appears to perform significantly worse compared with the two different liberal democracies under examination with regard to the translation of cleavage demands. Both the AFL-CIO and LULAC are the types of organizations that Gillens and Page classify as "mass-based" interest groups, which together with ordinary, individual citizens are found to have little influence on U.S. policy making. For both organizations, I could establish that the presidential platforms did not reflect the policy stances much, to say the least.

While I could establish that a decrease of AFL-CIO influence was highly correlated to a decrease of the traditional industrial worker population, one has to wonder what replaced it. Did

another cleavage become more important, or did both parties increasingly distance themselves from the masses in favor of corporate interests and wealthy individuals, as Gillens and Page suggest? The evidence I collected for LULAC at least suggests that one cleavage that has always been present in U.S. politics, and in which at least part of the subject population dramatically increases in the past few decades, remains under-articulated by both parties.

Despite this continuous increase of the Hispanic population in the U.S. and organizational growth and professionalization of LULAC, the impact of LULAC on national policy is at best modest, and at worst insignificant. Looking at AFL-CIO, I could establish that both major parties did reflect the policy positions of the AFL-CIO significantly more prior to the 1980s. Although AFL-CIO's positions on policy did not change significantly over time, as was the case with LULAC, the distance between AFL-CIO policy positions and those of both parties increase dramatically, to the point where it is correct to state that neither party reflects the policy position of the employed any longer. The small difference between Republicans and Democrats with regard to this is negligible. A question that did come up after weighing the results of this analysis was who, exactly, is being represented by U.S. political parties, if not the ordinary citizens and the identity-interest groups they organized in? The main difference between what Gillens and Page termed "business interest group" and our "identity-interest group" is that the former lacks popular legitimacy, as it only reflects the demands of a small percentage of the population, or at least a percentage much smaller than either the traditional industrial worker group or the Latino population.

Both the German and Japanese cases yielded mixed results for both union federation and identity-interest organizations. The German system appears to perform somewhat better in terms of translating the demands of both cleavages under analysis, at least with regard to the groups

represented by the identity-interest organizations under analysis. Whereas German parties used to better translate demands of DGB in earlier decades, it appears that after 1980, this function was taken over by two other parties traditionally counted as left of the center, the Greens and Die Linke. On one hand, Germany's traditional working class underwent the same changes as in the U.S., albeit slightly less pronounced. On the other hand, the neo-corporatist bargaining system made it more difficult for unions to be undermined, as in the U.S. case. Both factors combined explain why Germany's traditional working class continues to be relevant for political parties, particularly when compared to the U.S.

For the Japanese case, the evidence is much less conclusive, yet there are a few items that are worth mentioning. First, those parties that were present since 1955 remained seemingly unaffected by both identity-interest organizations. Indeed, it seems as if the content of LDP, SDP, and to a lesser extent NK, are rather close compared with both identity-interest groups. Only DPJ and a few younger, newer parties appear to be somewhat affected by both identity-groups. This is a trend Japan shares with the German case; in both, the traditional parties that were present from the onset of the party system translated the interests of the examined identity-interest organizations less well than newer parties. There are several conclusions I can draw from this. First, both systems appear to provide some level of insulation from the voter, in the sense that even if parties translate the interests of certain cleavage-based groups less well, it may result in lower party membership numbers and votes, but not in a demise of these parties. Also, much unlike the U.S. system, both systems allow for new parties to enter the system. In both cases, some of these newer parties focused on voter bases originally associated with one of the older parties. An important difference with the German case is that within Japan's LDP-dominated system, it is still difficult to influence politics without access to the LDP. The creation of

RENGO, for example, was inspired in part by the ambition to weigh more heavily on all Japanese parties, including LDP. While this effort appears to have borne some fruit, the differences between the BLL estimate results and RENGO results remain relatively small.

Unlike the U.S. case, our data did not suggest any trends with regard to incumbency of parties in Japanese or German government. Also unlike the U.S., the possibility of more than two parties entering the political arena creates the possibility of having pariah parties, whose positions are considered too controversial or extremist for other parties and result in their exclusion from potential coalitions.

Our study in part hinged on the assumption that political parties, including those in the U.S., should reflect the demands of the overwhelming majority of the people, and by extension, the demands of large cleavage-based-groups' interests. The central problem of the current U.S. political party system, then, is its decreasing lack of legitimacy and its inability to reflect the wishes and desires of a substantial segment of its voters. Granted, future research will have to show whether other cleavages became more relevant, or that Republicans and Democrats instead did, as suggested by Gillens and Page, and stopped reflecting the interests of the masses. It appears that U.S. parties have almost completely lost their ability to represent the people, a task now increasingly performed by identity-interest groups that lack the access to gain significant influence on policy making. From a comparative point of view, then, it appears the U.S. type model, with regard to its party system and integration of identity-interest groups into the political system – or lack of the latter – is not as successful with regard to citizen representation as the two other cases under examination.

3 Future research agenda considerations

While our analysis yielded mixed results, it also laid a foundation for what promise to be interesting future research projects. A first point to conclude is that future research will have to delve deeper into the hypotheses confirmed and to address shortcomings of those that couldn't be confirmed. The results of the data presented here helped to confirm some of the hypotheses posed, but it was impossible to confirm some hypotheses with the data available.

As pointed out in the first section, it appears that if the worker-vs.-owner cleavage at some place at some point in time was the most salient one, decreased unionization rates and a significantly decreased reduction of the traditional worker base suggest that this cleavage did lose a lot of salience during the past few decades. What seems certain is that in all three cases, despite the loss of salience, this cleavage is still being politicized and is relevant. However, to confirm this finding, I have to explore the question of whether this is just because some authors conflated workers-vs.-owners with a general left-vs.-right division, or whether other cleavages became more salient, or whether all cleavages lost salience.

With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and most influential union federations provided a solid set to see to what extent parties did indeed translate the interests of the secondary-sector employees, or the traditional sociological base of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. Because this project is laying the foundation for larger future research projects, I deliberately defined the *worker* side of the cleavage conservatively as only the segment of traditional industrial workers. Future research will have to expand on this by examining how and whether other segments of the employed population also could be argued to identify as those on the

worker side, particularly in light of increased unionization rates among tertiary-sector employees.

With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that in order to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity-interest organizations need to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the relevance of minority groups on politics by including an analysis of regional and/or local tiers, depending on the concentration of the respective minority groups. However, particularly for the U.S. case, it appears unlikely that the inclusion of additional identity-interest organizations translating demands made by subject minorities would be much different from the results I obtained for LULAC. If both U.S. parties remain relatively ignorant of demands from the largest Latino advocacy organization, which not only represents the largest, but also the fastest-growing minority group in the U.S., I can speculate that it is unlikely that either party would do better for smaller segments of the subject population.

The results for the two cleavages in the three cases examined suggest that it would be worthwhile to conduct a similar analysis for the two other cleavages mentioned in Chapter One: the rural-vs.-urban and the religious-vs.-secular cleavages. On one hand, it may appear as if these are not as relevant as the two analyzed for this project, which would be in line with what most party-centered cleavage literature agrees upon. On the other hand, this study suggests a complementary approach including data from both parties and extra-electoral organizations that may bring more conclusive answers to these questions. Particularly for the U.S. case, the religious-vs.-secular cleavage in fact may have become more salient in politics. For Japan, especially considering the fact that some authors did make mention of the possibility of a rural-

vs.-urban cleavage in connection with the position of the LDP, the latter cleavage would be an interesting research objective.

A minor consideration relates to the lack of findings related to incumbency of parties in government for both Germany and Japan. Because I could at least identify some trends for the U.S., albeit weak ones for incumbency, it would make sense to add coalition agreement texts to the analysis in order to see how they compare with the party manifestos and the identity-interest organization texts.

Appendix

1. AFL-CIO

1.1 Results for dataset I, Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, not stemmed

```
> aflcio1nocontroldata<-wfm("aflcio-1-no-control.csv")
> aflcio1nocontrolresults<-wordfish(aflcio1nocontroldata,c(1,2))
> aflcio1nocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.32405    0.03633 -0.3953 -0.25284
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  0.74817    0.01759  0.7137  0.78264
DEM.1960.txt             -0.29117    0.02884 -0.3477 -0.23465
DEM.1964.txt             -0.09747    0.02624 -0.1489 -0.04605
DEM.1968.txt             -0.36540    0.02861 -0.4215 -0.30933
DEM.1972.txt             -0.12112    0.02272 -0.1656 -0.07659
DEM.1976.txt             -0.14168    0.02479 -0.1903 -0.09309
DEM.1980.txt             -0.29487    0.01860 -0.3313 -0.25842
DEM.1984.txt             -0.66905    0.01913 -0.7065 -0.63155
DEM.1988.txt             -0.96299    0.05147 -1.0639 -0.86212
DEM.1992.txt             -1.20713    0.03662 -1.2789 -1.13535
DEM.1996.txt             -1.69490    0.02275 -1.7395 -1.65031
DEM.2000.txt             -1.34706    0.02216 -1.3905 -1.30363
DEM.2004.txt             -1.51306    0.02417 -1.5604 -1.46569
DEM.2008.txt             -1.24528    0.02129 -1.2870 -1.20354
DEM.2012.txt             -1.41265    0.02038 -1.4526 -1.37271
REP.1960.txt             -0.32686    0.03597 -0.3974 -0.25636
REP.1964.txt             -0.66087    0.03989 -0.7391 -0.58269
REP.1972.txt             -0.55083    0.02372 -0.5973 -0.50433
REP.1976.txt             -0.59194    0.02593 -0.6428 -0.54111
REP.1980.txt             -0.74078    0.01964 -0.7793 -0.70228
REP.1984.txt             -0.94259    0.02184 -0.9854 -0.89979
REP.1988.txt             -1.14718    0.01841 -1.1833 -1.11109
REP.1992.txt             -1.39039    0.01987 -1.4293 -1.35145
REP.1996.txt             -1.39963    0.02021 -1.4392 -1.36002
REP.2000.txt             -1.40575    0.01802 -1.4411 -1.37043
REP.2004.txt             -1.65937    0.01519 -1.6891 -1.62961
REP.2008.txt             -1.24580    0.02245 -1.2898 -1.20179
REP.2012.txt             -1.09375    0.02036 -1.1337 -1.05384
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.64679    0.02702  0.5938  0.69975
AFLCIO.1964.txt           0.73350    0.01983  0.6946  0.77235
AFLCIO.1971.txt           1.02882    0.01750  0.9945  1.06311
AFLCIO.1972.txt           0.72950    0.01588  0.6984  0.76062
AFLCIO.1973.txt           1.01593    0.01585  0.9849  1.04699
AFLCIO.1975.txt           1.07703    0.01470  1.0482  1.10585
AFLCIO.1976.txt           0.79428    0.01254  0.7697  0.81887
AFLCIO.1977.txt           1.01349    0.01426  0.9855  1.04145
AFLCIO.1979.txt           1.02050    0.01421  0.9926  1.04835
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.70320    0.02210  0.6599  0.74652
AFLCIO.1981.txt           1.02654    0.01566  0.9959  1.05723
AFLCIO.1983.txt           1.07691    0.01388  1.0497  1.10411
AFLCIO.1984.txt           0.76693    0.03092  0.7063  0.82754
```

```
AFLCIO.1985.txt           1.03129    0.01384  1.0042  1.05842
AFLCIO.1987.txt           1.03939    0.01329  1.0133  1.06544
AFLCIO.1989.txt           1.06381    0.01272  1.0389  1.08873
AFLCIO.1991.txt           1.04850    0.01372  1.0216  1.07540
AFLCIO.1993.txt           1.03886    0.01380  1.0118  1.06592
AFLCIO.1995.txt           1.09630    0.01000  1.0767  1.11590
AFLCIO.1997.txt           0.99818    0.01252  0.9737  1.02272
AFLCIO.1999.txt           0.92418    0.01164  0.9014  0.94700
AFLCIO.2001.txt           0.84767    0.02691  0.7949  0.90043
AFLCIO.2005.txt           1.17346    0.01341  1.1472  1.19975
AFLCIO.2009.txt           1.06698    0.01406  1.0394  1.09454
AFLCIO.2013.txt           0.96286    0.01079  0.9417  0.98402
```

1.2 Results for dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, not stemmed

```
> aflcio2nocontroldata<-wfm("aflcio-2-no-control.csv")
> aflcio2nocontrolresults<-wordfish(aflcio2nocontroldata,c(1,2))
> aflcio2nocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error    Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.51937   0.037085 -0.59205 -0.4467
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.56675   0.026337  1.51513  1.6184
DEM.1960.txt             -0.39044   0.030467 -0.45016 -0.3307
DEM.1964.txt              0.08755   0.030239  0.02828  0.1468
DEM.1968.txt             -0.50688   0.029298 -0.56430 -0.4495
DEM.1972.txt             -0.25062   0.025062 -0.29973 -0.2015
DEM.1976.txt             -0.57469   0.025142 -0.62397 -0.5254
DEM.1980.txt             -0.93367   0.014703 -0.96249 -0.9049
DEM.1984.txt             -0.89805   0.015948 -0.92930 -0.8668
REP.1960.txt             -0.45792   0.037344 -0.53111 -0.3847
REP.1964.txt             -0.93400   0.031400 -0.99554 -0.8725
REP.1972.txt             -0.63446   0.023318 -0.68016 -0.5888
REP.1976.txt             -0.90079   0.021274 -0.94248 -0.8591
REP.1980.txt             -1.18666   0.009463 -1.20521 -1.1681
REP.1984.txt             -1.07662   0.014068 -1.10419 -1.0490
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.81670   0.039984  0.73834  0.8951
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.50074   0.029613  1.44270  1.5588
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.65398   0.023157  1.60860  1.6994
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.58861   0.019617  1.55016  1.6271
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.82586   0.034224  0.75878  0.8929
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.17839   0.049612  1.08115  1.2756
```

1.3 Dataset III: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents excluding AFL-CIO platform proposals, as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013

```
> AFLCIO3data<-wfm("AFLCIO-3.csv")
> AFLCIO3results<-wordfish(AFLCIO3data,c(1,2))
> AFLCIO3results
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = AFLCIO3data, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1972.txt    -0.51889    0.02286 -0.5637 -0.47409
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1971.txt  1.08944    0.02053  1.0492  1.12967
DEM.1960.txt             -0.30055    0.02815 -0.3557 -0.24538
```

```
DEM.1964.txt             -0.13013    0.02581 -0.1807 -0.07953
DEM.1968.txt             -0.33219    0.02777 -0.3866 -0.27776
DEM.1972.txt             -0.07779    0.02227 -0.1214 -0.03414
DEM.1976.txt             -0.08235    0.02423 -0.1298 -0.03486
DEM.1980.txt             -0.18377    0.01808 -0.2192 -0.14833
DEM.1984.txt             -0.53041    0.01847 -0.5666 -0.49422
DEM.1988.txt             -0.82625    0.04899 -0.9223 -0.73024
DEM.1992.txt             -1.00964    0.03475 -1.0778 -0.94153
DEM.1996.txt             -1.45578    0.02119 -1.4973 -1.41425
DEM.2000.txt             -1.11918    0.02104 -1.1604 -1.07794
DEM.2004.txt             -1.25986    0.02289 -1.3047 -1.21500
DEM.2008.txt             -1.00209    0.02039 -1.0420 -0.96213
DEM.2012.txt             -1.14480    0.01950 -1.1830 -1.10658
REP.1960.txt             -0.35193    0.03498 -0.4205 -0.28338
REP.1964.txt             -0.66256    0.03802 -0.7371 -0.58804
REP.1968.txt             -0.35265    0.03533 -0.4219 -0.28341
REP.1976.txt             -0.52616    0.02495 -0.5751 -0.47725
REP.1980.txt             -0.66050    0.01879 -0.6973 -0.62367
REP.1984.txt             -0.83721    0.02069 -0.8778 -0.79666
REP.1988.txt             -1.00906    0.01732 -1.0430 -0.97511
REP.1992.txt             -1.22654    0.01846 -1.2627 -1.19037
REP.1996.txt             -1.24047    0.01872 -1.2772 -1.20378
REP.2000.txt             -1.23605    0.01674 -1.2689 -1.20324
REP.2004.txt             -1.45139    0.01399 -1.4788 -1.42397
REP.2008.txt             -1.06492    0.02115 -1.1064 -1.02346
REP.2012.txt             -0.94293    0.01925 -0.9807 -0.90520
AFLCIO.1973.txt           1.04837    0.01893  1.0113  1.08548
AFLCIO.1975.txt           1.13283    0.01762  1.0983  1.16737
AFLCIO.1977.txt           1.06103    0.01678  1.0281  1.09392
AFLCIO.1979.txt           1.07861    0.01662  1.0460  1.11118
AFLCIO.1981.txt           1.10830    0.01791  1.0732  1.14340
AFLCIO.1983.txt           1.16989    0.01595  1.1386  1.20116
AFLCIO.1985.txt           1.11875    0.01577  1.0878  1.14967
AFLCIO.1987.txt           1.13498    0.01505  1.1055  1.16449
AFLCIO.1989.txt           1.17147    0.01431  1.1434  1.19952
AFLCIO.1991.txt           1.15668    0.01537  1.1265  1.18681
AFLCIO.1993.txt           1.15654    0.01526  1.1266  1.18646
AFLCIO.1995.txt           1.22588    0.01107  1.2042  1.24757
AFLCIO.1997.txt           1.13366    0.01343  1.1073  1.15998
AFLCIO.1999.txt           1.06800    0.01216  1.0442  1.09183
AFLCIO.2001.txt           0.96857    0.02805  0.9136  1.02356
AFLCIO.2005.txt           1.35563    0.01379  1.3286  1.38266
AFLCIO.2009.txt           1.24033    0.01463  1.2117  1.26901
AFLCIO.2013.txt           1.10400    0.01141  1.0816  1.12636
```

1.4 Dataset I: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, stemmed

```
> aflcio1stemmednocontroldata<-wfm("aflcio-1-stemmed-no-control.csv")
> aflcio1stemmednocontrolresults<-wordfish(aflcio1stemmednocontroldata,c(1,2))
> aflcio1stemmednocontrolresults
Call:
       wordfish(wfm = aflcio1stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.3656    0.03861 -0.4413 -0.2899
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  0.7793    0.01896  0.7422  0.8165
DEM.1960.txt             -0.3477    0.03069 -0.4079 -0.2876
DEM.1964.txt             -0.1596    0.02810 -0.2147 -0.1045
DEM.1968.txt             -0.3974    0.03044 -0.4570 -0.3377
```

```
DEM.1972.txt              -0.1596    0.02428 -0.2072 -0.1120
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1790    0.02653 -0.2310 -0.1270
DEM.1980.txt              -0.3503    0.01990 -0.3893 -0.3113
DEM.1984.txt              -0.7325    0.02021 -0.7721 -0.6929
DEM.1988.txt              -0.9750    0.05427 -1.0813 -0.8686
DEM.1992.txt              -1.1985    0.03879 -1.2745 -1.1224
DEM.1996.txt              -1.7123    0.02389 -1.7591 -1.6655
DEM.2000.txt              -1.3025    0.02355 -1.3486 -1.2563
DEM.2004.txt              -1.4972    0.02559 -1.5474 -1.4470
DEM.2008.txt              -1.2118    0.02256 -1.2561 -1.1676
DEM.2012.txt              -1.3732    0.02171 -1.4158 -1.3307
REP.1960.txt              -0.3588    0.03822 -0.4337 -0.2838
REP.1964.txt              -0.6620    0.04192 -0.7442 -0.5799
REP.1972.txt              -0.5800    0.02511 -0.6292 -0.5308
REP.1976.txt              -0.5721    0.02750 -0.6260 -0.5182
REP.1980.txt              -0.7643    0.02077 -0.8050 -0.7236
REP.1984.txt              -0.9550    0.02297 -1.0000 -0.9099
REP.1988.txt              -1.1280    0.01950 -1.1662 -1.0898
REP.1992.txt              -1.3636    0.02095 -1.4047 -1.3226
REP.1996.txt              -1.3859    0.02127 -1.4276 -1.3442
REP.2000.txt              -1.3816    0.01904 -1.4189 -1.3442
REP.2004.txt              -1.6756    0.01588 -1.7067 -1.6444
REP.2008.txt              -1.1831    0.02387 -1.2299 -1.1363
REP.2012.txt              -1.0571    0.02151 -1.0992 -1.0149
AFLCIO.1960.txt            0.4785    0.03226  0.4152  0.5417
AFLCIO.1964.txt            0.7426    0.02180  0.6998  0.7853
AFLCIO.1971.txt            1.0577    0.01907  1.0204  1.0951
AFLCIO.1972.txt            0.7476    0.01727  0.7138  0.7815
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0207    0.01782  0.9858  1.0556
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.0879    0.01645  1.0557  1.1202
AFLCIO.1976.txt            0.8092    0.01377  0.7822  0.8362
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0207    0.01600  0.9893  1.0520
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0270    0.01597  0.9957  1.0583
AFLCIO.1980.txt            0.7042    0.02445  0.6563  0.7521
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.0387    0.01748  1.0044  1.0729
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.0750    0.01586  1.0439  1.1060
AFLCIO.1984.txt            0.7652    0.03432  0.6979  0.8324
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.0372    0.01557  1.0067  1.0677
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.0438    0.01496  1.0145  1.0731
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.0819    0.01404  1.0543  1.1094
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.0725    0.01506  1.0430  1.1020
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.0531    0.01532  1.0231  1.0831
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.1391    0.01064  1.1183  1.1600
AFLCIO.1997.txt            0.9974    0.01407  0.9698  1.0250
AFLCIO.1999.txt            0.9429    0.01279  0.9179  0.9680
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.8993    0.02817  0.8441  0.9545
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.1505    0.01569  1.1197  1.1812
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.0382    0.01644  1.0059  1.0704
AFLCIO.2013.txt            0.9827    0.01181  0.9595  1.0058
```

1.5 Dataset IA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, not stemmed ("NEGATIVE" as negative directional document)

```
> aflcio1stemmeddata<-wfm("aflcio-1-stemmed.csv")
> aflcio1stemmedresults<-wordfish(aflcio1stemmeddata,c(1,2))
> aflcio1stemmedresults
Call:
       wordfish(wfm = aflcio1stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:      Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
```

```
NEGATIVE.1968.txt          -0.4488    0.02398 -0.4958 -0.4018
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt    0.7859    0.01956  0.7475  0.8242
DEM.1960.txt               -0.3772    0.03083 -0.4376 -0.3168
DEM.1964.txt               -0.1807    0.02832 -0.2362 -0.1252
DEM.1968.txt               -0.4455    0.03054 -0.5054 -0.3857
DEM.1972.txt               -0.1695    0.02446 -0.2175 -0.1216
DEM.1976.txt               -0.1889    0.02672 -0.2413 -0.1365
DEM.1980.txt               -0.3552    0.01999 -0.3944 -0.3160
DEM.1984.txt               -0.7235    0.02021 -0.7631 -0.6839
DEM.1988.txt               -0.9655    0.05405 -1.0714 -0.8596
DEM.1992.txt               -1.1804    0.03849 -1.2558 -1.1049
DEM.1996.txt               -1.6713    0.02350 -1.7173 -1.6252
DEM.2000.txt               -1.2724    0.02338 -1.3182 -1.2266
DEM.2004.txt               -1.4665    0.02527 -1.5160 -1.4170
DEM.2008.txt               -1.1866    0.02242 -1.2306 -1.1427
DEM.2012.txt               -1.3389    0.02153 -1.3811 -1.2967
REP.1960.txt               -0.3903    0.03839 -0.4656 -0.3151
REP.1964.txt               -0.6941    0.04183 -0.7761 -0.6121
REP.1968.txt               -0.4542    0.03873 -0.5301 -0.3783
REP.1972.txt               -0.5961    0.02513 -0.6453 -0.5468
REP.1976.txt               -0.5817    0.02753 -0.6356 -0.5277
REP.1980.txt               -0.7733    0.02073 -0.8139 -0.7327
REP.1984.txt               -0.9555    0.02285 -1.0003 -0.9107
REP.1988.txt               -1.1241    0.01934 -1.1620 -1.0862
REP.1992.txt               -1.3464    0.02069 -1.3869 -1.3058
REP.1996.txt               -1.3692    0.02099 -1.4103 -1.3281
REP.2000.txt               -1.3647    0.01880 -1.4015 -1.3278
REP.2004.txt               -1.6533    0.01554 -1.6837 -1.6228
REP.2008.txt               -1.1652    0.02369 -1.2117 -1.1188
REP.2012.txt               -1.0420    0.02140 -1.0839 -1.0000
AFLCIO.1960.txt             0.4652    0.03301  0.4005  0.5299
AFLCIO.1964.txt             0.7483    0.02244  0.7043  0.7923
AFLCIO.1971.txt             1.0823    0.01976  1.0436  1.1210
AFLCIO.1972.txt             0.7631    0.01766  0.7285  0.7978
AFLCIO.1973.txt             1.0422    0.01848  1.0059  1.0784
AFLCIO.1975.txt             1.1159    0.01701  1.0826  1.1493
AFLCIO.1976.txt             0.8289    0.01409  0.8013  0.8565
AFLCIO.1977.txt             1.0453    0.01653  1.0129  1.0777
AFLCIO.1979.txt             1.0551    0.01644  1.0229  1.0873
AFLCIO.1980.txt             0.7213    0.02492  0.6724  0.7701
AFLCIO.1981.txt             1.0693    0.01795  1.0341  1.1045
AFLCIO.1983.txt             1.1068    0.01630  1.0748  1.1388
AFLCIO.1984.txt             0.7897    0.03490  0.7213  0.8581
AFLCIO.1985.txt             1.0680    0.01598  1.0366  1.0993
AFLCIO.1987.txt             1.0744    0.01536  1.0443  1.1045
AFLCIO.1989.txt             1.1138    0.01444  1.0855  1.1421
AFLCIO.1991.txt             1.1053    0.01546  1.0750  1.1356
AFLCIO.1993.txt             1.0864    0.01569  1.0556  1.1171
AFLCIO.1995.txt             1.1761    0.01091  1.1547  1.1975
AFLCIO.1997.txt             1.0347    0.01429  1.0067  1.0628
AFLCIO.1999.txt             0.9820    0.01293  0.9566  1.0073
AFLCIO.2001.txt             0.9336    0.02857  0.8776  0.9896
AFLCIO.2005.txt             1.1914    0.01602  1.1600  1.2228
AFLCIO.2009.txt             1.0739    0.01678  1.0410  1.1068
AFLCIO.2013.txt             1.0199    0.01199  0.9964  1.0434
```

1.6 Dataset IA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, stemmed ("NEGATIVE" as negative directional document)

```
> require(austin)
```

```
Loading required package: austin
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/english/AFLCIO/filtered")
> aflcio1data<-wfm("aflcio-1.csv")
> aflcio1results<-wordfish(aflcio1data,c(1,2))
> aflcio1results
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1data, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE                 -0.4121    0.02264 -0.4565 -0.36774
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  0.7549    0.01809  0.7195  0.79035
DEM.1960.txt             -0.3178    0.02907 -0.3748 -0.26080
DEM.1964.txt             -0.1150    0.02652 -0.1669 -0.06298
DEM.1968.txt             -0.4138    0.02881 -0.4702 -0.35732
DEM.1972.txt             -0.1290    0.02294 -0.1740 -0.08409
DEM.1976.txt             -0.1512    0.02503 -0.2002 -0.10212
DEM.1980.txt             -0.2987    0.01874 -0.3354 -0.26196
DEM.1984.txt             -0.6622    0.01920 -0.6998 -0.62452
DEM.1988.txt             -0.9565    0.05144 -1.0573 -0.85566
DEM.1992.txt             -1.1936    0.03647 -1.2651 -1.12210
DEM.1996.txt             -1.6634    0.02248 -1.7074 -1.61930
DEM.2000.txt             -1.3199    0.02207 -1.3631 -1.27662
DEM.2004.txt             -1.4899    0.02394 -1.5369 -1.44301
DEM.2008.txt             -1.2239    0.02122 -1.2655 -1.18230
DEM.2012.txt             -1.3838    0.02027 -1.4236 -1.34410
REP.1960.txt             -0.3561    0.03624 -0.4272 -0.28510
REP.1964.txt             -0.6902    0.03994 -0.7685 -0.61193
REP.1968.txt             -0.4094    0.03661 -0.4812 -0.33765
REP.1972.txt             -0.5661    0.02382 -0.6128 -0.51939
REP.1976.txt             -0.6032    0.02603 -0.6542 -0.55218
REP.1980.txt             -0.7503    0.01967 -0.7888 -0.71172
REP.1984.txt             -0.9450    0.02180 -0.9877 -0.90224
REP.1988.txt             -1.1460    0.01832 -1.1819 -1.11006
REP.1992.txt             -1.3784    0.01969 -1.4170 -1.33977
REP.1996.txt             -1.3887    0.02002 -1.4279 -1.34946
REP.2000.txt             -1.3939    0.01786 -1.4289 -1.35890
REP.2004.txt             -1.6456    0.01493 -1.6748 -1.61629
REP.2008.txt             -1.2323    0.02234 -1.2761 -1.18849
REP.2012.txt             -1.0835    0.02031 -1.1233 -1.04365
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.6416    0.02785  0.5870  0.69620
AFLCIO.1964.txt           0.7400    0.02037  0.7001  0.77997
AFLCIO.1971.txt           1.0497    0.01799  1.0144  1.08493
AFLCIO.1972.txt           0.7429    0.01622  0.7111  0.77472
AFLCIO.1973.txt           1.0306    0.01642  0.9984  1.06276
AFLCIO.1975.txt           1.0969    0.01516  1.0672  1.12666
AFLCIO.1976.txt           0.8116    0.01281  0.7865  0.83674
AFLCIO.1977.txt           1.0317    0.01471  1.0029  1.06050
AFLCIO.1979.txt           1.0416    0.01461  1.0130  1.07024
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.7195    0.02251  0.6754  0.76366
AFLCIO.1981.txt           1.0517    0.01601  1.0203  1.08305
AFLCIO.1983.txt           1.1017    0.01422  1.0739  1.12961
AFLCIO.1984.txt           0.7888    0.03143  0.7272  0.85043
AFLCIO.1985.txt           1.0552    0.01418  1.0275  1.08303
AFLCIO.1987.txt           1.0642    0.01360  1.0375  1.09084
AFLCIO.1989.txt           1.0887    0.01302  1.0631  1.11418
AFLCIO.1991.txt           1.0749    0.01402  1.0474  1.10239
AFLCIO.1993.txt           1.0671    0.01406  1.0395  1.09463
AFLCIO.1995.txt           1.1288    0.01014  1.1089  1.14865
AFLCIO.1997.txt           1.0383    0.01254  1.0137  1.06289
AFLCIO.1999.txt           0.9658    0.01164  0.9430  0.98861
```

```
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.8820    0.02710  0.8289  0.93509
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.2242    0.01322  1.1983  1.25014
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.1179    0.01388  1.0907  1.14514
AFLCIO.2013.txt            1.0023    0.01082  0.9811  1.02354
```

1.7 Dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, stemmed (only platforms)

```
> aflcio2stemmednocontroldata<-wfm("aflcio-2-stemmed-no-control.csv")
> aflcio2stemmednocontrolresults<-wordfish(aflcio2stemmednocontroldata,c(1,2))
> aflcio2stemmednocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                       Estimate Std. Error     Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE REP.1968.txt    -0.57753    0.04055 -0.657000 -0.4981
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.60252    0.02840  1.546854  1.6582
DEM.1960.txt             -0.45425    0.03319 -0.519310 -0.3892
DEM.1964.txt              0.06828    0.03291  0.003786  0.1328
DEM.1968.txt             -0.43772    0.03304 -0.502479 -0.3730
DEM.1972.txt             -0.19758    0.02766 -0.251792 -0.1434
DEM.1976.txt             -0.55450    0.02823 -0.609834 -0.4992
DEM.1980.txt             -0.96373    0.01656 -0.996186 -0.9313
DEM.1984.txt             -0.91999    0.01804 -0.955351 -0.8846
REP.1960.txt             -0.44477    0.04145 -0.526003 -0.3635
REP.1964.txt             -0.88030    0.03821 -0.955188 -0.8054
REP.1972.txt             -0.59508    0.02642 -0.646871 -0.5433
REP.1976.txt             -0.86886    0.02531 -0.918460 -0.8193
REP.1980.txt             -1.21837    0.01031 -1.238579 -1.1982
REP.1984.txt             -1.08740    0.01621 -1.119171 -1.0556
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.65465    0.04336  0.569673  0.7396
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.47382    0.03229  1.410537  1.5371
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.71920    0.02480  1.670585  1.7678
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.57430    0.02133  1.532489  1.6161
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.84089    0.03722  0.767947  0.9138
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.18067    0.05379  1.075242  1.2861
```

1.8 Dataset IIA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, not stemmed (only AFL-CIO platforms, "NEGATIVE" as negative directional document)

```
> aflcio2stemmeddata<-wfm("aflcio-2-stemmed.csv")
> aflcio2stemmedresults<-wordfish(aflcio2stemmeddata,c(1,2))
> aflcio2stemmedresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                       Estimate Std. Error    Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE.1968.txt        -0.62224   0.023084 -0.66748 -0.57699
POSITIVE AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.62213   0.028959  1.56538  1.67889
DEM.1960.txt             -0.50903   0.031152 -0.57009 -0.44798
DEM.1964.txt              0.02025   0.032284 -0.04302  0.08353
DEM.1968.txt             -0.55316   0.030375 -0.61269 -0.49363
DEM.1972.txt             -0.15831   0.027168 -0.21156 -0.10506
DEM.1976.txt             -0.47540   0.027439 -0.52918 -0.42162
DEM.1980.txt             -0.86075   0.015267 -0.89068 -0.83083
DEM.1984.txt             -0.79297   0.017413 -0.82710 -0.75884
REP.1960.txt             -0.49808   0.038973 -0.57447 -0.42170
```

```
REP.1964.txt             -0.85712   0.032452 -0.92072 -0.79351
REP.1968.txt             -0.72305   0.034833 -0.79132 -0.65478
REP.1972.txt             -0.55809   0.025176 -0.60744 -0.50875
REP.1976.txt             -0.78467   0.023519 -0.83076 -0.73857
REP.1980.txt             -1.08765   0.008856 -1.10501 -1.07029
REP.1984.txt             -0.96909   0.014543 -0.99759 -0.94058
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.57015   0.043401  0.48508  0.65521
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.49535   0.032841  1.43099  1.55972
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.80179   0.025065  1.75266  1.85091
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.69452   0.021426  1.65253  1.73652
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.96344   0.037395  0.89015  1.03673
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.32010   0.053970  1.21432  1.42588
```

1.9 Dataset IIA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, stemmed (only AFL-CIO platforms, "NEGATIVE" as negative directional document)

```
> aflcio2data<-wfm("aflcio-2.csv")
> aflcio2results<-wordfish(aflcio2data,c(1,2))
> aflcio2results
Call:
       wordfish(wfm = aflcio2data, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error     Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE.1968.txt       -0.65528    0.01992 -0.694319 -0.6162
POSITIVE AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.58938    0.02691  1.536642  1.6421
DEM.1960.txt            -0.43382    0.02885 -0.490361 -0.3773
DEM.1964.txt             0.05249    0.02978 -0.005878  0.1109
DEM.1968.txt            -0.63452    0.02575 -0.684986 -0.5841
DEM.1972.txt            -0.21051    0.02463 -0.258779 -0.1622
DEM.1976.txt            -0.49888    0.02442 -0.546754 -0.4510
DEM.1980.txt            -0.83147    0.01355 -0.858028 -0.8049
DEM.1984.txt            -0.77738    0.01526 -0.807295 -0.7475
REP.1960.txt            -0.50688    0.03487 -0.575225 -0.4385
REP.1964.txt            -0.89779    0.02559 -0.947938 -0.8476
REP.1968.txt            -0.68741    0.03135 -0.748860 -0.6260
REP.1972.txt            -0.59835    0.02197 -0.641411 -0.5553
REP.1976.txt            -0.81463    0.01938 -0.852615 -0.7767
REP.1980.txt            -1.06112    0.00811 -1.077016 -1.0452
REP.1984.txt            -0.96157    0.01246 -0.985993 -0.9372
AFLCIO.1960.txt          0.75092    0.04030  0.671928  0.8299
AFLCIO.1964.txt          1.52991    0.03019  1.470734  1.5891
AFLCIO.1972.txt          1.73538    0.02347  1.689375  1.7814
AFLCIO.1976.txt          1.70224    0.01978  1.663469  1.7410
AFLCIO.1980.txt          0.95339    0.03445  0.885864  1.0209
AFLCIO.1984.txt          1.30511    0.04996  1.207184  1.4030
```

1.10 Dataset III: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents excluding AFL-CIO platform proposals, as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, stemmed (only AFL-CIO proxy-platforms)

```
> AFLCIO3stemmeddata<-wfm("AFLCIO-3-stemmed.csv")
> AFLCIO3stemmedresults<-wordfish(AFLCIO3stemmeddata,c(1,2))
> AFLCIO3stemmedresults
Call:
       wordfish(wfm = AFLCIO3stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
```

```
NEGATIVE_REP.1972.txt     -0.5485    0.02401 -0.5956 -0.50148
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1971.txt   1.1113    0.02207  1.0681  1.15456
DEM.1960.txt              -0.3539    0.02968 -0.4121 -0.29572
DEM.1964.txt              -0.1831    0.02739 -0.2368 -0.12943
DEM.1968.txt              -0.3614    0.02936 -0.4189 -0.30383
DEM.1972.txt              -0.1205    0.02368 -0.1669 -0.07406
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1274    0.02579 -0.1779 -0.07682
DEM.1980.txt              -0.2437    0.01925 -0.2814 -0.20598
DEM.1984.txt              -0.6010    0.01936 -0.6389 -0.56301
DEM.1988.txt              -0.8279    0.05151 -0.9289 -0.72696
DEM.1992.txt              -1.0034    0.03674 -1.0754 -0.93141
DEM.1996.txt              -1.4747    0.02215 -1.5181 -1.43130
DEM.2000.txt              -1.0863    0.02229 -1.1300 -1.04264
DEM.2004.txt              -1.2533    0.02413 -1.3006 -1.20605
DEM.2008.txt              -0.9790    0.02153 -1.0212 -0.93677
DEM.2012.txt              -1.1113    0.02073 -1.1519 -1.07067
REP.1960.txt              -0.3675    0.03688 -0.4398 -0.29522
REP.1964.txt              -0.6548    0.03974 -0.7327 -0.57692
REP.1968.txt              -0.3841    0.03721 -0.4571 -0.31119
REP.1976.txt              -0.5031    0.02636 -0.5548 -0.45149
REP.1980.txt              -0.6843    0.01974 -0.7230 -0.64559
REP.1984.txt              -0.8473    0.02167 -0.8898 -0.80484
REP.1988.txt              -0.9846    0.01833 -1.0205 -0.94866
REP.1992.txt              -1.1955    0.01948 -1.2337 -1.15736
REP.1996.txt              -1.2195    0.01973 -1.2582 -1.18088
REP.2000.txt              -1.2082    0.01771 -1.2429 -1.17348
REP.2004.txt              -1.4609    0.01462 -1.4896 -1.43229
REP.2008.txt              -1.0037    0.02252 -1.0478 -0.95956
REP.2012.txt              -0.8949    0.02037 -0.9348 -0.85495
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0606    0.02053  1.0204  1.10088
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.1532    0.01905  1.1159  1.19051
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0790    0.01812  1.0435  1.11454
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0948    0.01798  1.0595  1.13000
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.1287    0.01936  1.0908  1.16669
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.1783    0.01757  1.1438  1.21270
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.1292    0.01721  1.0955  1.16293
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.1454    0.01640  1.1132  1.17752
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.1998    0.01537  1.1696  1.22988
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.1850    0.01652  1.1526  1.21736
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.1737    0.01655  1.1413  1.20614
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.2615    0.01185  1.2383  1.28475
AFLCIO.1997.txt            1.1231    0.01485  1.0940  1.15222
AFLCIO.1999.txt            1.0705    0.01326  1.0446  1.09653
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.9994    0.02952  0.9416  1.05729
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.2979    0.01706  1.2645  1.33132
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.1651    0.01756  1.1307  1.19957
AFLCIO.2013.txt            1.1136    0.01235  1.0894  1.13775
```

2. DGB

2.1 Dataset, not stemmed

```
> require(austin)
Loading required package: austin
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/DGB/filtered")
> DGBdata<-wfm("DGB.csv")
> DGBresults<-wordfish(DGBdata,c(1,2))
```

```
> DGBresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = DGBdata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                     Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_FDP1969.txt  0.87003   0.020790  0.8293  0.9108
POSITIVE_DGB1969.txt  1.16225   0.004904  1.1526  1.1719
CDU1961.txt           0.43696   0.104970  0.2312  0.6427
CDU1965.txt           0.03103   0.108767 -0.1821  0.2442
CDU1969.txt           0.84469   0.030154  0.7856  0.9038
CDU1972.txt           0.71538   0.017668  0.6808  0.7500
CDU1990.txt          -1.10534   0.004250 -1.1137 -1.0970
CDU.CSU1976.txt       0.74626   0.019784  0.7075  0.7850
CDU.CSU1980.txt      -1.10318   0.003105 -1.1093 -1.0971
CDU.CSU1983.txt      -1.08472   0.005496 -1.0955 -1.0739
CDU.CSU1987.txt      -1.09724   0.002719 -1.1026 -1.0919
CDU.CSU1994.txt      -1.03702   0.006616 -1.0500 -1.0240
CDU.CSU1998.txt      -1.10282   0.003816 -1.1103 -1.0953
CDU.CSU2002.txt      -1.03928   0.005342 -1.0497 -1.0288
CDU.CSU2005.txt      -1.03689   0.007457 -1.0515 -1.0223
CDU.CSU2009.txt      -1.02869   0.004952 -1.0384 -1.0190
CDU.CSU2013.txt       0.73982   0.008190  0.7238  0.7559
CSU1969.txt           0.60867   0.039873  0.5305  0.6868
CSU1990.txt          -1.10187   0.003341 -1.1084 -1.0953
DGB1962.txt           1.18197   0.004499  1.1731  1.1908
DGB1966.txt           1.16799   0.004097  1.1600  1.1760
DGB1972.txt           1.16687   0.003337  1.1603  1.1734
DGB1975.txt           1.18026   0.003255  1.1739  1.1866
DGB1978.txt           1.15426   0.002984  1.1484  1.1601
DGB1982.txt           1.13723   0.003077  1.1312  1.1433
DGB1986.txt           1.12487   0.002905  1.1192  1.1306
DGB1990.txt           1.11354   0.002686  1.1083  1.1188
DGB1994.txt           1.08123   0.003725  1.0739  1.0885
DGB1998.txt           1.10090   0.004516  1.0921  1.1098
DGB2002.txt           1.08541   0.004030  1.0775  1.0933
DGB2006.txt           1.08317   0.003589  1.0761  1.0902
DGB2010.txt           1.07668   0.003331  1.0702  1.0832
DieGruenen1980.txt    0.96995   0.009029  0.9523  0.9876
DieGruenen1983.txt   -1.09036   0.005410 -1.1010 -1.0798
DieGruenen1987.txt   -1.14283   0.001125 -1.1450 -1.1406
DieGruenen1990.txt    0.91474   0.010930  0.8933  0.9362
DieGruenen1994.txt    0.89569   0.008088  0.8798  0.9115
DieGruenen1998.txt    0.91775   0.007271  0.9035  0.9320
DieGruenen2002.txt    0.80007   0.010491  0.7795  0.8206
DieGruenen2005.txt    0.76262   0.009963  0.7431  0.7821
DieGruenen2009.txt    0.80743   0.007185  0.7934  0.8215
DieGruenen2013.txt    0.85477   0.005279  0.8444  0.8651
FDP1961.txt           0.91280   0.026256  0.8613  0.9643
FDP1972.txt           0.51179   0.073296  0.3681  0.6554
FDP1976.txt           0.89707   0.015047  0.8676  0.9266
FDP1980.txt          -1.10658   0.001919 -1.1103 -1.1028
FDP1983.txt          -1.10542   0.003446 -1.1122 -1.0987
FDP1987.txt          -1.09691   0.004141 -1.1050 -1.0888
FDP1990.txt          -1.10960   0.001932 -1.1134 -1.1058
FDP1994.txt          -1.02791   0.003951 -1.0357 -1.0202
FDP1998.txt          -1.10970   0.002068 -1.1138 -1.1057
FDP2002.txt          -1.03565   0.004371 -1.0442 -1.0271
FDP2005.txt          -1.10803   0.002289 -1.1125 -1.1035
FDP2009.txt          -1.04006   0.004461 -1.0488 -1.0313
FDP2013.txt           0.79037   0.008343  0.7740  0.8067
DieLinke2005.txt      0.92118   0.014383  0.8930  0.9494
```

```
DieLinke2009.txt     -1.01740   0.006416 -1.0300 -1.0048
DieLinke2013.txt      0.92887   0.006883  0.9154  0.9424
PDS1990.txt          -1.09261   0.004176 -1.1008 -1.0844
PDS1994.txt          -0.98702   0.010906 -1.0084 -0.9656
PDS1998.txt          -1.09653   0.002440 -1.1013 -1.0917
PDS2002.txt          -1.02722   0.007004 -1.0409 -1.0135
SPD1961.txt           0.80927   0.015352  0.7792  0.8394
SPD1965.txt           0.98431   0.007554  0.9695  0.9991
SPD1969.txt           0.83410   0.025343  0.7844  0.8838
SPD1972.txt           0.87812   0.012653  0.8533  0.9029
SPD1976.txt           0.78072   0.012567  0.7561  0.8054
SPD1980.txt          -1.09917   0.003435 -1.1059 -1.0924
SPD1983.txt          -1.10242   0.003315 -1.1089 -1.0959
SPD1987.txt          -1.10242   0.003315 -1.1089 -1.0959
SPD1990.txt          -1.09980   0.004341 -1.1083 -1.0913
SPD1994.txt          -1.02990   0.006647 -1.0429 -1.0169
SPD1998.txt          -1.10699   0.002622 -1.1121 -1.1019
SPD2002.txt          -1.02027   0.005968 -1.0320 -1.0086
SPD2005.txt          -1.01006   0.008366 -1.0265 -0.9937
SPD2009.txt          -1.01269   0.005548 -1.0236 -1.0018
SPD2013.txt           0.83569   0.007420  0.8211  0.8502
```

2.1 Dataset, stemmed

```
> DGBstemmeddata<-wfm("DGB-stemmed.csv")
> DGBstemmedresults<-wordfish(DGBstemmeddata,c(1,2))
> DGBstemmedresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = DGBstemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                     Estimate Std. Error    Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_FDP1969.txt   0.8911   0.018125  0.85561  0.9267
POSITIVE_DGB1969.txt   1.1065   0.004377  1.09791  1.1151
CDU1961.txt            0.4832   0.096315  0.29442  0.6720
CDU1965.txt            0.2293   0.100468  0.03237  0.4262
CDU1969.txt            0.8792   0.025951  0.82837  0.9301
CDU1972.txt            0.7388   0.015897  0.70763  0.7699
CDU1990.txt           -1.1009   0.005484 -1.11166 -1.0902
CDU.CSU1976.txt        0.7809   0.017644  0.74634  0.8155
CDU.CSU1980.txt       -1.0653   0.005262 -1.07564 -1.0550
CDU.CSU1983.txt       -1.0642   0.007306 -1.07854 -1.0499
CDU.CSU1987.txt       -1.0835   0.003621 -1.09063 -1.0764
CDU.CSU1994.txt       -1.0628   0.005351 -1.07334 -1.0524
CDU.CSU1998.txt       -1.0915   0.005128 -1.10156 -1.0815
CDU.CSU2002.txt       -1.0713   0.004085 -1.07928 -1.0633
CDU.CSU2005.txt       -1.0487   0.006745 -1.06188 -1.0354
CDU.CSU2009.txt       -1.0679   0.003599 -1.07491 -1.0608
CDU.CSU2013.txt        0.7801   0.007251  0.76590  0.7943
CSU1969.txt            0.6562   0.035775  0.58607  0.7263
CSU1990.txt           -1.0806   0.004841 -1.09006 -1.0711
DGB1962.txt            1.1167   0.004132  1.10856  1.1248
DGB1966.txt            1.1116   0.003656  1.10442  1.1188
DGB1972.txt            1.1141   0.002930  1.10836  1.1198
DGB1975.txt            1.1251   0.002850  1.11954  1.1307
DGB1978.txt            1.1079   0.002575  1.10284  1.1129
DGB1982.txt            1.0869   0.002722  1.08160  1.0923
DGB1986.txt            1.0782   0.002566  1.07316  1.0832
DGB1990.txt            1.0805   0.002285  1.07603  1.0850
DGB1994.txt            1.0555   0.003170  1.04933  1.0618
DGB1998.txt            1.0793   0.003711  1.07206  1.0866
```

```
DGB2002.txt            1.0690   0.003298  1.06253  1.0755
DGB2006.txt            1.0699   0.002902  1.06424  1.0756
DGB2010.txt            1.0644   0.002710  1.05908  1.0697
DieGruenen1980.txt     0.9589   0.007920  0.94335  0.9744
DieGruenen1983.txt    -1.0800   0.006614 -1.09300 -1.0671
DieGruenen1987.txt    -1.0795   0.003214 -1.08583 -1.0732
DieGruenen1990.txt     0.9187   0.009518  0.90003  0.9373
DieGruenen1994.txt     0.9087   0.007007  0.89500  0.9225
DieGruenen1998.txt     0.9368   0.006158  0.92473  0.9489
DieGruenen2002.txt     0.8340   0.009165  0.81599  0.8519
DieGruenen2005.txt     0.8033   0.008709  0.78620  0.8203
DieGruenen2009.txt     0.8404   0.006255  0.82811  0.8526
DieGruenen2013.txt     0.8802   0.004563  0.87123  0.8891
FDP1961.txt            0.8929   0.024260  0.84537  0.9405
FDP1972.txt            0.5179   0.069632  0.38144  0.6544
FDP1976.txt            0.9176   0.012921  0.89228  0.9429
FDP1980.txt           -1.1019   0.002473 -1.10676 -1.0971
FDP1983.txt           -1.1085   0.004115 -1.11658 -1.1004
FDP1987.txt           -1.0921   0.005110 -1.10215 -1.0821
FDP1990.txt           -1.1038   0.002558 -1.10879 -1.0988
FDP1994.txt           -1.0867   0.002380 -1.09138 -1.0821
FDP1998.txt           -1.1180   0.002402 -1.12270 -1.1133
FDP2002.txt           -1.0761   0.003105 -1.08214 -1.0700
FDP2005.txt           -1.1086   0.002831 -1.11418 -1.1031
FDP2009.txt           -1.0869   0.002989 -1.09277 -1.0811
FDP2013.txt            0.8210   0.007354  0.80660  0.8354
DieLinke2005.txt       0.9391   0.012108  0.91536  0.9628
DieLinke2009.txt      -1.0331   0.005575 -1.04406 -1.0222
DieLinke2013.txt       0.9342   0.005942  0.92258  0.9459
PDS1990.txt           -1.0734   0.005625 -1.08444 -1.0624
PDS1994.txt           -1.0352   0.007916 -1.05072 -1.0197
PDS1998.txt           -1.0706   0.003556 -1.07762 -1.0637
PDS2002.txt           -1.0535   0.005624 -1.06450 -1.0425
SPD1961.txt            0.8120   0.013888  0.78478  0.8392
SPD1965.txt            0.9706   0.006669  0.95749  0.9836
SPD1969.txt            0.8497   0.022612  0.80539  0.8940
SPD1972.txt            0.8921   0.011110  0.87028  0.9138
SPD1976.txt            0.8252   0.010892  0.80384  0.8465
SPD1980.txt           -1.0923   0.004353 -1.10084 -1.0838
SPD1983.txt           -1.0785   0.004963 -1.08819 -1.0687
SPD1987.txt           -1.0785   0.004963 -1.08819 -1.0687
SPD1990.txt           -1.0918   0.005531 -1.10269 -1.0810
SPD1994.txt           -1.0768   0.004485 -1.08561 -1.0680
SPD1998.txt           -1.0939   0.003712 -1.10122 -1.0867
SPD2002.txt           -1.0565   0.004490 -1.06527 -1.0477
SPD2005.txt           -1.0311   0.007166 -1.04511 -1.0170
SPD2009.txt           -1.0565   0.003988 -1.06428 -1.0486
SPD2013.txt            0.8628   0.006480  0.85012  0.8755
>
```

3. RENGO

```
> require(austin)
Loading required package: austin
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/Japanese/RENGO/filtered/")
> RENGOdata<-wfm("RENGO.csv")
> RENGOweightedresults<-wordfish(RENGOdata,c(28,21))
Warning: optim failed to converge while estimating theta[ 50 ] and alpha[ 50 ]
> RENGOweightedresults
Call:
```

```
        wordfish(wfm = RENGOdata, dir = c(28, 21))

Document Positions:
                 Estimate Std. Error    Lower      Upper
DPJ.2007.txt      0.37886   0.002596  0.37377  0.3839474
DPJ.2009.txt      0.35717   0.003229  0.35084  0.3634995
DPJ.2010.txt      0.37176   0.003926  0.36406  0.3794499
DPJ.2012.txt      0.35040   0.003246  0.34404  0.3567627
DPJ.2013.txt      0.35887   0.004009  0.35102  0.3667312
DPJ.1998.txt      0.34406   0.005998  0.33231  0.3558194
DPJ.2000.txt      0.34406   0.005998  0.33231  0.3558194
DPJ.2001.txt      0.34802   0.002548  0.34302  0.3530089
DPJ.2003.txt      0.36659   0.002729  0.36124  0.3719414
DPJ.2004.txt      0.35846   0.002609  0.35334  0.3635707
DPJ.2005.txt      0.36761   0.002174  0.36335  0.3718720
RENGO.2005.txt    0.49742   0.004367  0.48886  0.5059783
RENGO.2006.txt    0.47085   0.001911  0.46711  0.4745969
RENGO.2007.txt    0.48212   0.002504  0.47721  0.4870240
RENGO.2008.txt    0.49049   0.003778  0.48309  0.4978995
RENGO.2009.txt    0.46954   0.003976  0.46174  0.4773293
RENGO.2010.txt    0.47764   0.003394  0.47099  0.4842925
RENGO.2011.txt    0.46372   0.005120  0.45369  0.4737565
RENGO.2012.txt    0.45456   0.003986  0.44675  0.4623738
RENGO.2013.txt    0.44680   0.006730  0.43361  0.4599868
RENGO.1998.txt    0.43669   0.003650  0.42953  0.4438404
RENGO.1999.txt    0.45479   0.001805  0.45125  0.4583237
RENGO.2000.txt    0.45093   0.003212  0.44463  0.4572255
RENGO.2001.txt    0.44695   0.003470  0.44015  0.4537463
RENGO.2002.txt    0.46845   0.003562  0.46146  0.4754271
RENGO.2003.txt    0.47908   0.002458  0.47427  0.4839027
RENGO.2004.txt    0.47271   0.002823  0.46718  0.4782413
LDP_1998         -0.13248   0.007564 -0.14731 -0.1176543
LDP_2000         -0.16248   0.004915 -0.17212 -0.1528517
LDP_2001         -0.13702   0.004922 -0.14667 -0.1273715
LDP_2003         -0.10789   0.015241 -0.13777 -0.0780225
LDP_2004         -0.06033   0.007091 -0.07423 -0.0464326
LDP_2005         -0.29757   0.011152 -0.31943 -0.2757140
LDP_2007         -0.35335   0.026197 -0.40469 -0.3020037
LDP_2009         -0.09045   0.040086 -0.16902 -0.0118848
LDP_2010         -0.15423   0.004750 -0.16354 -0.1449211
LDP_2012         -0.09456   0.003740 -0.10189 -0.0872302
LDP_2013         -0.09067   0.003340 -0.09722 -0.0841260
NK_1998          -0.35781   0.020390 -0.39777 -0.3178474
NK_2000          -0.22015   0.017490 -0.25443 -0.1858691
NK_2001          -0.12628   0.005247 -0.13656 -0.1159950
NK_2003          -0.43177   0.042109 -0.51430 -0.3492331
NK_2005          -0.30596   0.015670 -0.33667 -0.2752486
NK_2007          -0.26385   0.012209 -0.28778 -0.2399229
NK_2009          -0.15946   0.005020 -0.16930 -0.1496245
NK_2010          -0.15129   0.004454 -0.16002 -0.1425586
NNP_2007          0.10422   0.047801  0.01053  0.1979051
NNP_2009          0.04256   0.033387 -0.02288  0.1079998
PNP_2005          0.10748   0.025409  0.05768  0.1572836
Restoration_2012 -5.99993   1.831780 -9.59015 -2.4097095
SDP_1998         -0.13248   0.007564 -0.14731 -0.1176543
SDP_2000         -0.06155   0.004853 -0.07106 -0.0520382
SDP_2003         -0.05690   0.004437 -0.06559 -0.0481988
SDP_2004         -0.35747   0.065623 -0.48609 -0.2288545
SDP_2005         -0.06037   0.034984 -0.12893  0.0082013
SDP_2007         -0.42254   0.049967 -0.52048 -0.3246079
SDP_2010         -0.12395   0.005856 -0.13543 -0.1124727
SDP_2012         -0.11520   0.005191 -0.12537 -0.1050270
```

```
YP_2010          -0.01916   0.009467 -0.03772 -0.0006084
YP_2012          -0.07695   0.010044 -0.09663 -0.0572610
```

4. LULAC

4.1 LULAC I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

```
> lulac1nocontroldata<-wfm("lulac-1-no-control.csv")
> lulac1nocontrolresults<-wordfish(lulac1nocontroldata,c(1,2))
> lulac1nocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac1nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt    -1.2102   0.012501 -1.2347 -1.1857
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7013   0.013383  0.6751  0.7275
LULAC.1994.txt            0.3831   0.109482  0.1685  0.5977
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6552   0.027138  0.6020  0.7084
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8069   0.010798  0.7857  0.8281
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8519   0.007664  0.8369  0.8669
LULAC.2000.txt            0.7943   0.010416  0.7739  0.8147
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8485   0.009814  0.8292  0.8677
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8515   0.009274  0.8334  0.8697
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8423   0.010227  0.8222  0.8623
LULAC.2004.txt            0.7885   0.007566  0.7737  0.8033
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8265   0.009964  0.8069  0.8460
LULAC.2006.txt            0.8124   0.009998  0.7928  0.8320
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8097   0.008390  0.7933  0.8261
LULAC.2008.txt            0.7907   0.007945  0.7751  0.8063
LULAC.2009.txt            0.7899   0.008423  0.7734  0.8064
LULAC.2010.txt            0.8022   0.010272  0.7820  0.8223
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8519   0.007317  0.8375  0.8662
LULAC.2012.txt            0.8012   0.010835  0.7799  0.8224
LULAC.2013.txt            0.7828   0.008274  0.7666  0.7990
REP.1992.txt             -1.2332   0.012169 -1.2571 -1.2093
REP.2000.txt             -1.2035   0.011198 -1.2255 -1.1816
REP.2004.txt             -1.1683   0.010349 -1.1886 -1.1480
REP.2008.txt             -1.0877   0.014323 -1.1157 -1.0596
REP.2012.txt             -1.0004   0.013011 -1.0259 -0.9749
DEM.1992.txt             -1.2590   0.021455 -1.3010 -1.2169
DEM.1996.txt             -1.3553   0.013444 -1.3816 -1.3289
DEM.2000.txt             -1.3166   0.012284 -1.3406 -1.2925
DEM.2004.txt             -1.3780   0.013239 -1.4039 -1.3520
DEM.2008.txt             -1.2309   0.012617 -1.2557 -1.2062
DEM.2012.txt             -1.3622   0.010992 -1.3837 -1.3407
```

4.2 LULAC II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

```
> lulac2nocontroldata<-wfm("lulac-2-no-control.csv")
> lulac2nocontrolresults<-wordfish(lulac2nocontroldata,c(1,2))
> lulac2nocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac2nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
```

```
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt   -1.1797   0.005010 -1.1895 -1.16991
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt  -0.1453   0.027998 -0.2002 -0.09046
LULAC1994.txt           -0.2787   0.106717 -0.4878 -0.06950
LULAC1997.txt            0.5668   0.031636  0.5048  0.62880
LULAC1998.txt            0.5120   0.029118  0.4549  0.56906
LULAC1999.txt            0.5996   0.027244  0.5462  0.65304
LULAC2000.txt            0.6739   0.030527  0.6141  0.73378
LULAC2002.txt            0.8973   0.029929  0.8387  0.95600
LULAC2003.txt            1.0480   0.024081  1.0008  1.09518
LULAC2004.txt            1.0411   0.022256  0.9975  1.08477
LULAC2005.txt            1.0561   0.020655  1.0156  1.09654
LULAC2006.txt            1.0718   0.020193  1.0323  1.11142
LULAC2007.txt            1.0748   0.019994  1.0356  1.11402
LULAC2008.txt            1.0483   0.020180  1.0087  1.08782
LULAC2009.txt            1.0697   0.022475  1.0257  1.11379
LULAC2010.txt            1.0327   0.021411  0.9907  1.07466
LULAC2011.txt            0.8891   0.020021  0.8499  0.92837
LULAC2012.txt            0.9257   0.020093  0.8863  0.96511
LULAC2013.txt            0.9011   0.019487  0.8629  0.93932
REP.1992.txt            -1.2185   0.004243 -1.2269 -1.21022
REP.2000.txt            -1.1950   0.004231 -1.2033 -1.18669
REP.2004.txt            -1.2717   0.002681 -1.2769 -1.26640
REP.2008.txt            -1.0784   0.007110 -1.0924 -1.06449
REP.2012.txt            -1.1117   0.005885 -1.1233 -1.10019
DEM.1992.txt            -1.1253   0.010361 -1.1456 -1.10495
DEM.1996.txt            -1.1625   0.006441 -1.1751 -1.14989
DEM.2000.txt            -1.0918   0.006957 -1.1055 -1.07820
DEM.2004.txt            -1.1665   0.006411 -1.1790 -1.15389
DEM.2008.txt            -1.0297   0.007354 -1.0441 -1.01531
DEM.2012.txt            -1.1090   0.006246 -1.1212 -1.09673
```

4.3 LULAC I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, stemmed

```
> lulac1stemmednocontroldata<-wfm("lulac-1-stemmed-no-control.csv")
> lulac1stemmednocontrolresults<-wordfish(lulac1stemmednocontroldata,c(1,2))
> lulac1stemmednocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac1stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt    -1.2273   0.013441 -1.2536 -1.2009
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7047   0.013865  0.6775  0.7319
LULAC.1994.txt            0.4518   0.109367  0.2374  0.6661
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6345   0.029299  0.5770  0.6919
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8112   0.010971  0.7897  0.8327
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8613   0.007568  0.8465  0.8762
LULAC.2000.txt            0.7990   0.010585  0.7783  0.8197
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8613   0.009605  0.8425  0.8801
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8417   0.009521  0.8230  0.8603
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8391   0.010432  0.8187  0.8596
LULAC.2004.txt            0.7881   0.007766  0.7729  0.8034
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8120   0.010437  0.7916  0.8325
LULAC.2006.txt            0.7961   0.010509  0.7755  0.8167
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8043   0.008639  0.7873  0.8212
LULAC.2008.txt            0.7867   0.008210  0.7706  0.8028
LULAC.2009.txt            0.7862   0.008693  0.7691  0.8032
LULAC.2010.txt            0.7960   0.010637  0.7752  0.8169
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8545   0.007341  0.8401  0.8689
```

```
LULAC.2012.txt            0.7845   0.011410  0.7622  0.8069
LULAC.2013.txt            0.7750   0.008601  0.7582  0.7919
REP.1992.txt             -1.2304   0.013244 -1.2564 -1.2045
REP.2000.txt             -1.2036   0.012153 -1.2274 -1.1798
REP.2004.txt             -1.1785   0.011133 -1.2003 -1.1567
REP.2008.txt             -1.0518   0.015545 -1.0822 -1.0213
REP.2012.txt             -0.9864   0.013919 -1.0136 -0.9591

DEM.1992.txt             -1.2529   0.023590 -1.2991 -1.2066
DEM.1996.txt             -1.4002   0.014694 -1.4290 -1.3714
DEM.2000.txt             -1.2925   0.013904 -1.3197 -1.2652
DEM.2004.txt             -1.3904   0.014954 -1.4197 -1.3611
DEM.2008.txt             -1.2363   0.013716 -1.2632 -1.2094
DEM.2012.txt             -1.3543   0.012546 -1.3788 -1.3297
```

4.4 LULAC IA, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

```
> require(austin)
Loading required package: austin
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/english/LULAC/filtered")
> lulac1data<-wfm("lulac-1.csv")
> lulac1results<-wordfish(lulac1data,c(1,2))
> lulac1results
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac1data, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt      -1.3565   0.006885 -1.3700 -1.3430
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7312   0.013229  0.7053  0.7571
LULAC.1994.txt            0.4320   0.107296  0.2217  0.6423
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6867   0.026805  0.6341  0.7392
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8328   0.010727  0.8118  0.8538
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8802   0.007594  0.8653  0.8951
LULAC.2000.txt            0.8227   0.010308  0.8025  0.8429
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8772   0.009715  0.8582  0.8963
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8786   0.009208  0.8605  0.8966
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8684   0.010166  0.8485  0.8883
LULAC.2004.txt            0.8200   0.007454  0.8054  0.8346
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8576   0.009823  0.8383  0.8769
LULAC.2006.txt            0.8432   0.009861  0.8239  0.8625
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8404   0.008276  0.8242  0.8566
LULAC.2008.txt            0.8236   0.007813  0.8083  0.8389
LULAC.2009.txt            0.8227   0.008285  0.8064  0.8389
LULAC.2010.txt            0.8362   0.010084  0.8164  0.8560
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8829   0.007215  0.8688  0.8971
LULAC.2012.txt            0.8361   0.010622  0.8152  0.8569
LULAC.2013.txt            0.8164   0.008130  0.8004  0.8323
REP.1992.txt             -1.1793   0.011389 -1.2016 -1.1570
REP.1996.txt             -1.3325   0.009309 -1.3508 -1.3143
REP.2000.txt             -1.1443   0.010629 -1.1651 -1.1235
REP.2004.txt             -1.0908   0.010050 -1.1105 -1.0711
REP.2008.txt             -1.0273   0.013951 -1.0546 -1.0000
REP.2012.txt             -0.9636   0.012691 -0.9885 -0.9388
DEM.1992.txt             -1.1789   0.020474 -1.2190 -1.1388
DEM.1996.txt             -1.3884   0.010177 -1.4084 -1.3685
DEM.2000.txt             -1.1983   0.012077 -1.2220 -1.1746
DEM.2004.txt             -1.2542   0.013017 -1.2797 -1.2287
DEM.2008.txt             -1.1051   0.012598 -1.1298 -1.0804
```

```
DEM.2012.txt             -1.1816   0.011564 -1.2042 -1.1589
```

4.5 LULAC IA, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, stemmed

```
> lulac1stemmeddata<-wfm("lulac-1-stemmed.csv")
> lulac1stemmedresults<-wordfish(lulac1stemmeddata,c(1,2))
> lulac1stemmedresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac1stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt      -1.3636   0.007136 -1.3776 -1.3496
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt  0.7359   0.013658  0.7092  0.7627
LULAC.1994.txt           0.5020   0.106615  0.2930  0.7109
LULAC.1997.txt           0.6681   0.028834  0.6116  0.7246
LULAC.1998.txt           0.8377   0.010884  0.8164  0.8590
LULAC.1999.txt           0.8893   0.007507  0.8746  0.9040
LULAC.2000.txt           0.8266   0.010479  0.8061  0.8471
LULAC.2001.txt           0.8891   0.009530  0.8704  0.9078
LULAC.2002.txt           0.8702   0.009423  0.8517  0.8886
LULAC.2003.txt           0.8666   0.010345  0.8463  0.8868
LULAC.2004.txt           0.8188   0.007648  0.8038  0.8338
LULAC.2005.txt           0.8437   0.010262  0.8235  0.8638
LULAC.2006.txt           0.8273   0.010341  0.8070  0.8475
LULAC.2007.txt           0.8353   0.008502  0.8186  0.8520
LULAC.2008.txt           0.8190   0.008063  0.8032  0.8348
LULAC.2009.txt           0.8195   0.008524  0.8028  0.8362
LULAC.2010.txt           0.8290   0.010435  0.8085  0.8494
LULAC.2011.txt           0.8847   0.007244  0.8705  0.8989
LULAC.2012.txt           0.8198   0.011151  0.7980  0.8417
LULAC.2013.txt           0.8083   0.008437  0.7917  0.8248
REP.1992.txt            -1.1769   0.011971 -1.2004 -1.1534
REP.1996.txt            -1.3342   0.009728 -1.3533 -1.3151
REP.2000.txt            -1.1413   0.011227 -1.1633 -1.1193
REP.2004.txt            -1.0971   0.010556 -1.1177 -1.0764
REP.2008.txt            -1.0015   0.014966 -1.0308 -0.9721
REP.2012.txt            -0.9534   0.013470 -0.9798 -0.9270
DEM.1992.txt            -1.1731   0.021662 -1.2156 -1.1307
DEM.1996.txt            -1.4023   0.010431 -1.4227 -1.3818
DEM.2000.txt            -1.1973   0.012728 -1.2222 -1.1723
DEM.2004.txt            -1.2537   0.013684 -1.2805 -1.2268
DEM.2008.txt            -1.1156   0.013171 -1.1414 -1.0898
DEM.2012.txt            -1.1875   0.012108 -1.2112 -1.1637
```

4.6 LULAC II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

```
> lulac2stemmednocontroldata<-wfm("lulac-2-stemmed-no-control.csv")
> lulac2stemmednocontrolresults<-wordfish(lulac2stemmednocontroldata,c(1,2))
> lulac2stemmednocontrolresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac2stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                     Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper
NEGATIVE REP.1996.txt  -1.17469   0.005438 -1.1853 -1.16403
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt -0.08933   0.030999 -0.1501 -0.02857
LULAC1994.txt          -0.20463   0.119744 -0.4393  0.03007
```

```
LULAC1997.txt           0.62674   0.034788  0.5586  0.69493
LULAC1998.txt           0.57153   0.032097  0.5086  0.63444
LULAC1999.txt           0.65624   0.029937  0.5976  0.71492
LULAC2000.txt           0.72863   0.033597  0.6628  0.79448
LULAC2002.txt           0.92791   0.033240  0.8628  0.99306
LULAC2003.txt           1.02931   0.027482  0.9754  1.08317
LULAC2004.txt           1.02629   0.025392  0.9765  1.07606
LULAC2005.txt           1.01879   0.023834  0.9721  1.06551
LULAC2006.txt           1.03640   0.023289  0.9908  1.08205
LULAC2007.txt           1.03804   0.023095  0.9928  1.08330
LULAC2008.txt           1.01280   0.023345  0.9670  1.05856
LULAC2009.txt           1.03359   0.025971  0.9827  1.08450
LULAC2010.txt           0.99780   0.024611  0.9496  1.04604
LULAC2011.txt           0.87808   0.022604  0.8338  0.92238
LULAC2012.txt           0.90563   0.022796  0.8609  0.95030
LULAC2013.txt           0.88451   0.022061  0.8413  0.92775
REP.1992.txt           -1.22259   0.004363 -1.2311 -1.21404
REP.2000.txt           -1.20368   0.004331 -1.2122 -1.19519
REP.2004.txt           -1.27344   0.002724 -1.2788 -1.26811
REP.2008.txt           -1.06978   0.007832 -1.0851 -1.05443
REP.2012.txt           -1.10342   0.006461 -1.1161 -1.09076
DEM.1992.txt           -1.14368   0.010657 -1.1646 -1.12279
DEM.1996.txt           -1.18503   0.006407 -1.1976 -1.17247
DEM.2000.txt           -1.11475   0.007140 -1.1287 -1.10076
DEM.2004.txt           -1.18561   0.006426 -1.1982 -1.17301
DEM.2008.txt           -1.05661   0.007635 -1.0716 -1.04164
DEM.2012.txt           -1.12173   0.006563 -1.1346 -1.10887
```

4.7 LULAC IIA, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, stemmed

```
> lulac2stemmeddata<-wfm("lulac-2-stemmed.csv")
> lulac2stemmedresults<-wordfish(lulac2stemmeddata,c(1,2))
> lulac2stemmedresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac2stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                      Estimate Std. Error   Lower     Upper
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt     -1.1349   0.003432 -1.1417 -1.128221
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt -0.1138   0.030536 -0.1737 -0.053980
LULAC1994.txt          -0.2255   0.116758 -0.4543  0.003365
LULAC1997.txt           0.6473   0.035126  0.5785  0.716152
LULAC1998.txt           0.5848   0.032457  0.5212  0.648448
LULAC1999.txt           0.6775   0.030238  0.6183  0.736798
LULAC2000.txt           0.7534   0.033939  0.6869  0.819899
LULAC2002.txt           0.9567   0.033699  0.8906  1.022744
LULAC2003.txt           1.0577   0.027968  1.0029  1.112555
LULAC2004.txt           1.0537   0.025851  1.0030  1.104379
LULAC2005.txt           1.0468   0.024251  0.9993  1.094322
LULAC2006.txt           1.0646   0.023710  1.0181  1.111090
LULAC2007.txt           1.0664   0.023513  1.0203  1.112449
LULAC2008.txt           1.0421   0.023733  0.9956  1.088647
LULAC2009.txt           1.0638   0.026413  1.0120  1.115542
LULAC2010.txt           1.0283   0.024992  0.9793  1.077243
LULAC2011.txt           0.9074   0.022875  0.8626  0.952260
LULAC2012.txt           0.9363   0.023073  0.8911  0.981554
LULAC2013.txt           0.9136   0.022332  0.8699  0.957408
REP.1992.txt           -1.1691   0.003685 -1.1763 -1.161863
REP.1996.txt           -1.1382   0.004363 -1.1468 -1.129685
REP.2000.txt           -1.1524   0.003657 -1.1595 -1.145194
```

```
REP.2004.txt            -1.2077   0.002396 -1.2124 -1.202959
REP.2008.txt            -1.0434   0.006489 -1.0562 -1.030717
REP.2012.txt            -1.0706   0.005353 -1.0811 -1.060075
DEM.1992.txt            -1.0936   0.009175 -1.1116 -1.075632
DEM.1996.txt            -1.1298   0.005555 -1.1407 -1.118924
DEM.2000.txt            -1.0658   0.006174 -1.0779 -1.053665
DEM.2004.txt            -1.1231   0.005746 -1.1344 -1.111851
DEM.2008.txt            -1.0060   0.006706 -1.0192 -0.992907
DEM.2012.txt            -1.0574   0.005918 -1.0690 -1.045771
```

4.8 LULAC IIA, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed

```
> lulac2data<-wfm("lulac-2.csv")
> lulac2results<-wordfish(lulac2data,c(1,2))
> lulac2results
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = lulac2data, dir = c(1, 2))

Document Positions:
                      Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt     -1.1340   0.002989 -1.1398 -1.1281
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt -0.2133   0.027177 -0.2666 -0.1601
LULAC1994.txt          -0.3677   0.100315 -0.5643 -0.1711
LULAC1997.txt           0.5755   0.032349  0.5121  0.6389
LULAC1998.txt           0.5094   0.029799  0.4510  0.5678
LULAC1999.txt           0.6091   0.027892  0.5544  0.6637
LULAC2000.txt           0.6883   0.031309  0.6270  0.7497
LULAC2002.txt           0.9242   0.030950  0.8635  0.9849
LULAC2003.txt           1.0797   0.025151  1.0304  1.1290
LULAC2004.txt           1.0737   0.023222  1.0282  1.1192
LULAC2005.txt           1.0893   0.021574  1.0470  1.1315
LULAC2006.txt           1.1061   0.021111  1.0647  1.1475
LULAC2007.txt           1.1100   0.020901  1.0690  1.1509
LULAC2008.txt           1.0824   0.021055  1.0411  1.1237
LULAC2009.txt           1.1072   0.023458  1.0612  1.1532
LULAC2010.txt           1.0692   0.022284  1.0255  1.1128
LULAC2011.txt           0.9182   0.020672  0.8777  0.9587
LULAC2012.txt           0.9579   0.020774  0.9172  0.9986
LULAC2013.txt           0.9306   0.020135  0.8911  0.9700
REP.1992.txt           -1.1555   0.003486 -1.1623 -1.1486
REP.1996.txt           -1.1453   0.003693 -1.1526 -1.1381
REP.2000.txt           -1.1354   0.003445 -1.1422 -1.1287
REP.2004.txt           -1.1898   0.002391 -1.1945 -1.1851
REP.2008.txt           -1.0475   0.005539 -1.0583 -1.0366
REP.2012.txt           -1.0767   0.004550 -1.0856 -1.0678
DEM.1992.txt           -1.0674   0.008531 -1.0841 -1.0507
DEM.1996.txt           -1.1151   0.005059 -1.1250 -1.1052
DEM.2000.txt           -1.0380   0.005712 -1.0492 -1.0268
DEM.2004.txt           -1.0839   0.005687 -1.0951 -1.0728
DEM.2008.txt           -0.9722   0.006179 -0.9843 -0.9601
DEM.2012.txt           -1.0327   0.005407 -1.0433 -1.0222
```

5. TGD

5.1 Dataset, not stemmed (cdu/csu98= negative, tgd98 = positive)

```
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/TGD/filtered")
> TGDdata<-wfm("TGD.csv")
> TGDresults<-wordfish(TGDdata,c(2,33))
```

```
> TGDresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = TGDdata, dir = c(2, 33))

Document Positions:
                  Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
CDUCSU1994.txt     -0.8354   0.006893 -0.8489 -0.8218
CDUCSU1998.txt     -0.8267   0.008942 -0.8442 -0.8092
CDUCSU2002.txt     -0.8140   0.006329 -0.8264 -0.8016
CDUCSU2005.txt     -0.8129   0.008669 -0.8299 -0.7959
CDUCSU2009.txt     -0.8006   0.005752 -0.8118 -0.7893
CDUCSU2013.txt     -0.7540   0.005565 -0.7649 -0.7431
DieGruenen1994.txt -0.5439   0.011191 -0.5658 -0.5219
DieGruenen1998.txt -0.7379   0.006708 -0.7510 -0.7247
DieGruenen2002.txt -0.7536   0.007593 -0.7685 -0.7387
DieGruenen2005.txt -0.7181   0.008374 -0.7346 -0.7017
DieGruenen2009.txt -0.6443   0.007513 -0.6590 -0.6295
DieGruenen2013.txt -0.6235   0.006119 -0.6355 -0.6115
PDS1994.txt        -0.6024   0.016500 -0.6347 -0.5701
PDS1998.txt        -0.6087   0.009770 -0.6278 -0.5895
PDS2002.txt        -0.6876   0.011660 -0.7104 -0.6647
DieLinke2005.txt   -0.6985   0.015348 -0.7286 -0.6684
DieLinke2009.txt   -0.6861   0.009921 -0.7055 -0.6666
DieLinke2013.txt   -0.6180   0.008277 -0.6342 -0.6018
FDP1994.txt        -0.8767   0.002953 -0.8825 -0.8709
FDP1998.txt        -0.8401   0.004991 -0.8499 -0.8303
FDP2002.txt        -0.8806   0.003351 -0.8872 -0.8741
FDP2005.txt        -0.8864   0.003983 -0.8942 -0.8786
FDP2009.txt        -0.8956   0.003211 -0.9019 -0.8893
FDP2013.txt        -0.8083   0.004785 -0.8177 -0.7989
SPD1994.txt        -0.7943   0.008100 -0.8101 -0.7784
SPD1998.txt        -0.8540   0.005629 -0.8650 -0.8429
SPD2002.txt        -0.7786   0.007203 -0.7928 -0.7645
SPD2005.txt        -0.8158   0.007934 -0.8313 -0.8002
SPD2009.txt        -0.7854   0.006176 -0.7975 -0.7733
SPD2013.txt        -0.7283   0.006150 -0.7404 -0.7163
TGD1996.txt         1.0345   0.125216  0.7890  1.2799
TGD1997.txt         0.9148   0.032254  0.8516  0.9781
TGD1998.txt         1.5217   0.073634  1.3773  1.6660
TGD1999.txt         1.3040   0.053238  1.1996  1.4083
TGD2000.txt         1.0325   0.053870  0.9269  1.1381
TGD2001.txt         1.2230   0.037827  1.1488  1.2971
TGD2002.txt         0.8920   0.053624  0.7869  0.9971
TGD2003.txt         1.2095   0.050482  1.1105  1.3084
TGD2004.txt         0.9325   0.052674  0.8292  1.0357
TGD2005.txt         0.9958   0.047908  0.9019  1.0897
TGD2006.txt         1.4534   0.015051  1.4239  1.4829
TGD2007.txt         1.4923   0.012727  1.4674  1.5173
TGD2008.txt         1.4762   0.012302  1.4521  1.5003
TGD2009.txt         1.4671   0.012263  1.4431  1.4911
TGD2010.txt         1.5001   0.011705  1.4771  1.5230
TGD2011.txt         1.5195   0.012709  1.4946  1.5444
TGD2012.txt         1.4794   0.012144  1.4556  1.5032
TGD2013.txt         1.4103   0.011374  1.3880  1.4326
```

5.2 Dataset, stemmed (cdu/csu98= negative, tgd98 = positive)

```
> require(austin)
Loading required package: austin
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/TGD/filtered")
```

```
> TGDstemmeddata<-wfm("TGD-stemmed.csv")
> TGDstemmedresults<-wordfish(TGDstemmeddata,c(2,33))
> TGDstemmedresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = TGDstemmeddata, dir = c(2, 33))

Document Positions:
                  Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper
CDUCSU1994.txt     -0.8307   0.006977 -0.8444 -0.8170
CDUCSU1998.txt     -0.8111   0.009624 -0.8299 -0.7922
CDUCSU2002.txt     -0.7993   0.006778 -0.8126 -0.7860
CDUCSU2005.txt     -0.8250   0.008044 -0.8407 -0.8092
CDUCSU2009.txt     -0.7939   0.005969 -0.8056 -0.7822
CDUCSU2013.txt     -0.7485   0.005820 -0.7599 -0.7371
DieGruenen1994.txt -0.5890   0.011117 -0.6108 -0.5672
DieGruenen1998.txt -0.7162   0.007327 -0.7305 -0.7018
DieGruenen2002.txt -0.7571   0.007655 -0.7721 -0.7421
DieGruenen2005.txt -0.7321   0.008301 -0.7484 -0.7158
DieGruenen2009.txt -0.6783   0.007370 -0.6927 -0.6638
DieGruenen2013.txt -0.6558   0.006064 -0.6677 -0.6439
DieLinke2005.txt   -0.6991   0.015823 -0.7301 -0.6680
DieLinke2009.txt   -0.6716   0.010643 -0.6925 -0.6507
DieLinke2013.txt   -0.6276   0.008532 -0.6443 -0.6109
FDP1994.txt        -0.8848   0.002671 -0.8900 -0.8796
FDP1998.txt        -0.8510   0.004553 -0.8600 -0.8421
FDP2002.txt        -0.8866   0.003110 -0.8927 -0.8805
FDP2005.txt        -0.8919   0.003705 -0.8992 -0.8847
FDP2009.txt        -0.9008   0.002989 -0.9067 -0.8949
FDP2013.txt        -0.8370   0.004030 -0.8449 -0.8291
PDS1994.txt        -0.5757   0.017880 -0.6108 -0.5407
PDS1998.txt        -0.5717   0.010666 -0.5926 -0.5508
PDS2002.txt        -0.6769   0.012386 -0.7012 -0.6526
SPD1994.txt        -0.7911   0.008207 -0.8072 -0.7750
SPD1998.txt        -0.8370   0.006199 -0.8492 -0.8249
SPD2002.txt        -0.7723   0.007496 -0.7870 -0.7577
SPD2005.txt        -0.8127   0.008046 -0.8285 -0.7970
SPD2009.txt        -0.7830   0.006332 -0.7954 -0.7706
SPD2013.txt        -0.7330   0.006228 -0.7452 -0.7208
TGD1996.txt         1.1379   0.114979  0.9126  1.3633
TGD1997.txt         0.8929   0.031811  0.8306  0.9553
TGD1998.txt         1.4405   0.070502  1.3023  1.5787
TGD1999.txt         1.3373   0.049405  1.2405  1.4342
TGD2000.txt         1.0199   0.051545  0.9189  1.1209
TGD2001.txt         1.1876   0.036543  1.1160  1.2592
TGD2002.txt         0.9404   0.052013  0.8385  1.0424
TGD2003.txt         1.2327   0.048150  1.1383  1.3271
TGD2004.txt         0.9531   0.051179  0.8528  1.0534
TGD2005.txt         1.0415   0.045992  0.9513  1.1316
TGD2006.txt         1.4400   0.014431  1.4117  1.4683
TGD2007.txt         1.4823   0.012173  1.4585  1.5062
TGD2008.txt         1.4662   0.011765  1.4432  1.4893
TGD2009.txt         1.4601   0.011740  1.4371  1.4831
TGD2010.txt         1.4876   0.011193  1.4657  1.5096
TGD2011.txt         1.4898   0.012270  1.4658  1.5139
TGD2012.txt         1.4525   0.011734  1.4295  1.4755
TGD2013.txt         1.3951   0.010954  1.3737  1.4166
```

6. BLL

```
require(austin)
Loading required package: austin
```

```
Loading required package: numDeriv
> setwd("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/Japanese/bll/filtered")
> blldata<-wfm("bll.csv")
> bllresults<-wordfish(blldata,c(24,8))
> bllresults
Call:
        wordfish(wfm = blldata, dir = c(24, 8))

Document Positions:
                  Estimate Std. Error     Lower     Upper
BLL2003.txt       0.4803086   0.002493   0.47542  0.485195
BLL2004.txt       0.4952377   0.001613   0.49208  0.498398
BLL2005.txt       0.4950171   0.001211   0.49264  0.497391
BLL2006.txt       0.4716039   0.001111   0.46943  0.473782
BLL2007.txt       0.4919513   0.001218   0.48956  0.494339
BLL2008.txt       0.5002426   0.001361   0.49758  0.502909
BLL2009.txt       0.5209648   0.003283   0.51453  0.527399
BLL1998.txt       0.4977378   0.001318   0.49515  0.500321
BLL1999.txt       0.4854505   0.001383   0.48274  0.488161
BLL2000.txt       0.4824708   0.001435   0.47966  0.485284
BLL2001.txt       0.5099338   0.001268   0.50745  0.512420
BLL2002.txt       0.4966989   0.001641   0.49348  0.499915
DPJ.2003.txt      0.3531598   0.002446   0.34837  0.357954
DPJ.2004.txt      0.3550276   0.002282   0.35056  0.359500
DPJ.2005.txt      0.3564270   0.001939   0.35263  0.360228
DPJ.2007.txt      0.3562120   0.002366   0.35158  0.360849
DPJ.2009.txt      0.3359540   0.002956   0.33016  0.341748
DPJ.2010.txt      0.3512346   0.003593   0.34419  0.358276
DPJ.2012.txt      0.3341286   0.002957   0.32833  0.339924
DPJ.2013.txt      0.3589234   0.003548   0.35197  0.365878
DPJ.1998.txt      0.3370232   0.005182   0.32687  0.347180
DPJ.2000.txt      0.3370232   0.005182   0.32687  0.347180
DPJ.2001.txt      0.3563055   0.002238   0.35192  0.360692
LDP_1998         -0.0689635   0.008080  -0.08480 -0.053127
LDP_2000         -0.1035728   0.005406  -0.11417 -0.092978
LDP_2001         -0.0758820   0.005325  -0.08632 -0.065444
LDP_2003         -0.0515788   0.016822  -0.08455 -0.018609
LDP_2004         -0.0460098   0.007784  -0.06127 -0.030753
LDP_2005         -0.2701283   0.014128  -0.29782 -0.242438
LDP_2007         -0.3379355   0.034819  -0.40618 -0.269691
LDP_2009          0.0050063   0.040855  -0.07507  0.085080
LDP_2010         -0.1090339   0.005351  -0.11952 -0.098546
LDP_2012         -0.0541811   0.004076  -0.06217 -0.046192
LDP_2013         -0.0387474   0.003530  -0.04567 -0.031830
NK_1998          -0.3864703   0.029769  -0.44482 -0.328123
NK_2000          -0.1622615   0.020059  -0.20158 -0.122947
NK_2001          -0.0580986   0.005609  -0.06909 -0.047105
NK_2003          -1.2241612   0.213700  -1.64301 -0.805316
NK_2005          -0.3263651   0.022441  -0.37035 -0.282381
NK_2007          -0.2731218   0.016382  -0.30523 -0.241013
NK_2009          -0.1254779   0.005789  -0.13682 -0.114131
NK_2010          -0.1074076   0.005012  -0.11723 -0.097584
NNP_2007          0.1700213   0.046172   0.07953  0.260517
NNP_2009          0.0938949   0.033221   0.02878  0.159006
PNP_2005          0.1519768   0.024657   0.10365  0.200303
Restoration 2012 -5.9999285   2.355043 -10.61573 -1.384129
SDP_1998         -0.0689635   0.008080  -0.08480 -0.053127
SDP_2000         -0.0152442   0.005034  -0.02511 -0.005378
SDP_2003         -0.0073485   0.004571  -0.01631  0.001611
SDP_2004         -0.4079334   0.100256  -0.60443 -0.211436
SDP_2005          0.0053431   0.036237  -0.06568  0.076366
SDP_2007         -0.5567968   0.091484  -0.73610 -0.377491
```

```
SDP_2010          -0.0833435   0.006404  -0.09589 -0.070792
SDP_2012          -0.0622817   0.005540  -0.07314 -0.051423
YP_2010            0.0006278   0.010132  -0.01923  0.020485
YP_2012           -0.0488472   0.010982  -0.07037 -0.027322
```

7. *A.1: Total population and employment U.S. 1960-2013*

	Tot. population	**E 1**	**E 2**	**E3**	**PT 1**	**PT 2**
1960	180671	53418	7935	45483	6845	2855
1961	183691	53601	8175	45426	7121	3142
1962	186537	54963	8691	46272	7527	2661
1963	189241	56387	9082	47305	7746	2620
1964	191888	58026	9350	48676	8155	2455
1965	194302	60031	9608	50423	8466	2209
1966	196560	62362	10323	52039	8112	1960
1967	198712	64848	11146	53702	8701	2163
1968	200706	66519	11590	54929	9075	1970
1969	202676	68528	12025	56503	9652	2056
1970	205052	69491	12431	57059	9999	2446
1971	207660	70120	12799	57321	10152	2688
1972	209896	72785	13393	59393	10612	2648
1973	211908	75580	13655	61925	10972	2554
1974	213853	77094	14124	62970	11153	2988
1975	215973	76249	14675	61575	11228	3804
1976	218035	79175	15132	64044	11607	3607
1977	220239	82121	15361	66759	12120	3608
1978	222584	85753	15525	70228	12650	3516
1979	225055	88222	15635	72587	12893	3577
1980	227224	88525	15912	72612	13067	4321
1981	229465	89543	15689	73853	13025	4768
1982	231664	88462	15516	72945	12953	6170
1983	233791	89500	15537	73963	12911	6266
1984	235824	93565	15770	77794	13169	5744
1985	237923	95871	16031	79841	13489	5590
1986	240132	98299	16342	81957	13935	5588
1987	242288	100771	16800	83970	14395	5401
1988	244498	103021	17114	85907	14963	5206
1989	246819	105259	17469	87790	15393	4894
1990	249464	106598	17769	88829	15341	5204
1991	252153	105373	17934	87438	15172	6161
1992	255029	106437	18136	88301	14918	6520
1993	257782	107966	18579	89387	15240	6481
1994	260327	110517	18293	92224	17638	4625
1995	262803	112448	18362	94086	17734	4473
1996	265228	114171	18217	95954	17770	4315
1997	267783	116983	18131	98852	18149	4068
1998	270248	119019	18383	100637	18530	3665
1999	272690	121323	18903	102420	18758	3357
2000	281424	125114	19248	105866	18814	3227
2001	284968	125407	19335	106072	18790	3715
2002	287625	125156	19636	105521	18843	4213

2003	290107	126015	19634	106381	19014	4701
2004	292805	127463	19983	107480	19380	4567
2005	295516	129931	20357	109573	19491	4350
2006	298379	132449	20337	112111	19591	4162
2007	301231	134283	21003	113280	19756	4401
2008	304093	133882	21258	112624	19343	5875
2009	306771	128713	21178	107535	18710	8913
2010	310339	127914	21003	106911	18251	8874
2011	312602	128934	20536	108398	18334	8560
2012	314687	131452	20360	111093	18806	8122
2013	NA	133111	20247	112864	NA	7935

Tot. Pop.: Total U.S. population
E 1: Nonagriculture, Wage and Salary Workers Total population and employment U.S. 1960-2013 (in thousands)
E 2: Employment Level - Nonagriculture, Government Wage and Salary Workers
E 3: Employment Level - Nonagriculture, Private Industries Wage and Salary Workers
PT 1: Work Part Time Noneconomic Reasons
PT 2: Persons at Work 1-34 Hours, Economic Reasons, All Industries
Sources: Population Estimates Program, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor

8. *A.2: Employed population per sector in Germany*

Year	**Total Employed population (in thousands)**	**Percentage active in Agricultural**	**Percentage active in Goods-producing / secondary economy**	**Percentage active in Service-providing / tertiary economy**
2013	42 281	1,5	24,7	73,8
2012	42 033	1,6	24,7	73,7
2011	41 570	1,6	24,6	73,8
2010	41 020	1,6	24,5	73,9
2009	40 892	1,6	24,8	73,5
2008	40 856	1,6	25,3	73,1
2007	40 325	1,7	25,2	73,2
2006	39 635	1,6	25,2	73,1
2005	39 326	1,7	25,7	72,6
2004	39 337	1,8	26,2	72,0
2003	39 200	1,8	26,8	71,4
2002	39 630	1,8	27,4	70,9
2001	39 809	1,8	28,0	70,1
2000	39 917	1,9	28,5	69,6
1999	39 031	2,0	29,1	68,9
1998	38 407	2,0	29,9	68,1
1997	37 947	2,1	30,4	67,5
1996	37 969	2,1	31,1	66,8
1995	37 958	2,3	32,0	65,8
1994	37 798	2,4	32,4	65,1
1993	37 786	2,5	33,3	64,2
1992	38 283	2,7	34,4	62,9
1991	38 790	3,0	35,7	61,3
1990	30 409	3,5	36,6	59,9
1989	29 480	3,7	36,7	59,6
1988	28 937	3,9	36,9	59,2

1987	28 531	4,1	37,3	58,6
1986	28 138	4,3	37,8	57,9
1985	27 608	4,4	38,1	57,5
1984	27 226	4,6	38,5	56,9
1983	26 993	4,8	38,9	56,3
1982	27 241	4,9	39,6	55,5
1981	27 453	5,0	40,5	54,5
1980	27 420	5,1	41,1	53,8
1979	26 968	5,3	41,2	53,6
1978	26 457	5,7	41,3	53,0
1977	26 198	5,9	41,8	52,4
1976	26 139	6,2	41,8	52,1
1975	26 248	6,6	42,4	51,0
1974	26 924	6,8	44,0	49,1
1973	27 181	7,1	44,9	47,9
1972	26 857	7,5	45,2	47,2
1971	26 710	7,9	46,1	46,0
1970	26 589	8,4	46,5	45,1
1969	26 228	9,1	48,5	42,3
1968	25 826	9,8	47,7	42,5
1967	25 804	10,2	47,5	42,3
1966	26 673	10,5	48,8	40,7
1965	26 755	10,7	49,2	40,1
1964	26 604	11,3	48,8	39,9
1963	26 581	11,8	48,6	39,5
1962	26 518	12,5	48,7	38,8
1961	26 426	13,1	48,5	38,5
1960	26 063	13,7	47,9	38,3

Source: DESTASIS (2014)

9. *A.3: Employed population per sector in Germany (in thousands)*

	Goods-producing	**Service-providing**	**Agr.**	**Public service**	**total**	**Unemployed**	**T + D**
1989	20830	36940	4130	NA	61900	1340	5030
1990	21120	37890	3920	NA	62930	1300	5190
1991	21630	38660	3880	NA	64170	1370	5250
1992	21880	38930	3790	NA	64600	1550	5300
1993	21790	39500	3430	NA	64720	1870	5450
1994	21320	39800	3410	NA	64530	1900	5460
1995	21080	40050	3330	NA	64460	2280	5530
1996	21290	40480	3250	NA	65020	2270	5680
1997	20980	41420	3210	NA	65520	2390	6000
1998	20520	41170	3100	NA	64790	3000	6190
1999	19930	41600	3030	NA	64560	3150	6310
2000	19560	42120	2940	NA	64620	3250	6710
2001	18680	42230	2910	NA	63820	3660	6920
2002	18110	40290	2310	2200	62910	3600	7270
2003	17880	40790	2130	2270	63070	3270	7370
2004	17240	41380	2160	2280	63060	2960	7460
2005	17140	41760	2060	2210	63170	2910	7620

2006	17320	42030	2110	2190	63650	2660	7700
2007	17110	42500	2270	2270	64150	2510	7730
2008	16790	42200	2230	2370	63590	2920	7600
2009	16060	42130	2160	2250	62600	3410	7540
2010	15610	42880	2060	2220	62770	3210	7600
2011	15370	43030	1980	2280	62660	2970	7590
2012	14780	43260	1900	2340	62280	2800	7600
2013	15310	43570	1920	2390	63190	2440	4720

Source: JMIAC (2014)
Agr.: Agricultural sector; NA: not available separately, subsumed in service-sector; T + D: Temporary and day laborers; Total (total Goods-producing, Service-providing, Agricultural, and public service jobs) [137]

10. Discrepancies scores identity-interest organizations and parties (Chapter 5)

10.1 Score discrepancies for AFL-CIO dataset I, not stemmed

0.93796 DEM.1960
0.83097 DEM.1964
1.11357 DEM.1968
1.39422(afl71/dem68)
0.85062 DEM.1972
1.13705(afl73/dem72)
1.19815(afl75/dem72)
0.93596 DEM.1976
1.15517(afl77/dem76)
1.16518(afl79/dem76)
0.99807 DEM.1980
1.32141(afl81/dem80)
1.37178(afl83/dem80)
1.43598 DEM.1984
1.70034(afl85/dem84)
1.70844(afl87/dem84)
2.02680(afl89) DEM.1988
2.01149(afl91/dem88)
2.24599(afl93) DEM.1992
2.30343(afl95/dem92)
2.64718(afl97) DEM.1996
2.57380(afl99/dem96)
2.19473(afl2001) DEM.2000
2.32652(afl2005) DEM.2004
2.31226(afl2009) DEM.2008
2.37551(afl2013) DEM.2012

0.97365 REP.1960
1.57965 REP.1964
1.07222 REP.1968
1.35287 (Afl71/dem68)

[137][137] All numbers are rounded down to zero because the original tables follow the convention of displaying multiples per ten thousand instead of per thousand.

1.28033 REP.1972
1.56676(afl73/Rep72)
1.62786(afl75/Rep72)
1.38622 REP.1976
1.60543 (afl77/Rep76)
1.61244(afl79/Rep76)
1.44398 REP.1980
1.76732 (afl81/rep80)
1.81769(afl83/rep 80)
1.70952 REP.1984
1.97388(afl85/rep 84)
1.98198(afl87/rep 84)
2.21099(afl89) REP.1988
2.19568(afl91/rep 88)
2.42925(afl93) REP.1992
2.48669(afl95/rep 92)
2.39781(afl97) REP.1996
2.32381(afl99/rep 96)
2.25342 Afl2001/REP.2000
2.83283 Afl2005/REP.2004
2.31278 Afl2009/REP.2008
2.5661 Afl2013/REP.2012

10.2 Score discrepancies for DGB dataset, not stemmed

0.74501 Dgb62 CDU1961
1.13696 Dgb66 CDU1965
0.32330 Dgb66 CDU1969
0.55932 Dgb66 CSU1969
0.45149 Dgb72 CDU1972
0.43400 Dgb75 CDU.CSU1976
2.25744 Dgb78 CDU.CSU1980
2.22195 Dgb82 CDU.CSU1983
2.22211 Dgb86 CDU.CSU1987
2.21541 Dgb90 CSU1990
2.21888 Dgb90 CDU1990
2.11825 Dgb94 CDU.CSU1994
2.20372 Dgb98 CDU.CSU1998
2.12469 Dgb02 CDU.CSU2002
2.12006 Dgb06 CDU.CSU2005
2.10537 Dgb10 CDU.CSU2009
0.33686 Dgb10 CDU.CSU2013

0.37270 Dgb62 SPD1961
0.18368 Dgb66 SPD1965
0.33389 Dgb66 SPD1969
0.28875 Dgb72 SPD1972
0.39954 Dgb75 SPD1976
2.25343 Dgb78 SPD1980
2.23965 Dgb82 SPD1983
2.22729 Dgb86 SPD1987
2.21334 Dgb90 SPD1990
2.11113 Dgb94 SPD1994
2.20789 Dgb98 SPD1998
2.10568 Dgb02 SPD2002

2.09323 Dgb06 SPD2005
2.08937 Dgb10 SPD2009
0.24108 Dgb10 SPD2013

0.26917 Dgb62 FDP1961
0.25519 Dgb66 FDP1961
0.51179 Dgb69 FDP1969
0.28319 Dgb75 FDP1976
2.26084 Dgb78 FDP1980
2.24265 Dgb82 FDP1983
2.22178 Dgb86 FDP1987
2.22314 Dgb90 FDP1990
2.10914 Dgb94 FDP1994
2.21060 Dgb98 FDP1998
2.12106 Dgb02 FDP2002
2.19120 Dgb06 FDP2005
2.11674 Dgb10 FDP2009
0.28631 Dgb10 FDP2013

0.18431 Dgb78 DieGruenen1980
2.22759 Dgb82 DieGruenen1983
2.26770 Dgb86 DieGruenen1987
0.19880 Dgb90 DieGruenen1990
0.18554 Dgb94 DieGruenen1994
0.18315 Dgb98 DieGruenen1998
0.28534 Dgb02 DieGruenen2002
0.32279 Dgb06 DieGruenen2005
0.26925 Dgb10 DieGruenen2009
0.22191 Dgb10 DieGruenen2013

2.20615 dgb90 PDS1990
2.06825 Dgb94 PDS1994
2.19743 Dgb98 PDS1998
2.11263 Dgb02 PDS2002
0.16199 Dgb06 DieLinke2005
2.09408 Dgb10 DieLinke2009
0.14781 Dgb10 DieLinke2013

10.3 Score discrepancies for RENGO

0.56917 LDP_1998
0.61341 LDP_2000
0.58397 LDP_2001
0.58697 LDP_2003
0.53304 LDP_2004
0.79499 LDP_2005
0.83547 LDP_2007
0.55999 LDP_2009
0.63187 LDP_2010
0.54912 LDP_2012
0.53747 LDP_2013

0.09263 DPJ_1998

0.10687 DPJ_2000
0.09893 DPJ_2001
0.11249 DPJ_2003
0.11425 DPJ_2004
0.12981 DPJ_2005
0.10326 DPJ_2007
0.11237 DPJ_2009
0.10588 DPJ_2010
0.10416 DPJ_2012
0.08793 DPJ_2013

0.79450 NK_1998
0.67108 NK_2000
0.57323 NK_2001
0.91085 NK_2003
0.80338 NK_2005
0.74597 NK_2007
0.62900 NK_2009
0.62893 NK_2010

0.56917 SDP_1998
0.51248 SDP_2000
0.53598 SDP_2003
0.83018 SDP_2004
0.55779 SDP_2005
0.90466 SDP_2007
0.60159 SDP_2010
0.56976 SDP_2012

0.37790 NNP_2007
0.42698 NNP_2009

0.38994 PNP_2005

6.45449 Restoration_2012

0.49680 YP_2010
0.53151 YP_2012

10.4 Score discrepancies for LULAC dataset I, not stemmed

1.6163 Lulac94 REP.1992
1.9115 Lulac95 REP.1996
1.8654 Lulac97 rep96
2.0171 Lulac98 rep96
2.0621 Lulac99 rep96
1.9978 Lulac00 REP.2000
2.0520 Lulac01 rep00
2.0550 Lulac02 rep00
2.0458 Lulac03 rep00
1.9568 Lulac04 REP.2004
1.9948 Lulac05 rep04
1.9807 Lulac06 rep04
1.9780 Lulac07 rep04

1.8784 Lulac08 REP.2008
1.8776 Lulac09 rep08
1.8899 Lulac10 rep08
1.9396 Lulac11 rep08
1.8016 Lulac12 REP.2012

1.6421 Lulac94 DEM.1992
2.0566 Lulac95 DEM.1996
2.0105 Lulac97 dem96
2.1622 Lulac98 dem96
2.2072 Lulac99 dem96
2.1109 Lulac00 DEM.2000
2.1651 Lulac01 dem00
2.1681 Lulac02 dem00
2.1589 Lulac03 dem00
2.1630 Lulac04 DEM.2004
2.2045 Lulac05 dem04
2.1904 Lulac06 dem04
2.1877 Lulac07 dem04
2.0216 Lulac08 DEM.2008
2.0208 Lulac09 dem08
2.0331 Lulac10 dem08
2.0828 Lulac11 dem08
2.1634 Lulac12 DEM.2012

10.5 Score discrepancies for TGD

1.8699 Tgd96 CDUCSU1994
1.7502 Tgd97 C94
2.3484 Tgd98 CDUCSU1998
2.1307 Tgd99 c98
1.8592 Tgd00 c98
2.0497 Tgd01 c98
1.7060 Tgd02 CDUCSU2002
2.0235 Tgd03 c02
1.7465 Tgd04 c02
1.8087 Tgd05 CDUCSU2005
2.2663 Tgd06 c05
2.3052 Tgd07 c05
2.2891 Tgd08 c05
2.2677 Tgd09 CDUCSU2009
2.3007 Tgd10 c09
2.2677 Tgd11 c09
2.2800 Tgd12 c09
2.1643 Tgd13 CDUCSU2013

1.5784 Tgd96 DieGruenen1994
1.4587 Tgd97
2.2596 Tgd98 DieGruenen1998
2.0419 Tgd99
1.7704 Tgd00
1.9609 Tgd01
1.6456 Tgd02 DieGruenen2002
1.9631 Tgd03

1.6861 Tgd04
1.7139 Tgd05 DieGruenen2005
2.1715 Tgd06
2.2104 Tgd07
2.1943 Tgd08
2.1114 Tgd09 DieGruenen2009
2.1444 Tgd10
2.2393 Tgd11
2.1237 Tgd12
2.0338 Tgd13 DieGruenen2013

1.6369 Tgd96 PDS1994
1.5172 Tgd97
2.1304 Tgd98 PDS1998
1.9127 Tgd99
1.6412 Tgd00
1.8317 Tgd01
1.5796 Tgd02 PDS2002
1.8971 Tgd03
1.6201 Tgd04
1.6943 Tgd05 DieLinke2005
2.1519 Tgd06
2.1908 Tgd07
2.1747 Tgd08
2.1532 Tgd09 DieLinke2009
2.1862 Tgd10
2.2056 Tgd11
2.1655 Tgd12
2.0283 Tgd13 DieLinke2013

1.9112 Tgd96 FDP1994
1.7915 Tgd97
2.3618 Tgd98 FDP1998
2.1441 Tgd99
1.8726 Tgd00
2.0631 Tgd01
1.7726 Tgd02 FDP2002
2.0901 Tgd03
1.8131 Tgd04
1.8822 Tgd05 FDP2005
2.3398 Tgd06
2.3787 Tgd07
2.3626 Tgd08
2.3627 Tgd09 FDP2009
2.3957 Tgd10
2.4151 Tgd11
2.3750 Tgd12
2.2186 Tgd13 FDP2013

1.8288 Tgd96 SPD1994
1.7091 Tgd97
2.3757 Tgd98 SPD1998
2.1580 Tgd99
1.8865 Tgd00
2.0770 Tgd01

1.7460 Tgd02 SPD2002
1.9881 Tgd03
1.7111 Tgd04
1.8116 Tgd05 SPD2005
2.2692 Tgd06
2.3503 Tgd07
2.2920 Tgd08
2.2856 Tgd09 SPD2009
2.2855 Tgd10
2.3049 Tgd11
2.2648 Tgd12
2.1386 Tgd13 SPD2013

10.6 Score discrepancies for BLL

0.5667013 LDP_1998
0.5860436 LDP_2000
0.5858158 LDP_2001
0.5318874 LDP_2003
0.5412475 LDP_2004
0.7651454 LDP_2005
0.8298868 LDP_2007
0.5259711 LDP_2009
0.6299987 LDP_2010
0.5751459 LDP_2012
0.5597122 LDP_2013

0.1607146 DPJ_1998
0.1454476 DPJ_2000
0.1530325 DPJ_2001
0.1271488 DPJ_2003
0.1402101 DPJ_2004
0.1385901 DPJ_2005
0.1357393 DPJ_2007
0.1850108 DPJ_2009
0.1697302 (bll09) DPJ.2010
0.1868362 (bll09) DPJ.2012
0.1620414 (bll09) DPJ.2013

0.8842081 NK_1998
0.6447323 NK_2000
0.5680324 NK_2001
1.7044698 NK_2003
0.8213822 NK_2005
0.7650731 NK_2007
0.6464427 NK_2009
0.6283724 (bll09) NK_2010

0.5667013 SDP_1998
0.4977150 SDP_2000
0.4876571 SDP_2003
0.9031711 SDP_2004
0.5003602 SDP_2005
1.0487481 SDP_2007
0.6043083 (bll09) SDP_2010

0.5832465 (bll09) SDP_2012

0.6619726 NNP_2007
0.6148597 NNP_2009
0.5196741 PNP_2005
6.5208933 Restoration_2012

0.5215926 (bll09) YP_2010
0.5698120 (bll09) YP_2012

11 DGB Resolution Categories

DGB - BUNDESKONGRESS

Berlin, 11. - 16. Mai 2014

Empfehlungen der Antragsberatungskommission und ihre Bedeutung

Lfd. Nr.	Empfehlung	Bedeutung
	Grundsatz	Da über Anträge abgestimmt wird, kann ein Antrag grundsätzliche entweder **angenommen** oder **abgelehnt** werden. Bei Anträgen zur Satzung wird dies ganz deutlich.
1.	**Nichtbefassung**	Kann über einen Antrag nicht abgestimmt werden, wird **Nichtbefassung** empfohlen. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn der DGB-Bundeskongress nicht zuständig ist oder der Antrag z.B. fehlerhaft formuliert ist oder das im Antrag angesprochene Ereignis bereits überholt ist. Der Antrag ist dann weder angenommen, noch abgelehnt.
2.	**Erledigt bei Annahme von Antrag**	Liegen wort- oder sinngleiche Anträge vor, lautet die Empfehlung **Erledigt bei Annahme von Antrag ... / bzw. der Anträge.....**
3.	**Ablehnung**	Die Empfehlung **Ablehnung** ist eindeutig und bedarf keiner Erläuterung.
4.	**Annahme**	Die Empfehlung **Annahme** hat mehrere Ausprägungen: Verpflichtet den im Antrag genannten Adressaten, die vom Kongress beschlossenen Meinungen und Maßnahmen umzusetzen. Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Antrages berichten.

5.	**Annahme in geänderter Fassung**[138]	Es wird empfohlen, wenn aus sachlichen Gründen eine Änderung oder Ergänzung des eingereichten Textes durch die ABK notwendig war. Dabei bleibt das Anliegen des Antragsstellers grundsätzlich unverändert. Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Antrages berichten.

Empfehlungen der Antragsberatungskommission und ihre Bedeutung

Lfd. Nr.	Empfehlung	Bedeutung
6.	**Annahme als Material zu Antrag**	Wird gewählt, wenn der Antrag überwiegend oder im weitesten Sinne mit dem Antragsinhalt übereinstimmt, dem er zugeordnet wird. „**Annahme als Material zum Antrag**..." bedeutet, dass nicht

[138] Das kann auch bedeuten, dass nur einzelne Passagen (Absätze) angenommen werden.

		alle Details des Antrages geteilt werden. Der im zugeordneten Antrag genannte Antragsadressat ist verpflichtet, die im Materialantrag genannten Aussagen zu berücksichtigten, soweit sie dem Antragsbegehren im zugeordneten Antrag nicht widersprechen. Die auf anderen Kongressen gewählte Formulierung „Material zum Antrag ...“ meint das gleiche. Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Material-Antrages berichten.
7.	**Annahme als Material an (Gremium)**	z. B. an den Bundesvorstand. Dies ist ein Überweisungsbeschluss. „**Annahme als Material an** ...“ bedeutet, dass für das Antragsbegehren eine Lösung gefunden werden muss. Der Kongress kann die Details oder Folgen jedoch nicht eindeutig übersehen oder entscheiden, z.B. bei Finanzierungsfragen (Hoheit Bundesvorstand oder Bundesausschuss) oder die Details müssen erst genauer geprüft werden. Der Antrag wird also an den Adressaten überwiesen. Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Material-Antrages berichten.

Source: DGB Bundesvorstand (DGB National Headquarters)

Consulted works

1. Secondary Sources

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LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), last accessed June 2014: www. http://lulac.org/

NCLR (National Council of La Raza) homepage, last accessed June 2014: http://www.nclr.org/

DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [German Trade Union Confederation]), last accessed June 2014: http://www.dgb.de/ [English version: http://en.dgb.de/]

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[139] These are merely the official websites of the six interest groups under analysis. Websites of political parties, archives, research institutes, and organizations and institutes affiliated with the above six organizations that were used for this project will be listed in the respective chapters.

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EDUCATION

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore
Doctoral Program in political science, Major field: Comparative Politics, Minor field: International Relations, September 2007 – present – *expected graduation February 2015*

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), Belgium
Faculty ESP Economic, Social and Political Sciences
M.A. in International Relations and Conflict Prevention, with distinction, June 2007

University of Antwerp (UiA), Belgium
M.A. in American Studies (Joint program Universities of Antwerp, Brussels and Ghent), June 2003

University of Vienna, Austria
M.A. (Magister der Philosophie) in Political Science and Scandinavian Studies, with highest distinction, June 2002

University of Bergen (UiB), Norway
Erasmus/Socrates exchange student, with distinction, 1999-2000
Participation in a course provided by the University of Seattle on Norwegian-American Foreign Policy

Free University of Brussels (VUB), Belgium
Candidate (Kandidaat) in Political and Social Sciences, with distinction, June 1999

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS & RESEARCH

Research Interests

Comparative Politics; Organized interests; Democracy and Elections; Political History; Qualitative and Quantitative Methods; Nationalism; Minority Politics; American Politics; European Politics; East Asian Studies; International Relations.

Peer Reviewed Publications

Forthcoming: "Going Postal – Empire Building through Miniature Messages on German and Japanese Stamps," in: *Japan Studies Review: Interdisciplinary Studies of Modern Japan*, Summer 2015

Under Review: "Cleavage Research – The State of a Subfield and its Future."

Manuscripts in Progress

Book project with co-author Hitomi Nakamura (PhD Candidate at Nanzan University, Nagoya); Working title: "Identity fluidity, Pan-Asianism, and the fifteen years war – The case of Kawashima Yoshiko"

"Minorities in contemporary Europe: still bargaining chips in international diplomacy?"

Conference Papers

"Minorities in contemporary Europe: still bargaining chips in international diplomacy?" Paper presented at MPSA: Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 22-25, 2010, and WPSA: Western Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 1-3, 2010 San Francisco

"Identity fluidity, Pan-Asianism, and the fifteen years war – The case of Kawashima Yoshiko" Paper presented at: NPSA: Northeastern Political Science Association Annual Meeting, November 11-13, 2010 Boston; 20th Annual Graduate Student Conference on East Asia at Columbia University, February 4-5, 2011, New York City; Johns Hopkins University: *Eaton E Lattman Graduate Student Community Lecture Series*, October 26, 2010

"Disaffection, Dealignment, and Cleavages in the USA and Japan" Paper presented at NASSS Nagoya American Studies Summer Seminars: International Graduate Student Seminar (IGSA), July 24-27, 2011, Nagoya Japan

"Going Postal – Empire Building through Miniature Messages on German and Japanese Stamps" Paper presented at AAS (The Association for Asian Studies): Annual Conference, March 15-18, 2012, Toronto Canada

"Cleavage Research – The State of a Subfield and its Future." Paper presented at Johns Hopkins University *Twentieth Century Seminar*, September 25, 2013

Magister Thesis

"Das Politische Leben Deutschsprachiger Minderheiten in Ost- und Westeuropa: Fallstudien aus Suedtirol, Nordschleswig und Polen." Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des Titels "Magister der Philosophie") University of Vienna, Austria May 2002.

Research Assistantships

RA to: Professor Mark Blyth Summer 2008, Professor Erin Chung, Summer 2011, Professor Michael Hanchard, Summer 2013

TEACHING

Courses taught at Johns Hopkins University

Government and Politics in the US, Fall 2010, Fall 2011, Spring 2012
A Normal Country? – German Politics and Identity seminar, Fall 2011, Fall 2012
Political Structures of Europe, Winter 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
Comparative Political Institutions, Summer 2014
From Meiji to Manga – Japanese Politics and History, Winter 2015 taught at Nanzan University, Nagoya and Tokyo

Courses taught at UMBC as Adjunct Professor

The Policy-Making Process, Fall 2012, Fall 2013

Teaching assistantships and guest lectures at Johns Hopkins University

Guest lecture on Consociationalism in Prof. Margaret Keck's graduate course: Politics and Territory, Fall 2009
Teaching Assistant to Professor Richard S. Katz: Comparative Political Behavior; including guest-lecture on Belgian Political Behavior, Spring 2008, Spring 2010
Teaching Assistant to Professor Richard S. Katz: Democracy and Elections, Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant to Professor Ginsberg: Introduction to American Politics, Fall 2010

Instructor at Johns Hopkins CTY – Center for Talented Youth

Instructor Model United Nations and Advanced Geography, Summer 2009-2013

OTHER ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

Invited expert on the course of US Presidential and Midterm Elections, November 4, 2009, November 2, 2010, November 6-7, 2012, VTM (Belgian television)
Consulted as expert on the course of US Midterm Elections, November 4, 2014, VTM (Belgian Television)
Key note speaker at: NAGPS (National Association of Graduate-Professional Students) Southeast Regional Conference 2010 at Florida International University, March 11-12, 2010
NAGPS South-East Regional Chair (National Association of Graduate and Professional Students), 2009 – 2010
GRO-Chair, presiding the Graduate Student government GRO, May 2009 – May 2010
Director of Conference: NAGPS Southeast Regional Conference 2011 at Johns Hopkins University, April 8-9, 2011 Baltimore
Graduate student representative for Homewood and SAIS on the JHU Doctor of Philosophy board, Summer 2010 – Fall 2011
Graduate student representative on the Johns Hopkins Diversity Task force, Fall 2011
Graduate student representative at the EAS Program coordination committee, September 2011 – May 2012
Panel Organizer: "The Politics of Japanese National Symbols" AAS (The Association for Asian Studies): Annual Conference, March 15-18, 2012, Toronto Canada

GRANTS and AWARDS

Fulbright IIE Fellowship 2007-2011
Johns Hopkins Fellowship 2007 – present
BAEF (Belgian-American Educational Foundation) Fellowship 2007-2008
Erasmus/Socrates Exchange Fellowship 1999-2000
GRO Conference Grant Spring 2010
NAGPS 2010 – Board of Directors Award
Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences Dean's Teaching Fellowship 2011
NASSS 2011 Travel and board grant
Johns Hopkins Krieger School of Arts and Sciences Dean's Teaching Prize 2012

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Dutch: Native Speaker
German: Native Speaker

English: Fluent (speaking, reading, writing)
French: Fluent (speaking, reading, writing)
Norwegian (Bokmål): Fluent (speaking, reading, writing)
Danish: Reading and Understanding
Swedish: Reading and Understanding
Japanese: beginning level (in progress)

MEMBERSHIPS

AAS – Association for Asian Studies
APSA – American Political Science Association
BAEF Alumni
ECPR – European Consortium for Political Research
Fulbright Alumni Association